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ABSTRACT 
Social and Epistemological Bases of Technology Transfer: the Case 
of Artificial Intelligence 
This thesis addresses a problem in the literature on technology transfer of 
understanding the local appropriation of knowledge. Based on interpretive and 
analytic traditions developed in Science and Technology Studies (STS) and 
ethnomethodology, I conceptualise technology transfer as involving communication 
between discursive communities. I develop the idea of 'performance of community' to 
argue that explanations of research and technology, and readings of those 
explanations, are sites for the elaboration of the identity of a discursive community. 
I explore this approach through a case study in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). 
I focus on what I call 'explanatory practices', that is practices of describing, 
identifying and explaining Al, and trace the differences in these practices, according 
to location,. context and audience. The novelty of my thesis is to show the 
pervasiveness of performance of community within these explanatory practices, 
through showing the differences in the claimed identity and significance of Al, 
associated with different locations, contexts and audiences. 
I draw out some of the implications of my approach by counterposing it to a theory 
of technology transfer as the passing of neutral units of information, which I argue is 
implicit in a complaint made by Al vendors that the Al marketplace had been 
damaged by overselling or hype. In particular, I show that disclaimers of hype 
(more than the perpetration of it) had always been associated with the marketing of 
Al. More generally, my claim is that it is politically important to understand that 
neutral information is not available even as an ultimate standard, and that the local 
appropriation of knowledge is not an aberration to be controlled, but a component of 
both successful and unsuccessful communication between discursive communities. 
3 
CONTENTS 
Chapter One: The interdisciplinary context of discussions of technology 
transfer. 
1.0 Introduction Page 6 
1.1 Evolutionary economics, uncertainty and the evaluation of 
technology Page 11 
1.2 Dissemination, local knowledge and social groups Page 16 
1.3 Conclusion. Technology transfer as communication between 
discursive communities Page 21 
Chapter Two: The case of artificial intelligence, methodology and material 
2.0 Introduction Page 24 
2.1 Methodological issues of a discursively based analysis Page 25 
2.2 Case study: the exploitation of Al Page 29 
23 Ethnographic standpoint and the availability of material Page 32 
2.4 Conclusion. Explanatory practices Page 37 
Chapter Three. How the Al industry construed 'the Problem of Al' 
3.0 Introduction Page 44 
3.1 The Al market: identifying growth and crisis Page 47 
3.2 How Al vendors negotiated the problem of Al Page 53 
3.3 Explaining the problem of Al Page 61 
3.4 Misdescribing and misidentifying: toward a theory of 
technology transfer? Page 66 
3.5 Summary Page 67 
Chapter Four. Narrative and audience: Al acquires a History 
4.0 Introduction Page 69 
4.1 The first Al conference,, the first Al program: history for the 
general reader Page 72 
4.2 'The first Al program' and the scepticism of insiders Page 79 
4.3 Conclusion. Audience as a socio-rhetorical mechanism Page 85 
Chapter Five. United around the symbolic? Alliances in the field 
5.0 Introduction Page 88 
5.1 Al as a cognitive science Page 90 
5.2 From "Al' to 'symbolic AF: history and power Page 96 
5.3 Conclusion. Page 103 
4 
Chapter Six. Reading and interpretation: ascribing intelligence 
6.0 Introduction Page 107 
6.1 Reading and interests: the Al debate Page 108 
6.2 Interpretive flexibility: 'intelligence) as an explanatory resource Page 116 
6.3 Conclusion Page 124 
Chapter Seven: Industrial and political strategies 
7.0 Introduction Page 12 8 
7.1 What computers can do: non-numerical computing for an 
industrial audience Page 130 
7.2 The Fifth Generation as the future of computing Page 137 
7.3 The importance of not being extreme Page 145 
7.4 Conclusion Page 153 
Chapter Eight: Analytic and theoretical conclusions 
8.0 Introduction Page 154 
8.1 The analytic and methodological framework Page 154 
8.2 Major conclusions of the case study Page 156 
8.3 Contributions to the discussion of technology transfer Page 160 
Bibliography Page 165 
Acknowledgments 
With many thanks for their comments and criticism to my supervisors, Steve 
Woolgar and Nfichael Lynch. I am grateful to Geoff Cooper for reading and 
commenting on Chapters One and Two. Thanks also to participants of CRICT 
lunch meetings who provided critical feedback on early versions of several chapters 
of the case study. The material and some of the arguments in this thesis were also 
presented in papers at a University of Bath workshop (Humans, Animals, Machines) 
in July 1995, and a University of Surrey workshop (The Transformation of 
Knowledge)in January 1999; thanks to participants at both those workshops for 
criticism and comments. 
Vaux, J Chapter One 6 
CHAPTERONE 
THE INTERDISCIEPLINARY CONTEXT OF DISCUSSIONS OF 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
1.0 Introduction 
I begin , in this section, by exploring some of the main issues of technology transfer as 
a preliminary to a selective and critical literature survey in sections 1.1 and 1.2. In 
referring to technology transfer in this thesis, I mean a set of questions to do with the 
exploitation of science and technology and the promotion of links between industry, 
academia and government. ' Technology transfer, in this sense, has been an 
increasingly important matter of political concern (realised mainly through research 
funding policies), at least since the 1960s (Faulkner and Senker, 1995; Oakley and 
Owen, 1989; Tisdell, 1981; Webster and Etzkowitz, 1991). At the same time, there 
is some agreement that the conditions of production of science and technology are 
changing and reflect a closer industrial interest in research, with knowledge 
increasingly produced outside traditional university department structures 
(Etzkowitz, Webster and Healey, 1997; Faulkner and Senker; Gibbons et al, 1994). 
Discussions of technology transfer have developed within a number of disciplines, 
including economics, management studies and policy studies. There are relatively few 
sociological studies of technology transfer, but arguments in science and technologies 
studies (STS) about the relationship between the social and the technical are relevant 
to the discussion. In this section I explore the issues as they have been identified 
mainly in non-sociological writings, and conclude by noting some discussions about 
the possible relevance of STS ideas to these issues. 
The issues addressed in academic studies of technology transfer extend over a range 
of topics and disciplinary perspectives, and are frequently located in discussions of 
technological innovation. They include (among other discussions) two major strands 
or sets of questions to do with causality and modelling: whether and/or how 
technological innovations can be said to have economic or social consequences, and 
how the transfer of technology may be modelled. For example, many economics- 
This is largely an issue of 'developed' economies. It contrasts, in particular, to studies of 
technology transfer between 'first' and 'third' world economies, which focus on issues such as the 
development gap (cf Yearley, 1988). 
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based studies (particularly among 'alternative' or 'evolutionary' economists)' start 
from the argument that technological advance causes economic change (Nelson and 
Winter, 1977,1982; Freeman, 1984,1988a and b; Perez, 1983; Freeman and Perez, 
1988; Dosi, 1982,1988). Approaches to modelling technology transfer, often from a 
policy studies perspective , include knowledge-flow models (eg Faulkner and 
Senker) 
and triple helix models (eg Etzkowitz,, Webster and Healey). Questions of causality 
and of modelling are interlinked and counterposed in a number of ways. For example, 
many authors begin with a rejection of the so-called 'linear model' (where 
technological products are conceived as flowing in one direction from research to 
implementation) and discussions of the 'impact' or 'effect" of technological 
innovation may be criticised as involving at least an implicit linear model (Faulkner 
and Senker; Newby, 1992). On the other hand, the perhaps rather obvious 
assumption that technological innovation is economically significant underlies almost 
all approaches to the topic, but is only explicitly argued in some (mostly economic) 
texts (eg Nelson and Winter, and other authors mentioned above). 
The idea that technological innovation brings economic change has been developed to 
suggest the idea of 'strategic technologies' that are particularly critical for economic 
growth. Strategic technologies are sometimes theorised in terms of Kondratiev 'long 
waves" (Freeman, 1982,1984) or 'technological paradigms" (Dosi,, 1984; Freeman 
and Perez, 1988; Perez, 1983,1985). However, the idea of strategic technologies is 
' This approach to economics is broadly neo-Schumpeterian (cf section 1.1, below). Most recent 
discussions usually describe the approach as 'evolutionary economics', a name which (as far as I am 
aware) was coined in Nelson and Winter's (1982) book, An Evolutionary Aeory of Economic 
Change. However, other traditions have fed into the modem literature, including approaches based in 
the idea of Kondratiev 'long waves' (eg Freeman, 1982; 1984) which are sometimes described as 
'alternative' or 'new' economics. 
' Long waves are economic cycles, and it is a matter of dispute among economists whether these 
cycles are detectable in economic data (cf Freeman, 1982; Miles and Robins, 1992) . 
Although 
Kondratiev's name is always associated with long wave theory, it is Schumpeter's (1939) use of the 
idea which is influential. (cf Freeman, 1982, pp 207-8, who also suggests that Kondratiev didn't 
even invent the initial idea which should be attributed to a Dutch Marxist called van Gelderen). 
Miles and Robins (1992, p 8) suggest that the Freeman/Perez version of Kondratiev long waves is the 
most robust of recent conceptualisations. 'Long waves are now interpreted, if considered at all, in 
terms of the succession of "new technology systems" or techno-economic paradigms' associated with 
'technological revolutions". ' 
' The idea of technological paradigms was introduced by Giovanni Dosi, inspired by Kuhn's (1962) 
idea of scientific paradigms. Dosi (1984, p 14) says. - 'In broad analogy with the Kuhnian definition of 
a "scientific paradigm", we shall define a "technological paradigm" as a "model" and a "pattern" of 
solution of selected technological problems, based on selected principles derived from natural sciences 
and on selected material technologies. ' The idea was further developed by Carlotta Perez in the idea 
of a 'techno-economic paradigm', focusing on the ability of socio-economic organisations to match 
the style of the paradigm (Perez, 1983; 1985). Freeman and Perez (1988) relate techno-economic 
paradigms with a version of Kondratiev's long wave theory. 
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politically effective beyond its value for economic theory, as the following passage 
(the opening sentence of Martin and Irvine's influential book Research Foresight 
(1989, p 1)) indicates: 
There is now remarkable international consensus that emerging technologies within 
the fields of electronics, information and communications, advanced materials and 
biotechnology will have a revolutionary impact on both economic activity and 
society more generally over the coming years. These generic technologies are in 
the view of many (eg Freeman and Perez, 1988; Hirooka, 1986) driving a new 
Kondratiev 'long wave' of economic development. [Emphases added] 
One of the problems of strategic technologies is the problem of prediction, or of 
identifying which technologies will turn out to be strategic. Martin and Irvine, and 
others who have taken up the idea of foresight (particularly in the UK government's 
Foresight initiative), attempt to dissolve the problem of prediction through the 
notion of the 'foresight process' (cf Henkel et al, 1999, p 190), that is, discussion of 
alternative future scenarios as the context for identifying a range of possible strategic 
technologies (rather than attempting to predict the technological future in detail). 
This is a more pragmatic approach than informed, say, the fifth generation computing 
programmes' of the early 1980s which identified a single paradigm, artificial 
intelligence, as the future of information technology. Nonetheless, although it may 
provide a means of dealing with the difficulties, strategic scenario planning does not 
entirely dissolve the problem of prediction, and it leaves untouched the question of 
how technologies are evaluated (how actors judge technologies). 
Other approaches to technology transfer do not particularly prioritise strategic 
knowledge, but ask instead about the relations between different sites of knowledge, 
in respect of any sort of exploitable knowledge. For example, in a triple helix 
model') the interest is in analysing new forms of knowledge production as a co- 
production of government, industry and academia. On this approach it is argued (eg 
Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1996, p2 1) that new collaborative institutional forms, 
which are removing the old boundaries between industry and university, act to 
dissolve the problem of technology transfer: 
Knowledge is no longer transferred, but co-developed. 
However while it may indeed be true that some specific local boundaries are 
weakened or even disappear, and while from a normative point of view this may be 
'I discuss fifth generation computing programmes at several points, but especially in Chapter Seven. 
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the best way to do it, it is less clear that it dissolves the general problem. Even if the 
distinction between universities and industrial research labs were to disappear, there 
will still be different social groups with different interests in the knowledge under 
production. ' The question would then still arise, how do these different groups 
relate or communicate? Furthermore, the problem of how different groups relate is 
connected with the question of how technologies are evaluated. This is evident in the 
way in which Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz attempt to dissolve the problem of 
technology transfer. The co-development of knowledge, they suggest, means that 
'code' is shared. And they explicate the idea of 'code sharing' by contrast to a 
situation where code is not shared, in an 'older model' of university-industry 
relations (p 21): 
[The older model] assumes that each of the partners will assess the collaboration 
and negotiation in terms of its own code. ' 
By contrast, newer models of industry-university relations are said to be dynamic, 
unstable and reflexive (p 23): 
The future location of research is expected to be found in the interaction among 
different contexts. 
The triple helix is thus explicitly presented as a destroyer of group identity. 
Technology is no longer 'transferred', because it is produced in temporary 
collaborations which constitute both researcher and client. This conceptual isation 
partly depends on transforming any ideas of local interests, values and knowledge 
(and so on) into local 'codes". a trope that implies that social change is tantamount to 
rewriting computer code. It may be asked whether this does not too easily dismiss 
the differences between social groups in the context of technology transfer. By 
contrast, a knowledge flow model (eg Faulkner and Senker) retains the notion of 
different sites of knowledge in a way that implicitly retains the importance of social 
groups, and also recognises a problem of communication between groups. However, 
because this problem is theorised in terms of a typology of knowledge, it does not 
provide an obvious way of problematising local interests, values and knowledge (I 
return to this point and argue it in more detail in section 1.2). 
6 Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz themselves emphasise (p 22) that 'a triple helix is by nature unstable'. 
' They spell out the relationships of the older model (pp 21-22): 'For example, a university 
department has to balance its relations with relevant partners against teaching obligations, high-level 
publications, and other acaden-fic objectives. The industrial partner is interested in the transfer of 
insights in terms of strategic and operational profits from the perspective of the business, while 
government is expected to orchestrate, but not to intervene in this collaboration. Thus, each partner 
assesses the collaborative efforts in terms of its own institutional codification. ' 
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Some of the problems that I have identified in this section , including questions of the 
evaluation of technology, of communication between social groups and of social 
change, are reflected in sociological discussions in science and technology studies (or 
STS). In particular, problems of technological evaluation may be approached through 
discussions about the social construction of technological identities which already 
raise questions of relations between social groups (cf the discussion in section 1.2, 
below). The affinities between STS and some other approaches to technology 
transfer have been noted in the literature. Faulkner and Senker (p 26) suggest that: 
Policy-oriented research on industry-PSR linkage grew out of the sister fields 
which emerged during the 1 960s - science studies and science policy. 
Van den Belt and Rip (1987, p 136), writing from an STS perspective, claim: 
[B]oth the Nelson-Winter-Dosi model and the social constructivist approach 
developed by Pinch and Bijker share a common inspiration, which can loosely be 
called evolutionary thinking. 
There have been several attempts to show links between evolutionary economics and 
actor network theory (ANT). ' Books such as Technological Change and Company 
Strategies (Coombs et al, 1992) bring together STS authors (such as Donald 
MacKenzie and Michel Callon) with researchers from a variety of policy, 
management and economics backgrounds. ' The editors present the alliance in terms 
of congruences particularly between evolutionary economics and actor networks (p 
8): 
[W]here the evolutionary economist sees a stable natural trajectory, the sociologist 
sees a normalised irreversible techno-economic network: where the evolutionary 
economist sees a radical innovation, the sociologist sees ruptured networks and the 
emergence of new networks. 
However, the claimed alliance is not limited, on the STS side, simply to actor 
networks. In a paper in the same volume, Callon (1992, p 72) talks of the need for 
showing mechanisms of both 'irreversibilisation' and 'reversibilisation", citing as an 
insight into the latter, social shaping and social constructionist approaches in STS 
(specifically Bikjer et al, 1987; MacKenzie and Wajcmann, 1985). 
' Actor network theory is an approach within STS associated with Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, 
John Law and others. 
Callon has also contributed to more specifically economic collections7 for example he has a paper on 
"Variety and irreversibility in networks technique conception and adoption" in a volume called 
Technology and the Wealth of Nations (Foray and Freeman, 1993). 
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In the following two sections of this chapter I survey some discussions selected from 
the literature as being pertinent to the question of a sociological (specifically an STS) 
contribution to discussions of technology transfer, and which also may illuminate 
some issues already noted in this section, to do with the evaluation of technology and 
communication between social groups. In section 1.1, 'Evolutionary economics, 
uncertainty and the evaluation of technology, I explore the way in which the 
uncertainty of technological development is located within the context of an 
economic analysis of the impact of technological innovation. I ask how this 
compares to accounts (in the STS literature) of the uncertainty of technological 
development based in the social shaping of technological identities. In section 1.2, 
'Dissemination, local knowledge and social groups', I ask how the same sort of social 
shaping arguments bear on problems adduced in policy study models of technology 
transfer. I then critically question the social shaping analysis In terms of a challenge 
to the priority of social-group identity, made by Latour (1987). 1 conclude, in 
section 1.3, with a preliminary exploration of the idea that technology transfer may 
be conceptualised as communication between discursive communities. 
1.1 Evolutionary economics, uncertainty and the evaluation of technology 
In the previous section I suggested that contemporary interest in how technological 
innovations are diffused is based on a prior assumption about the wealth-creating 
power of new and advanced technology. This assumption is now ingrained in UK 
and other national policy documents, but appears to be a relatively new idea both in 
policy-making and in mainstream economics (cf Rosenberg 1994). 'o The power of 
technological advance to shape economies has been explicitly argued by alternative 
and evolutionary economists (Nelson and Winter 1977,1982; Freeman 1984; 1988a 
and b; Perez 1983; Freeman and Perez 1988; Dosi 1982; 1988; Coombs et al, 1987; 
1992) The identification of technological advance as a cause of change may be open 
to the criticism, made for example from a 'social shaping' perspective (Bijker et al, 
1989; MacKenzie and WaJcman, 1985), that it fails to grasp the importance of the 
The economic historian Nathan Rosenberg comments at the beginning of his book, Exploring the 
B1ackBox(l994, p9)- 'it is no longer necessary for an economist to apologise when introducing the 
subject of technological change. That is, in itself, a (modest) cause for celebration, since the situation 
was very different as recently as forty years ago. ... Although sympathetic readers of Marx and Schumpeter had learned to attach great importance to technological change as a major impulse - 
perhaps the major impulse - in generating long-term economic growth, such an awareness had not yet 
rubbed off on the dominant academic traditions of western economics. ' 
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social assignation of meaning in determining whether and how technologies are taken 
up. In this section I begin by looking at the way that issues of assessment and 
acquisition of technology are treated within a broad argument for the economic power 
of technological advance, and then explore some issues of uncertainty raised by a 
social shaping critique. 
Arguments for the economic power of technological advance tend to follow 
Schumpeter (1942) who spoke of technological advance as introducing 'gales of 
creative destruction I into an economic system, providing the explanation both of 
destabilisation and of growth. The argument is based on a critique of 'orthodox' or 
4neoclassical' economics which supposes an economic equilibrium. Neo- 
Schumpeterians argue that economic systems are prone to discontinuities and they 
identify technological advance as the cause. In this brief outline of the argument, I 
shall rely mainly on Nelson and Winter's influential book (1982), An Evolutionary 
Theory ofEconomic Change. Nelson and Winter attack, as the two'pillars' of 
orthodox economics, the assumption that firms always act to maximise profits, and 
the hypothesis of an equilibrium in economic systems. Following Schumpeter, they 
see technological advance as the key to discontinuity; and they question traditional 
accounts of the acquisition of technological knowledge, with the help of concepts 
from Herb Simon (1947), Nfichael Polanyl (1967) and others. Nelson and Winter 
(pp 59-65) are particularly critical of the way in which orthodox economics tends to 
treat 'knowledge' as just one more factor of production. In the abstractions of 
orthodox economics, they argue, rational companies can tell what will be the outcome 
of their investment: companies are assumed to be 'all-knowing'. This does not 
mean that actual companies are supposed to know the effects of their choices,, but 
that the market behaves as if they do (this is 'the invisible hand' at work). Nelson 
and Winter (pp 202-4) reply that real firms are not all-knoWing; nor does the 
economy behave as if they were. 
Following Simon (1947), Nelson and Winter replace the orthodox description of 
corporate behaviour (rational selection across a known set of choices) with the idea 
that companies search for solutions in an ill-defined search space. They emphasise 
(pp 171-2) that such searching will be inherently uncertain, that it will be contingent 
on the local historical context, and that it will be Irreversible insofar as the cost of 
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search will mean companies have an investment in any chosen path. Here 
C. uncertainty' is adduced in comparison with the standard of full knowledge set by 
orthodox theory, but there is also a reflexive sense of uncertainty since individual 
firms are second-guessing the behaviour of firms in general. " Nelson and Winter's 
model of the behaviour of firms is based on the following of routines, which are good 
enough, " and which tend to be followed for as long as they work. " Thebehaviour 
of firms faced with the need to assess and acquire new technology is therefore crucial 
to economic discontinuity. Ina later paper, Nelson (1987) compared technological 
advance to a horse race: some technologies and companies will win and some will 
lose; advance happens because the horse race takes place. " 
There have been a number of responses to the ideas of evolutionary economics by 
sociologists working in science and technology studies (STS). Some of these" 
(Pinch and-Bijker 1987; van den Belt and Rip, 1987; MacKenzie, 1990; 1992) are 
based on a critique of Nelson and Winter's notion of 'technological traiectory"' as 
implying technological determinism. Technological trajectories,, according to Nelson 
and Winter (pp 258-9), are based in 'technicians' beliefs about what is feasible or at 
least worth attempting'. That is to say, the trajectories are described not in terms of 
the logic of technologies, but in terms of the behaviour of technologists. Similarly, 
" Because the environment includes the decisions made by other firms, there is a relevant paradox to 
be found in game theory. As Kenneth Arrow (economist and Nobel laureate) put it in a recent book 
review relating to the field of game theory (Times Higher Education Supplement, 23 October 1998, p 
23): 'Each entrepreneur or other decision-maker would base his or her current investments on forecasts 
of the choices made by others: but these actions were in turn dependent on the forecasts made about 
the original individual's choices. ' For this reason, Arrow suggests, 'the Austrian economist Oskar 
Morgenstern and the US sociologist Robert K Merton had expressed the view in the 1930s that 
economic and social forecasting was impossible. ' 
" This is based on Simon's notion of 'satisficing', which he explained (1969, p 36) as a pragmatic 
reaction to the complexity of the economic environment: 'Normative economics has shown that exact 
solutions to the larger optimisation problems of the real world are simply not within reach or sight. 
In the face of this complexity the real-world business firm turns to procedures that find good enough 
answers to questions whose best answers are unknowable. ' 
" The model is 'evolutionary' because those firms that hit on winning routines are the ones that 
survive. 
" From the point of view of any individual firm, however, the greater economic good is not much 
compensation for falling at the first fence. 
11 it has also been argued (Callon 1992,1993; Coombs et al 1992; Foray and Freeman 1993) that 
actor network theory (ANT) has affinities with evolutionary economics, including a common concern 
with heterogeneous networks and with uncertainty. 
"' The notion of technological trajectory was introduced by Nelson and Winter to help account for the 
way in which technological innovation is cumulative (relatively certain) and irregular (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982, pp 255-262). They suggest, for example (p 262), that given the introduction of new 
knowledge which, say, made old skills obsolete, and introduced new ones, technical progress 
would surge forward as solutions appeared to problems suddenly made relatively easy by the 
strengthening of the knowledge base - only to slacken again as the new areas of search become, in 
their turn, relatively well explored. ' 
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Giovanni Dosil, who suggests that technological trajectories are the technological 
equivalent of 'normal science' (cf Kuhn, 1962) following fII rom the institution of new 
'technological paradigms', explains the trajectories (1984, p 15) in terms of a 
blinding of the technological imagination to other possibilities. Itisnotentirely 
clear why this should be taken as an example of technological determinism, except 
perhaps that the technologists are seen to fail against an implicit standard of the 
potential of technology. However, science studies has long been alert to hints of 
technological determinism as part of its inheritance from the Sociology of Knowledge, 
particularly Bloor's (1976) Strong Programme. Bloor's approach was strongly 
causalistic., initiating a search for social (or other non-scientific) causes of scientific 
achievements. The Strong Programme challenged the idea that scientific knowledge 
was the outcome simply of a search for truth, The analogous task, in the case of 
technology, is to challenge the idea that technological advance occurs simply from 
following the logic of technology. Technology is not autonomous., the argument goes, 
but shaped by society (cf Mackenzie and Wa*cman, 1985). This argument often 
takes the form of the rejection of the idea that technology I impacts' upon society. 17 
So, for example, MacKenzie and WaJcman (p 8) reject discussions of the 'effects' or 
'impact' of technology on society, on the grounds that technology is not independent 
of society in the first place: 
Our focus - and where our criticism of technological determinism would centre - is 
on the assumption that technological change is autonomous, 'outside' of the society 
in which it takes place. Our question is, what shapes the technology in the first 
place, before it has 'effects? Particularly, what role does society play in shaping 
technology? 
This emphasis on the primacy of the social over the technical is not an obvious issue 
for the evolutionary economists. " 
The social shaping argument, however, is notjust about reversing the causal arrow. 
" It is not clear, however, to what extent this idea is actually held by academic sociologists and 
historians of science. MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985) name Lynn White's history of the stirrup as a 
prime example of the offence, but they do this through a very uncharitable reading which takes White 
to be saying that wherever there are stirrups there is feudalism. A better example, not cited by 
MacKenzie and Wajcman, might be in the tradition of ideafist history of ideas, for example the work 
of Harold Innis (195 1) who argued that every culture gets a primary 'bias' from the technology it 
produces. 
" In more recent writings this situation has partly changed, at least programmatically. For example, 
Nelson and Soete (1988, p 633) remark. 'Indeed it will be the broad societal context: including 
economic, but also social and ethical factors will set the conditions within which technological 
change will be adapted, even selected. ' 
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More importantly, perhaps, the exploration of how the social shapes technology has 
led to a description of 'the social' not just at the level of causes, but also as the locus 
of meaning. (Bijker et al, 1987; MacKenzie and Wa cman, 1985) This means that 
claims about the uncertainty of technological development, in the STS tradition,, 
imply openness, multiple meanings, and interpretive flexibility in determining what a 
technological product is (and what it is for). As Bijker et al (1987, p 12) put it, - in 
the introduction to The Social Construction of Technology: 
Because social groups define the problems of technological development, there is 
flexibility in the way things are designed, not one best way. 
Pinch and Bijker (1987) exemplify this argument with a history of the bicycle aimed 
at convincing the reader that there is nothing intrinsically 'better' about a modem 
bicycle compared to, say, a penny-farthing, nor is there any inevitability about the 
route from penny-farthing to modem bicycle. The location of optimal design, of what 
the bicycle 'means' is, they argue, to be found in various social groups which have 
different interests in what a bicycle is for: optimal design and technological advance 
is an outcome of social negotiation. 
MacKenzie (1992) notes that, despite elements of technological determinism, 
evolutionary economics stresses the uncertainty of technological outcomes. The 
discussion of uncertainty in social shaping texts provides a contrast to the 
uncertainty described by evolutionary economists: it is a contrast between the 
freedom of decisive choice and the luck of the horse race, between the social 
negotiation of outcomes and strategies to manage the overwhelming power of 
circumstance. Moreover, in the radical versions of uncertainty which each discipline 
offers we may see quite divergent theonsing: on the one hand the impossibility of 
rational choice,, on the other openness of meanings. " Nonetheless, evolutionary 
economics and social shaping both agree on the uncertainty of technological 
outcomes. Evolutionary economics, however, asserts the economic significance of 
technological innovation at the same time as it points to the difficulty of prediction 
and the problems that this creates for technology strategy both for firms and for 
governments. Nelson and others (Nelson 1959, Arrow 1962) have argued that 
To foreshadow discussion later in the thesis (cf especially Chapter Six), this may be seen as an 
example of the performance of academic discipline based in the negotiability of theoretical concepts. 
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market forces provide inadequate resources for R&D, ' suggesting a need for 
government action, at least in funding basic science, " if not in promoting technology 
transfer. There is a difference of opinion among alternative and evolutionary 
economists on the 'sharpness' of change brought by technological innovation, but 
most agree that there are important policy implications (cf Nelson and Soete, pp 
634-5). " This provides the context for a more detailed discussion of the social,, 
institutional and political mechanisms through which technology transfer is, or may 
be, enabled. The latter discussions point again to the need for a way of theorising 
relations between social groups, indicated in section 1.0. In the next section I look at 
some of the ways technology transfer has been problematised, particularly in 
technology policy literature, and ask how insights into the social constitution of 
meaning (discussed in this section) can contribute to this discussion. 
1.2 Disseminationg local knowledge and social groups 
I suggested previously (section 1.0), that there is a question whether models of 
technology transfer adequately represent social relations and communication between 
social groups. Models of technology transfer are often approached through a critique 
of the so-called 'linear model' (cf Clark and Staunton, 1989; Newby 1992; Schmoch 
et al. ) 
1993; Faulkner and Senker, 1995). The linear model may be seen as reflecting 
the economic representation of technology as the creator of wealth (as in the texts 
discussed in 1.1). Indeed, the linear model is sometimes blamed specifically on 
Schumpeter (Newby, 1992). Arguments against the linear model generally aim to 
" Cf, for example Freeman (1993, p 25): 'Ever since the seminal papers of Nelson (1959) and Arrow 
(1962) there has been a widespread consensus that this [the financing of fundamental research) was a 
clear case of market failure. ' Nelson and Soete (1988, p 63 1) stress Arrow's role: 'Since Arrow's 
seminal contribution in this area some twenty-five years ago, there is general agreement that market 
failure is indeed one of the intrinsic characteristics in this area and that underinvestment in R&D will 
be the logical outcome of market allocation. ' 
" Nelson and Winter (p 391) point out that what counts as basic and applied research is socially 
determined: 'Society in effect has a choice regarding what arenas of research it will define as basic 
research to be funded publicly and guided by the tenets of a scientific discipline, and what areas it will 
regard as applied and to be guided (if not necessarily funded) by criteria close to the values of the 
organisations using particular technologies. ' 
" Nelson and Soete (1988, pp 634-635) in the concluding paragraph of a concluding chapter to a 
collection of papers on Technical Change and Economic Theory, remark- 'In this volume several 
authors, but especially Carlota Perez and Christopher Freeman, have proposed that we are entering a 
new era with a drastically different operative economic-technical paradigm. Not all of the authors of 
this book would put the matter as sharply. But all would agree that there are important new things 
going on and to be monitoring. Let the exploration go on. Let it be urged and supported. But new 
government structures and public laws will be needed to support the valuable [sic] of the new, and to 
constrain the pernicious. ' 
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provide more complex channels of flow, so that information can pass two ways, 
feedback is enabled, and so on. In diagrammatic versions of the linear model, this can 
lead to increasingly baroque creations5 with multiple levels and complex feedback 
loops (cf Schmoch et al, 1993; Woolgar, 1994b). 
An alternative to producing ever more complex diagrammatic representations of 
dissemination is to problernatise the links and mechanisms by which knowledge is 
disseminated, and several authors have approached this task. I have mentioned two 
of these approaches above (section 1.0). The 'triple helix' model describes new 
collaborative institutional forms and mechanisms in which knowledge is 'co- 
developed' (eg Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1996). This (as I suggested in section 
1.0) perhaps too easily removes problems of linkages and relations between social 
groups. The knowledge flow model developed by Faulkner and Senker incorporates 
the idea that knowledge has different locations and asks about the movement and 
transformation of knowledge between organisations. ' In this model, knowledge has 
various organisational locations (such as educational institutions and corporate 
research labs), and the authors also provide a typology of knowledge which allows 
them to distinguish different sites of knowledge (such as textbooks or embodied 
skills) which may be more or less available (more or less explicit or tacit) and require 
different social forms of linkages (such as personal visits or reading of journals). 
This provides a nuanced account of inter-organisational linkages. However, as Sanz- 
Menendez and Webster (1996) have noted, this approach generates the further 
question of how communicated knowledge is appropriated locally. "' Faulkner and 
Senker (pp 20-23), in a section on the limits to academic-industry links, mention 
several 'barriers', including failure to communicate, differences of agenda and 'mutual 
suspicion and antagonism'. Perhaps these barriers can be conceptualised through the 
idea that different social groups appropriate knowledge according to their own 
purposes or interests, following Pinch and Bijker's (1987) paper (discussed in 
sectionl. l). Latour in his book Science in Action (1987), however, raises doubts 
" Faulkner and Senker (1995, p 42) talk of 'knowledge', both to avoid implications of a hierarchical 
distinction between science and technology, and in reference to 'the overall knowledge requirements of 
the innovating organisation'. 
11 in a proposal for a new COST action in social science, Sanz-Menendez and Webster (1996, Section 
A) point to the need for a broader understanding of how firms and other organisations 'cope with and 
shape' knowledge flows. They suggest: 'They will share, exchange and depend on translating 
knowledge among themselves. But they will also do so according to their localised needs and 
capacities. These can be called distinct "knowledge constituencies". ' 
Vaux, J Chapter One 18 
about the analytic value of 'social groups' as an explanation of problems in the 
uptake of science and technology. In the remainder of this section, I shall further 
explore these two contrasting positions on the power of social groups to constitute 
meanings. 
Latour challenges the analytic value of the concept of social groups partly on the 
21 basis of his more general claim to have surpassed the Subject-Object distinction. 
But it is also an element in an important attack on what he calls the 'diffusion model' 
of the uptake of scientific knowledge or of technological artifacts. fn his critique of 
the diffusion model Latour rejects talk of technological impact (as do Pinch and 
Bijker), but he also rejects talk of social shaping, or indeed any talk of 'the social'. 
The diffusion model, he suggests (1987, p 141) , in fact generates the distinction 
between the social and the technical: 
In the diffusion model society is made of groups which have interests: these groups 
resist, accept or ignore both facts and machines, which have their own inertia. In 
consequence we have science and technics on the one hand, and society on the other. 
... Let us go further: belief in the existence of a society separated from 
26 technoscience is an outcome of the diffusion model . 
He proposes, in place of a diffusion model, a model of 'translation', which does not 
distinguish the social from the technical, or subject from object., but recognises only: 
heterogeneous chains of association that from time to time, create obligatory 
passage points. 
In addition to these general arguments against the social/technical distinction, Latour 
also has specific arguments accounting for the construction of social groups. This 
may be illustrated by his tale of Eastman's 'invention' of amateur photographers. 
As he puts it, in a form of words designed to emphasise the novelty of the point (p 
122): 
Eastman had the bright idea of inventing a new group of 6- to 96-year-olds that was 
endowed with a craving for taking pictures. This enlistment depended on a camera 
that was simple to operate ... 
More formally, 'inventing new groups' is one of the Machiavellian tactics identified 
11 Although this perhaps is more evident in later writings, particularly We have never been modern 
(1991). 
" Later on the same page (14 1), Latour spells out the implication for analyses that begin with a 
rejection of technological determinism. 'Social deten-ninism courageously fights against technical 
determinism, whereas neither exists except in the fanciful description proposed by the diffusion 
model. ' 
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by Latour in his description of the complex steps involved in the achievement of 
translation. This is Tactic Three of Translation Four, 'reshuffling interests and goals' 
(p 115). 
To see the analytic force of Latour's emphasis on the invention of social groups, it is 
useful to compare it with an argument that makes much of the power of social 
groups, Pinch and Bijker's history of the bicycle. In particular, they claim (p 30): 
In deciding which problems are relevant, the social groups concerned with the 
artifact and the meaning those groups give to the artifact play a crucial role: a 
problem is defined as such only when there is a social group for which it constitutes 
a 'problem'. 
However,, the relevant social groups identified by Pinch and Bijker, as assigning 
different meanings to the bicycle, are themselves identifiable largely in terms of their 
relationship to bicycles. Pinch and Bijker continue (p 30): 
The use of the concept of a relevant social group is quite straightforward. The 
phrase is used to denote institutions and organisations (such as the military or some 
specific industrial company), as well as organised or unorganised groups of 
individuals. The key requirement is that all members of a certain social group share 
the same set of meanings, attached to a specific artifact. [My emphases] 
The social groups actually identified by Pinch and Bijker (pp 30-42) include 
C4 1) r consumers or users , anticyclists women cyclists', 'young men of means and 
nerve' for whom 'the function of the bicycle was primarily for sport', and 'elderly 
men'. While one might argue that 'women' or 'young men of means and nerve' or 
'elderly men' are in some sense already social groups, it is only insofar as they have a 
relationship to bicycles that they become 'relevant' social groups. If Pinch and 
Bijker suppose that bicycles only become meaningful insofar as cyclists give them 
various meanings, where did the cyclists (somehow already cyclists) find these 
pieces of metal that they then deemed to be bicycles? This is perhaps an 
uncharitable reading of Pinch and Bi . ker, whose project is to show that engineering J 
considerations alone do not determine what counts as optimal design, that there is no 
(one best way' (p 28). However, Latour makes an important point, which Pinch and 
Bijker at best gloss over, that technological artifacts are already socially active. They 
are designed to entrap allies (users) and already address (configure) potential groups 
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of users. " Perhaps it is not the case that the concept of a social group ('relevant' or 
otherwise) is quite straightforward 
The difference between Latour on the one hand,, and Pinch and Bijker on the other, is 
not Merely one of prioritising either artifacts (engineers) or users. Each text may be 
seen as taking a slightly different stance on the Kuhnian project of re-opening 
scientific and technological facts, for the purposes of seeing how they were stabilised 
(Kuhn 1962, p 1). Part of the power of Pinch and Biker's paper is to do with a re- 
opening, or a distancing, of a familiar object. The bicycle is an excellent case to use, 
because it is difficult to believe that the penny-farthing wasn't doomed from the 
start. In convincing us that the penny-farthing (or, as it was once tellingly called, 
'the ordinary) might have had a future, Pinch and Bijker reveal the whiggish hand of 
technological history. Latour, by contrast, aims to show us all the steps by which 
such a history is written, including all the 'boxes' that get closed along the way, by 
the various mechanisms of recruiting allies and enrolling interests. But in doing this, 
Latour often depends on a style of story-telling which, explicitly in his theory , is 
itself a mythic outcome of the networks, that is, the myth of the lone inventor (or, 
indeed, the myth of Machiavelli). " It is not clear, then, why the fact that social 
groups are, for ANT, an outcome of the networks should in itself make them less 
appropriate as analytic concepts than, say, the concept of 'power'. For everything, 
including power, is surely an outcome of the networks, according to ANT. 
There is one more thing to notice about the social groups adduced by Pinch and 
Bijker, as well as by Latour, which is that they tend to be identified as social groups 
insofar as they are users of a technology, be it racing cycles,, safety cycles, or 
Eastman's camera. A similar point may be made in relation to Woolgar's (199 1) 
notion of 'configuring the user', which shares With Latour a sense of the construction 
of users and their needs, in this case through the technological 'text'. However, the 
problem of the identification and evaluation of technologies, especially strategic 
11 My parenthetical use of more Woolgarian terms is to indicate that this point can be made from 
other directions than actor network theory. For the concept of 'configuring the user', cf Woolgar 
(1991). 
" The myth is generated by the invisibility of the masses of enrolled allies. Latour (1987, p 174) 
remarks: 'Although scientists are successful only when they follow the multitude, the multitude 
appears successful only when it follows this handful of scientists! This is why scientists and 
engineers may appear alternatively endowed with demiurgic powers - for good or bad - or devoid of 
any clout. ' 
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technologies goes beyond a vendor-user relationship. Among other things it involves 
communication between established institutional (and quasi-institutional) groups, 
including academics, policy analysts , industrial strategists, ftulding bodies, venture 
capitalists, and so on. What is required is an approach to understanding social 
groups which goes beyond the designer/user paradigm, but does not assume that 
social groups are given (with their interests) from the start. 
1.3 Conclusion: technology transfer as communication between discursive 
communities 
I began this chapter by identifying two major themes in discussions of innovation 
and technology transfer: the first concerned with theorising the economic impact of 
technological innovation; the second concerned with modelling links and movements 
between various sites involved in the diffusion of science and technology (or, in the 
term now most commonly used, 'knowledge). Each of these themes is broadly 
associated with bodies of literature in different disciplines: the first in economics and 
the second in policy studies. These themes are also somewhat indirectly reflected in 
sociological discussions within science and technology studies (STS) which are 
concerned with relations between the 'social' and the 'technical' (and I include here 
those, such as Latour, who argue that this is a false opposition (cf section 1.2)). On 
the topic of the socio-economic impact of technological innovation that interests 
evolutionary economists, STS texts initially seemed to offer a contrary view arguing 
that it is the social that impacts on the technical; but there is also a more interesting 
complementarity between the two literatures, which agree on the uncertainty of 
technological outcomes, but with divergent emphases in describing this uncertainty 
(cf section 1.1). The STS description of uncertainty is based in the idea of 
interpretive flexibility, that no one meaning or use is given with (inscribed in) a 
technological artifact, but that what an artifact is (and is for) is the outcome of 
negotiation between social groups of users, each with different interests. This 
seemed to promise a notion of uncertainty that might help provide a fuller 
description of some of the problems of technology evaluation and acquisition 
suggested in the economic models, and at the same time to offer a means of 
conceptualising local interests and 'barriers' in a way that would be useful in models 
of technology transfer. However, Latour (1987) points to a problem with taking 
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social groups as analytic 'givens', complete with interests and purposes that define 
what an artifact is; indeed, one may as easily claim that the artifact creates the users 
as a social group (cf section 1.2). 
What is needed is a way of theorising social groups which allows for the co- 
production of artifact and user, as well as explaining the persistence of local interests, 
and addressing the question of the local appropriation of knowledge. The notion of 
discursive community is useful here. I take a discursive community to be one which 
is identified and maintained through negotiation among members, and between 
members and non-members. This understanding of discursive community is based 
on discussions within STS which owe much to the traditions of ethnomethodology 
and conversation analysis (cf Lynch, 1993, for an overview). This approach 
provides a number of concepts for analysing discursive material (which I discuss in 
more detail in 2.1 , 
below). The idea of discursive community lies behind notions 
such as 'configuring the user' (Woolgar, 199 1), where for example help desk staff 
perform community ('who we are') in the formulations through which they configure 
their clients. In principle, at least, the rhetorical performance of community may be 
shown in a variety of representational practices, including the identification and 
evaluation of artifacts, and the construed significance of scientific research or 
technological skills (cf Cooper and Woolgar, 1993). 29 My working assumption, in 
embarking on this thesis, is that conceptualising technology transfer as 
communication between discursive communities (Woolgar, 1994b) provides a unified 
way of investigating the various questions relating to technology transfer that I have 
noticed in this chapter, such as how actors judge technologies, what the 'cultural 
barriers' are to technology acquisition, and how knowledge is appropriated locally or, 
in other words, the social and epistemological bases of technology transfer. 
In Chapter Two, which now follows, I propose to transform the above rather 
programmatic statement of aims into a coherent and detailed account of the terms and 
intentions of my thesis. I provide a more detailed description of a discursively-based 
methodology (2.1), introduce my case study, on the exploitation of artificial 
intelligence (2.2) and describe the evidential basis (the material and the ethnographic 
2917or example, in a study of a committee defining software quality standards, Cooper and Woolgar 
(1993) show the co-construal of what the proper concerns are about quality and who is properly 
concerned vAth testing quality and formulations of who we are. 
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perspective) of my case study (2.3). 
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THE CASE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, METHODOLOGY 
AND MATERIAL 
2.0 Introduction. 
At the end of the previous chapter I suggested that technology transfer might be seen 
in terms of communication between discursive communities. In this chapter I begin 
by locating this conceptualisation within the methodological traditions of STS, and 
ask how it relates to questions of technology transfer as raised specifically in terms 
of my case study. I addition I address some further methodological issues to do with 
sources of material and ethnographic standpoint, which are raised by the fact that 
some significant parts of my material were gathered, prior to embarking on a 
sociological study, when I was more a participant than a participant-observer in the 
Al industry. I conclude with a summary outline of the methodological basis of my 
case study, identifying the specific object of study and describing the chapter-by- 
chapter structure of the case study. 
I begin (2.1) with a discussion of some approaches within STS to the use of 
discursive material and associated theorisations. I address these from a 
methodological viewpoint, asking what the discursive object is and what is implied in 
ten-ns of going about the interpretation of discursive material. More specifically, I 
ask what these traditions have to offer for a study of communication between 
discursive communities, looking particularly at approaches which can show the 
negotiation or performance of community. 
In 2.2 1 introduce my case study, which relates to the exploitation of Al. I ask first 
how this case relates to the broader discussion of technology transfer; and second 
whether and how issues of communication and performed community are germane to 
this case study. I also ask whether and how substantive questions about the nature 
of knowledge are relevant to a study of technology transfer, by comparing some 
other STS approaches to Al as a theory of knowledge. 
In 2.3 1 ask what issues in practice or in principle are raised by my closeness to the 
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community which I am studying. This arises because my experience as a journalist 
covering the Al industry provided my initial contact with the Al community, and 
some significant sections of my thesis are based on material that I gathered not as a 
sociologist but as a specialist trade journalist. I approach these issues by looking at 
some anthropological discussions about the authority of the participant-observer and 
the difficulties of 'indigenous anthropology, and ask whether and how these debates 
are relevant to my own case. 
Finally, in 2.4 1 surnmarise the discussion in the preceding sections of this chapter, as 
a basis for exploring the appropriate discursive objects of this case study. This 
section concludes with a chapter-by chapter outline of the structure of my case 
study. 
2.1 Methodological issues of a discursively based analysis 
To suggest that technology transfer may be described as communication between 
discursive communities (as I did in 1.3) is already to locate my approach within some 
strands of STS that not only make use of discursive (spoken and written) material, 
but also derive a variety of methodological and theoretical lessons from this use. 
There are a number of contrasting theorisations Within recent work in STS. For 
example, the idea of technology as text (Cooper and Woolgar, 1993; Grint and 
Woolgar, 1997; Woolgar, 199 1) conceptuallses the identification and use of 
technology as a 'reading', to emphasise the role of the user (the social) in determining 
what a technology is and what it is for. In contrast, the voice given to 'non-humans' 
in actor network theory is intended to rupture the social-technical divide (Callon, 
1986; Latour, 1987,199 1). Elsewhere, Lynch (1993) criticises both Latour and 
Woolgar for distancing meaning from the local production of scientific knowledge. 
Such differences in theorising discursive material also inform some of the 
methodological choices, and the methodological and theoretical issues are not easily 
abstracted from each other. 'O In the following discussion, however, I attempt to 
emphasise the methodological aspects. 
To use discursive material implies more than the mere use of spoken or written 
" As Tsatsaroni and Cooper (1999) point out, this is particularly so insofar as STS approaches to 
discourse analysis are historically based within an empirical problematic of handling data, in contrast 
to the continental tradition. 
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material. The use of interview techniques is common in the social sciences but often 
approached in an objectivist framework, where the point is to gather data or 
information, and the interviewees' words are taken as a report and sometimes indeed 
as a report on the world. " More commonly, however, interview material is taken as 
a report of the subject's views or opinions. An example from the science studies 
literature is Mulkay and Gilbert's (1981) use of interviews with scientists to contrast 
scientists' talk of what they do with Popper's description of what scientists do. 
More recent approaches in STS have been more concerned with the 'perfon-native' 
aspect of discursive material, although performativity is a concept which is open to 
varieties of interpretation (some of which I discuss below). The idea of discursive 
interpretation has also been extended so that the discursive object is no longer 
necessarily a piece of speaking or writing, but may be, for example, scientific practice 
or the social world. Latour and Woolgar each transforms the discursive object of 
analysis in a different way, Latour through a serniotically-based concept of 
'translation', and Woolgar through a radical conception of the text/artifact as 
interpretatively open, but both implying the power of language to act (cf slightly 
different arguments to this effect by Lynch (1993, p 99) and by Tsatsaroni and 
Cooper (1999, p 14)). Do methodological implications follow from this 'linguistic 
turn"' or do the arguments attach predominantly to questions of theorisation? In 
the following paragraphs I ask what is on offer in practical methodological terms as 
an approach to discursive material, looking particularly at some aspects of the work 
of Latour,, Lynch and Woolgar. 
Actor-network theory (ANT), with which Latour has been strongly associated (in 
collaboration with Nfichel Callon, John Law and others), presents itself initially as a 
set of methodological guidelines. That is to say, ANT describes the achievement 
both of scientific knowledge and of technological advance in terms of 'translations" 
through which actors enrol allies. The task of the analyst is to 'follow the actors'. 
Guidelines as to what the novice analyst might expect along the way appear to be set 
3' For example, in the course of a research project (EPSRC Grant GR/K 32548) that involved 
interviews with university Industrial Liaison Officers (ILOs), I was shown a successful MBA thesis 
that had been partly based on interviews with university ILOs. I was struck by the fact that while we 
were exploring the variety of ways in which ILOs' talk configured academics, the MBA thesis used 
the same material as evidence of whether or not academics were aware of issues of exploitation, IPF, 
etc. The ELOs in the MBA thesis were treated as expert witnesses, on our (STS-based) approach, the 
talk of the ILOs was interrogated for the performance of social relations. 
" This phrase was possibly coined by Rorty (1967) in his book titled The Linguistic Tuni, to refer to 
the development of the philosophical movement sometimes called 'linguistic philosophy'. 
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out in Latour's (1987) Science in Action, in a detailed description of the tactics and 
rules of method employed by successful actors. These are followed , in the 
appendices, by rules of method and principles for the analyst herself to apply. 
However, the rules of method for actors are not actually a how-to-do-it guide for 
entrepreneurs or scientists, but a redescription of efficacy (scientific truth or 
technological advance) for the purposes of philosophical argument. Similarly the 
rules of method for the analyst seem to provide a philosophical rather than a 
methodological orientation to carrying out a case study. It is significant that 111 
Mapping the Dynamics ofScience and Technology (Callon et al, 1986), which does 
claim to offer a method for the study of science and technology, the method is co- 
word analysis and ANT supplies the philosophical justification. 
The effectiveness which Latour describes through 'translation I is one way of 
approaching the performativity of discourse. In anglophone traditions there are 
other routes to performativity. The term 'performative' was introduced into British 
'-ordinary language' philosophy by Austin (1961) in the 1950s" who was describing 
a type of utterances which are not reports, but 'perform' a deed (examples include 'I 
promise' and 'I apologise')" . In the STS conception of performance, 
however, the 
ethnomethodological concept of 'indexicality' is a more important root. Garfinkel and 
Sacks (1970) took the name from Yehoshua Bar-Hillel" (1956), who used the term 
'indexical expressions' for a broad class of words (such as 'here", 'now, 'she% 'this') 
whose meaning varied with occasion and context of use. Lynch (1993, pp 17-18) 
says of Garfinkel's use of 'indexicality' that it is 'simply another way of speaking of 
the entire picture of social order'. The question of indexicality disappears into the 
ethnomethodological project, in a way that leaves virtually no gap between 
theorisation and methodology (p 22): 
[W]hat becomes prominent is not that all expressions are indexical but that members 
Austin's paper 'Performative Utterances' was published posthumously in a collection of his papers 
edited by Urmson and Warnock (Austin, 196 1). The editors, in a Foreword, say that this paper 'is a 
version, with minor verbal corrections, of an unscripted talk delivered in the Third Programme of the 
BBC in 1956'. 
11 Austin (196 1, pp 233-4) argued that in abstract there is a clear distinction between reports and 
performances, but that in practice there is a pervasive ambiguity: 'If he had said "I feel perfectly awful 
about it", then we should think it must be meant to be a description of the state of his feelings. If he 
had said "I apologise", we should feel this was clearly a performative utterance, going through the 
ritual of apologising. But if he says "I am sorry" there is an unfortunate hovering between the two. 
The phenomenon is quite common. ' 
"' Bar-Hillel was a pioneer in the field of machine translation, that is, computer translation between 
one natural language and another. Bar-Hillel is also important in the history of Artificial Intelligence 
as a recognised precursor to research in natural language understanding. 
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manage to make adequate sense and adequate reference with the linguistic and other 
devices to hand. The question for ethnomethodology is, How do they do that? 
Ethnomethodological studies also provide descriptions of how local negotiation is 
done that have provided a model or inspiration for some STS studies that are not 
directly in the ethnomethodological tradition. In particular they suggest a way of 
approaching the idea of the negotiated performance of community through the idea of 
formulations of membership (cf Sacks, 1972; Schegloff, 1972). Schegloff pointed to 
the pervasiveness of construals of membership which can occur within conversations 
ostensibly on some other matter. He explored this within interchanges about 
(geographical) location (p 93), where the selection and recognition of formulations of 
location can, he claims, be seen as a basis for 
demonstrations of, claims to, failings in, decisions about, etc, the competent 
membership [of the 'same community'] of either speaker or hearer. 
This,, he goes on to suggest, provides the 'never-ending' possibility of the testing of 
adequate membership of relevant communities. " Cooper and Woolgar illustrate the 
performance of community through a case study of a government- initiated project to 
define a framework for assuring software quality. In this case, performance of 
community is shown by displaying the ties between decisions about what counts as 
equality' in software and negotiations of relevant community, appropriate skills, etc. 
The analytic point (that this is performance of community) is made through 
describing the rhetorical achievements of various actors. However, there is a 
theoretical question about the status of such descriptions. Tsatsaroni and Cooper 
(1999, pp 13-14) argue that the implication of performativity contained in the idea of 
performance of community is contrary to the main thrust of Woolgar's theorisation; 
and that the textual metaphor ('technology as text') prioritises the openness of the 
text. This seems confirmed by Grint and Woolgar (p 73) who argue that showing 
performance of community is only of limited value in theorising the relation between 
the social and the technical, since it can only reveal local productions of the 
social/technical divide but not go beyond it. '7 Thus while, for Woolgar, social 
Schegloff (1972, p 94) says. 'Insofar as fhendships, reputations, marriages, collaborations, etc, may 
turn on someone's competent membership in some class of members (eg "swinger", 
"anthropologist", "good Jewish girl", "Afficanist", etc), each occasion of the use of a place 
formulation selected because of its presumed recognisability to a member of such a class is part of a 
never-ending potential test in which persons can be shown to be inadequate members of the class, and 
thereby inadequate candidates for the activity. ' 
37 it might be argued that this begs the question of whether there is an analytic point beyond the local 
production of the world. Cf Lynch's criticism (1993, pp 95-100) of Latour and Woolgar as 
attempting to act as observers from Mars. 
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relations are based in the performance of community and negotiation of boundaries, 
mundane discourse is transcended through a radical moment, the moment of the 
( methodological horrors' (cf Woolgar, 1988a) and the 'constituting reader' (cf 
Tsatsaroni and Cooper, p 13): interpretation is revealed to be radically arbitrary. 
Methodologically this radical moment is not habitable, but suggests a meta- 
methodological trap, the possibility of subverting any interpretation. 
Finally, in this section, I come to the question of what this suggests for a study of 
technology transfer as communication between discursive communities. The first 
implication is that the performance of community may provide the basis for a notion 
of discursive communities based in the negotiation of boundaries. The second is that 
it is methodologically appropriate to look for the co-production of community, of 
audience and of technological identities in the communication between discursive 
communities (and that this may be particularly appropriate given the 
institutionalisation of technology transfer mentioned in section 1.0). The details of 
how these possibilities may be transformed into a methodology specific to my case 
study are discussed in the final section of this chapter (2.4), following an 
introduction to my case study, and discussion of ethnographic standpoint (which 
raises matters of further relevance to the question of analytic 'distance'). 
2.2 Case study: the exploitation of Artificial Intelligence 
In Chapter One I identified, among the practical themes at issue in discussions of 
technology transfer, the evaluation of strategic technologies and the making of links 
between (among others) universities and industry. In this section, I first locate my 
case study in terms of some of the themes at issue in practical discussions of 
technology transfer and then explore its relevance to a study of communication 
between discursive communities. Finally, I locate my thesis in contrast to other 
sociological studies of Al and of the proper description of knowledge. 
The Al industry may be identified as making its first appearance around 1980, when 
it consisted mostly of small university spin-off companies (Ovum, 19841, section 3.1 
of this thesis). These companies sold hardware and software products based on 
research that had been under way for about two decades in a small number of high 
ranking academic institutions, mainly in the US but also in Europe, especially the UK 
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and France (Fleck, 1982; Ovum, 1984). The products, initially, were mainly aimed at 
the development of 'expert systems"' and, again initially, were mostly written in an 
Al language such as Lisp (or, in the UK and France, Prolog). As an example of 
technology transfer, then, this is a case of 'knowledge-led' innovation (Senker and 
Faulkner, 1995, p 27), and its basis in small university spin-off companies was a 
form considered particularly appropriate to research-based innovation (cf Segal, 
Quince and Partners, 1985 ). US companies, in particular, were successful in 
gaining venture capital funds (Ovum, 1986a; 1986b). At the same time, in the early 
1980s, Al was identified as a strategic technology in several national and international 
strategic funding programmes for 'fifth generation' computing. These included the 
Japanese Fifth Generation Computing Programme, the UK Alvey Programme, the 
European Esprit programme and, in the US, the DARPA Strategic Computing 
programme (these are further discussed in 3.1 and 7.2). Most of these programmes 
embodied what was then a fairly new emphasis on promoting industrial-academic 
links (Senker and Faulkner, 1995; Owen and Oakley, 1989) They were therefore 
much more than research-funding programmes, but provided an impetus to the Al 
industry, through the promotion of academic-industrial collaboration (cf 7.1). The 
identification of Al as a strategic technology was therefore important to the early 
success of the Al industry. The story of how this identification was made has been 
told by pointing to the institutional basis of Al in prestigious academic institutions 
(Fleck, 1982; 1987). However it is difficult to divorce the idea of institutional 
authority from the rhetorical and discursive practices that maintain that authority. 
The question of how Al was identified as a strategic technology by policy makers 
(and as a growth market by industry and by venture capitalists) gained a more 
practical urgency, at least for some members of the Al community, in the light of the 
alleged 'failure' of Al by the late 1980s and early 1990s. I begin my case study (in 
Chapter Three) with a study of the way in which Al vendors construe and explain 
the failure of Al and how this partly depends on a construction of the history of Al 
as one in which a powerful technology was oversold. This is an interesting starting 
point because it enables me to explore how the Al industry construes its own 
identity through its relationship with its customers. Most interestingly, however, 
"I shall not try to further explicate this term at this point. Cf discussion below, especially chapters 
Three and Seven. 
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this perfon-ned identity appears to include analyses of the failure of Al in terms of a 
failure in communication (between vendors and the market, and between academics 
and industry); thus it is an opportunity to explore how communication is adduced as 
significant to the transfer of technology by members of the industrial Al community. 
In taking Al as a case study in technology transfer, I am deliberately distancing my 
study from the question of whether machines can think, and whether knowledge is 
inherently social, and similar issues which have usually been the focus of sociological 
studies of Al. Collins (1987), for example, suggests that Al researchers and 
sociologists of knowledge share a common subject, knowledge; " and he offers a 
typology of knowledge as a contribution to the common discussion. " In his later 
book, Artificial Experts (1990), Collins rejects approaching the discussion through a 
typology of knowledge. " Instead, he offers a re-reading of the question of machine 
intelligence in terms of social interaction (p 13). The issue is still taken to be the 
claim that machines can think, and Collins develops an alternative description of 
knowledge based inhuman action. Woolgar (1985; 1987) in a response to critics of 
Al such as Coulter (1983) argues for the retention of the sceptical stance and sees the 
Al debate as a contest between alternative essentialist accounts of what it is to be 
human. While this study distances itself from the substantive debate, Woolgar 
nonetheless takes it that Al is about building intelligent machines. Against all these, 
may be put the suggestion of the philosopher Hilary Putnam (1988, p 277) that, 
while Al researchers tend to believe in machine intelligence, the building of intelligent 
machines is at best a notional aim of Al research. In terms of my ethnographic 
perspective (cf 2.3) my starting point is similar to Putnam's. Methodologically, 
" Collins (1987, p 329) says: 'Self-imposed evaluative neutrality is less easy for the analyst to 
maintain in the case of Al than in other areas of science because both AI and recent science studies 
share a topic. knowledge. This means that the findings of the whole research program of modem 
science studies, as well as specific studies of Al, have implications for what Al researchers are trying 
to do, whereas for most science and technology the visitor from science studies can be an onlooker, in 
this case he or she is also an expert, a knowledge specialist. ' 
" Interestingly, Collins' typology had included the suggestion that knowledge moves from the 'tacit' 
to 'the explicit', which is directly contrary to the suggestion made by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) 
that only novices make use of rules. Collins, like several of the texts referred to in Chapter One of 
this thesis, makes use of Polyani's (1967) concept of 'tacit knowledge' (including Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Faulkner and Senker, 1995). 'Tacit knowledge' is generally treated as knowledge 
which happens not to be made explicit. The phenomenological notion of 'embodied knowledge' by 
contrast, which is presumably informing Dreyfus' typology, is of a knowledge that is not available to 
explicit intellectualisation (cf Merleau Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, 1945). 
" Taking Dreyfus' approach to the typology of knowledge as his example, Collins (1990, p2 1) 
suggests that such typologies tend to lead to a dichotomy between scientific and practical knowledge, 
which creates 'too much discontinuity between classes of knowledge'. 
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however, the question of how or whether ascriptions of 'intelligence' entered into the 
communication of the identity of Al is part of what I am investigating. 
2.3 Ethnographic standpoint and the availability of material 
The material I am drawing on for this thesis includes textual and interview material 
that I list in more detail later (section 2.4). My starting point in collecting material, 
however, has been my experience as a trade journalist specialising in the field of Al 
for nearly ten years (1984-1993). This covers most of the period of the rise and fall 
of the Al market (which I discuss in some detail in 3.1). Over this time, I 
interviewed representatives of practically all the industrial companies active in the Al 
industry in the UK, as well as many from the USA and France (and some other 
European countries). 42 1 also interviewed many Al academics (again, mainly from the 
UK but also some from the USA, France and other places). I attended most of the 
major UK Al conferences (particularly the industrially oriented ones) and several in 
the US and France. As the editor (and main author) of a monthly Al newsletter 
(Machine Intelligence News), I was dealing from day to day with press releases 
concerning Al products and companies (which were the bread-and-butter matters of 
the newsletter), as well as other relevant topics such as national and international 
funding programmes. From 1992, when I became publisher of the newsletter, I also 
became a member of the Al Vendors' Association (since my newsletter was itself one 
of the service products associated with the Al industry). This has given me a wealth 
of material, but also constitutes a significant methodological problem to do with 
ethnographic distance. In the next few paragraphs I explore some of the problems of 
` native' or I indigenous' ethnography (cf Fahim, 1982) and ask how they may apply 
in this case. I conclude this section by locating the material that I gathered as a 
journalist within the broader scope of material that I use in this thesis. 
Ethnographic studies have traditionally been seen as involving a balance between the 
experience of the insider and the authority of the outsider, exemplified in the figure of 
" As I discuss further in 3.1, the first and most important location of the Al industry was in the USA. 
However, both France and the UK had an early and important local Al industry and market. The 
most evident gap in my material is the experience of Japanese companies. The Japanese 
industry and 
market was also an early and significant one. However, Japanese companies 
did not tend to try to sell 
into European and North American markets (one exception being an effort by Hitachi in the late 
I 990s, which I discuss in 3.1, another being the ill-fated Prolog machine, launched to rival American 
LisP workstations, which was removed from the market almost as soon as it was launched). 
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the 'participant observer'. This is sometimes stated as an opposition between 
subjectivity and objectivity. As Clifford and Marcus (1986, p 13) put it: 
Since Malinowski's time, the 'method' of participant-observation has enacted a 
delicate balance of subjectivity and objectivity. The ethnographer's personal 
experiences, especially those of participation and empathy, are recognised as 
central to the research process, but they are firmly restrained by the impersonal 
standards of observation and 'objective' distance. 
However, the idea that objectivity is a characteristic of location, of being an outsider, 
may be challenged by stories which show that outsiders may simply and grossly 
misunderstand what is going on. This was shown, for example,, by Soraya Altorki, - a 
US-trained anthropologist who returned to her home (Saudi Arabia) and carried out a 
study of women like herself, from elite families. Altorki (1982) claims that only by 
being one of the women (as she anyway was)" could she gain access to material that 
provided evidence of the structural power of Saudi women in making marriages and 
so controlling inter-family links. She contrasts this (p 171) to the 'sociological myth' 
that Arab women are passive objects of exchange in marriage arrangements. The 
point here is not that the insider is in a position of epistemological privilege" , or that 
the Arab women's self-view cannot be challenged. Indeed, there may also be 
limitations on what an insider gets shown simply because she is an insider. Fahim 
and Helmer (19 82, p xix) point out: 
[T]he local anthropologist may not be taken seriously by informants if he probes 
types of behaviour that informants view as commonly shared knowledge, such as 
marriage customs, or he may be considered intolerably crude in broaching other 
topics, such as sexual practices. 
There is,, they suggest, room for the 'rude foreigner' described by Elizabeth Colson 
(quoted p xix; cf Colson, 1982)", 
who would be able to crash through barriers and ask the kinds of questions that may 
not be appropriate. People are willing to respond since they realise that the 
" Altorki (1982, p 169) does point out that she returned 'somewhat of a stranger to my own culture', 
and had to reassume the role expected of her. 
" The point is more to do with access and acceptability than the foundations of knowledge. Altorki 
(1982, p 172) says: 'I believe that only a female native anthropologist can possibly have some easy 
access to the data needed, although I am prepared to admit the possibility that a foreign female 
anthropologist might, under most favourable field work conditions, also gain such access in the long 
run. But in how long a runT 
" Fahim and Helmer's paper is the introduction to a volume (Fahim, 1982) based on a symposium 
(sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, held in July 1978 in Burg 
Wartenstein, Austria). Elizabeth Colson is one of the contributors to the volume, but the comment 
about the 'rude foreigner' is not in this paper and was presumably made during 
discussion in the 
symposium. 
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anthropologist, a sort of 'innocent child', does not know. 
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Where does this leave the questions of objectivity and ethnographic distance? The 
above discussion suggests that there are different benefits and dangers for 'insiders' 
and for 'outsiders', which require to be taken into account in any ethnographic field 
study. However, it offers no guarantees to either insiders or outsiders merely on the 
basis of their location. It leaves open the more general question of the possibility of 
ethnographic distance, and whether insiders may not still be at a disadvantage in 
interpreting their own culture. It is worth noting, from the example cited in the 
previous paragraph, that Altorki had spent time 'outside'. Indeed, it is only because 
she had been trained (in the West) as an anthropologist that she could address the 
question of the adequacy of Levi-Strauss's kinship structures as a description of the 
social power of Saudi women. The question, otherwise, would simply not have 
arisen. This is not to smuggle anthropology back in again as a source of knowledge,, 
but to reintroduce it as a possible source of questions5 hypotheses and 
interpretations. 
If objectivity is not guaranteed by the poles of location ('Inside' or 'outside'), is it to 
be found at the boundary? Crapanzo (1986),, in an essay that accuses 
anthropologists of bad faith in so far as they believe they can be objective (the 
c ethnographer's paradox'), points to the significance of boundary-making in attempts 
to understand another culture. He says (p 52): 
The ethnographer ... marks a boundary: his ethnography declares the limits of his 
and his readers' culture. It also attests to his - and his culture's - interpretive 
power. 
In a similar point, Woolgar (1988b) describes ethnographers as crossers of 
boundaries. Again, this is in the context of no longer looking for objectivity, but 
retaining a search for the source of ethnographic distance. The question then 
becomes, how easy is it for the insider to mark and maintain boundaries? ' The 
question of marking or maintaining boundaries is particularly pertinent in my own 
case since, unlike Altorki, I did not approach the field of Al as a trained 
"' Geertz (1983, p 15 1) observes: 'We are all natives now, and everybody else not immediately one 
of us is an exotic. What looked once to be a matter of finding out whether savages could distinguish 
fact from fancy now looks to be a matter of finding out how others, across the sea or down the 
corridor, organise their significative world. ' Most people, however, do not address the question of 
how significative worlds are organised. We may all be natives, but we are not all anthropologists 
(either indigenous or visiting). 
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ethnographer. Altorki had available a contrast between 'being an anthropologist' and 
'being one of the women', performed through an understanding of the difference 
between questions which were relevant to each community. " For example, as an 
anthropologist, questions of the likely benefits of different marriage links were only 
relevant (only discussed in her paper) insofar as they were questions that were 
decided by the women; she may have had strong views on who should marry whom, 
but we see no trace of this in her paper. " On the other hand, although I may not 
have had ethnographic training at the time, I came to the field of Al as an outsider, in 
twosenses: I was a journalist and I had (previously) trained as a philosopher. 
However, if ethnographers are crossers of boundaries it does not follow that all 
crossers of boundaries are ethnographers. Both these backgrounds contributed 
different ways of constituting myself as different, and highlighted slightly different 
problems in my attempt retrospectively to recast ten years of my life as an 
ethnographic field trip. 
As ajournalist, I began specialising in the field of Al in 1984 when I worked on an 
engineering trade journal" and I began to focus exclusively on the field in 1985, when 
I became editor of an Al newsletter called Machine Intelligence News (MIN). This 
newsletter covered the Al" industry, including product announcements, company 
news, the development and implementation of applications, government initiatives, 
and the views of various market and strategic analysts. It was sold by subscription 
only and the readership (which was never more than a few hundred) consisted of 
people already with some interest in Al, including members of corporate Al R&D 
departments, market analysts, and Al vendors and consultants. Because the 
newsletter was about and for the industrial Al community, this minimised the sort of 
"I am not suggesting that the availability of this contrast solves the problem of marking boundaries 
in Altorki's case, merely that it is one of resources available for managing the problem. Altorki's 
point, however, is to cast doubt on the very notion of 'indigenous anthropology'. She says (1982, p 
174). 'At no point in the analysis of my data have I found that the methods and theoretical 
perspectives developed in social anthropology were inadequate for an ethnological, cross-culturally 
meaningful, interpretation of the position of women in my own society. ' 
"' This sort of distinction is deliberately blurred by anthropologists concerned with the meeting of 
autobiography and ethnography (cf papers in Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Okely and Callaway, 1992). 
49 Engineeritig Today, published by Haymarket. In the three years I was there, this successively 
changed its name to TechnologY, then New Technology, before being closed down in 1985. 
" Until about 1987, MIN covered the Al industry in the terms described in the first paragraph of this 
section, which might otherwise be described as 'symbolic Al' (I discuss this in Chapter Five). Later 
in the 1980s, when products and applications of artificial neural nets began to appear, I also covered 
that. By the late 1980s, I extended the coverage over new interface technologies such as Virtual 
reality - 
Vaux, J Chapter Two 36 
journalistic boundary crossing that might have been involved if I had been writing for 
a publication with a more general readership. " I did not, for example, provide 
parenthetical explanations when I used technical or insider terms, as would be 
necessary in a more general publication. " On the other hand5 I performed a 
boundary-crossing role within the industrial Al community, providing a medium of 
communication between sub-communities. This was evideq, for example, when I 
interviewed Al vendors who spoke to me in order to communicate with my readers 
who were their potential customers, while I attempted to gather the information that 
I thought my readers would want (I discuss some examples of this in 3.2). Despite 
these internal divisions however, the readership can be seen as a performed 
community,, and the issues and questions covered by MIN reflected this community. 
Relevant (and pressing) questions included the extent to which any 'real life' 
applications of Al had been or were about to be implemented, whether and when the 
market was going to take off and, finally, what went wrong (why did the Al market 
fail? ), As ajoumalist my interests (in the sense of questions I understood to be 
relevant) largely coincided with the interests of the industrial Al community. 
Perhaps my philosophical identity can introduce a sceptical difference? As a 
philosopher, I came to the field of Al with an interest in what I took to be the 
philosophical issues raised by Al, in particular its claims about intelligence. " 
However, these turned out to be at best marginally relevant to the newsletter. ' In 
this respect, I am like the indigenous anthropologist who sees how much outsider 
anthropologists misunderstand (cf my comments on the sociological literature on Al 
in 2.2 above). Nonetheless, like Altorki (1982, p 174)1) 1 do not see a problem in 
principle in applying my more newly learned sociological skills to material gathered 
" One example of this was when I tried to interest New Scientist in a story about the first 'real-life' 
implementation of neural networks (in an airport security device). For readers of MfN, the question of 
whether, how many, and how successfully Al programs were going into implementation was a major 
story throughout the late 1980s. But it was not a story for New Scientist. 
" On journalist training courses we were taught that parenthetical explanations should always be 
provided as if the reader had no specialised knowledge, and more knowledgeable readers would 
simply read over or ignore the parenthetical explanations. To have included such parenthetical 
explanations in MIN, however, would have distanced it from its readers. Similarly Engineering 
Today would never have explained engineering terms that might have required explanation in a 
national paper. This is one of the ways in which the trade press performs community. 
"I published one academic paper (Vaux, 1986) in which I argued against the Al conception of mind, 
but also that AI and philosophical contributions to the AI debate were not engaging in the same 
issues. A much developed version of the latter argument is contained in Chapter Six (section 6.1) of 
this thesis. 
11 1 occasionally included brief reviews of new contributions to the Al debate, but I always felt this to 
be a bit of a self-indulgence. My connections with the journal AIand Society gave me some context 
for continuing to explore these interests. 
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while I was ajoumalist. Also like Altorki, however, I need to point out some 
specific practical issues in relation to the gathering of material. 
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As a journalist,, I spent a great deal of time interviewing various significant figures in 
the industrial Al community, particularly senior executives in Al start-up companies. 
I tape recorded these interviews (as I would a sociological interview), but in general I 
neither transcribed them fully nor kept them for any length of time after I had 
extracted what I wanted for the immediate purposes of a story. On journalist 
training courses we were taught to keep notes and other material for six months in 
case of libel charges. As a philosopher, I had a tendency to notice arguments that 
reflected philosophical issues and a sensitivity to anti -philosopher jokes. " 
However, philosophers have no concept of observational material, and I kept no field 
notes of any of these conversations (although I had in mind, for most of the time, the 
idea of 'one day writing all this up'). Some of this material, therefore, is not 
documented and may not be reliable in detail, although it has as much reliability as 
some other published autobiographical material. I therefore make use of some of my 
undocumented memories, but always make it clear (eg by using such forms as 'I 
remember... '). However, since I was writing a monthly newsletter from 1985 to 
1993,1 do have a great deal of textual evidence of the stories of moment and how 
they were handled. The final year of the newsletter overlapped with the first year of 
writing this thesis, ' and 
for this period I do have much better documented material, 
including interview transcripts and field notes of a Prolog users' conference (I make 
use of this material particularly in Chapter Three). In addition to the material I 
gathered as a journalist, much of this thesis is based on written material (published 
and unpublished) which provides examples of explanations of Al in different 
contexts and to different audiences. This is the major documented base of the larger 
part of this thesis. 
2.4 Summary: explanatory practices 
In this chapter I have explored what it might mean to study technology transfer as 
communication between discursive communities, in terms of the methodological 
traditions of STS (section 2.1) and some of the specific technology transfer issues 
" For example- 'Well philosophers haven't got very far with this subiect in two thousand years. ' 
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raised by the case of Al (section 2.2). Discussion of the methodological tradition 
provided a notion of 'performed community', an idea which was also raised in the 
slightly different context of the question of my own ethnographic position (section 
2.3). In this section, I try to draw some of these issues together and to ask what the 
lessons are for this case study. In particular: what are the discursive objects of my 
case study and how should I approach them? The point at issue is communication 
between discursive communities, and therefore it is not enough simply to explore the 
performance of a single community. I need not only to look at the industrial Al 
community, but also at the academic Al community (and probably several other 
communities besides). How does each construe their own identity and the identity 
of AI; and how (since the issue is communication) do they construe one another? If I 
focus on how each performs community, however, there is a danger of making it 
seem as if communication is impossible. To show the negotiation of a 'we' and of an 
'other', is to show the negotiation of boundaries and of difference. The pointl 
however , is to show how communication is possible, as well as the 
difficulties 
involved. In particular, since this is a study of technology transfer, the point is to 
show how communication about science and technology (what it is, what it is for, 
how it may change things) is possible. The solution, therefore , is to look at 
how 
scientific knowledge or technological advances are described and explained by 
different communities, particularly how they are described between communities, 
and then to read these descriptions for the performance of community. In the next 
few paragraphs I discuss some of the methodological implications of this. 
It is important, first, to note a problem in using the phrase 'technology transfer', 
which is often taken to imply a hierarchical distinction between science and 
technology, and a unidirectional, linear model in which science is done in universities, 
transformed by industry into technological products, and then disseminated (cf 1.2). 
Many authors have introduced other terms in which to conceptualise the knowledge 
used in innovation (cf Faulkner and Senker, 1995, pp 213-227). Nonetheless it 
seems to me valuable to retain the phrase 'technology transfer' to refer to 
institutionalised political practices for supporting technological innovation at a 
national level, as well as corporate practices of identifying, evaluating and marketing 
innovatory processes and products. In this narrow sense, only Chapters Three and 
Seven of my case study deal directly with technology transfer. It is central to my 
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analysis, however, that technology transfer should be located within a broader 
context of practices of communication and explanation. Academic explanatory 
practices, addressing a variety of audiences, are particularly relevant in a case of 
technology transfer which was research-led and which, on the basis of academic 
research developments was claimed to have revolutionary social and economic 
implications - as was the case with Al. Chapters Four, Five and Six all address 
communication between discursive communities,, within the broader context of 
technology transfer, largely within and between academic disciplines and subfields, 
but also in relation to more general audiences. 
I use the term 'explanatory practices' to refer to discursive practices of describing 
and explaining. My interest is in whether and how such explanations may perform 
more than they overtly say (eg descriptions which act to do more than simply 
describe). More specifically, I am interested in whether and how they perform 
community and configure the audience. It is important therefore to present any 
explanatory practices that I study in terms of location, context and audience. To 
give an initial indication of what I mean by these terms: by 'location' I mean the 
location of author or speaker or producer of the text, perhaps in institutional terms 
(for example, Al academic); by 'context' I mean the site of the explanation in a 
material sense,, that is the type of publication (eg textbook) or discussion (eg 
interview) in the understanding that there are complex performed conventions 
appropriate to different contexts" ; and by 'audience' I mean both the intended and 
configured audience. The category of 'audience' is not straightforward, and I am 
using a distinction between 'Intended' and 'configured' that needs some explanation. 
The intended audience, I take it,, is the audience of publishers' contracts, or the 
audience the author personally wishes to influence or to produce. A configured 
audience, on the other hand, has to do with mechanisms of capture. This is largely 
following the description given by Woolgar (Cooper and Woolgar, 1993; Grint and 
Woolgar, 1997; Woolgar, 199 1), where the user is configured partly through internal 
textual mechanisms and partly by various commentary resources (marketing material, 
reviews, visions of the inventor, etc). However, it is not clear what the equivalent of 
commentary resources would be in the case of explanatory practices, since relevant 
" However, there are are further senses of'context' which may also be relevant, including, for 
example, historical context (eg the way computers were talked about in the 1950s), and programmatic 
contexts (eg the context of the 'need' for a national IT programme). 
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commentary resources would themselves be explanatory practices. " It should not be 
assumed that any particular location, context or audience can be determinately 
defined, since these identifications will always be negotiated outcomes and as such a 
potential object of study. Nonetheless, there are some institutional i sed and relatively 
stable categories at issue here (such as 'sociologists' and 'textbooks'), and I assume it 
will usually be relatively easy to make a preliminary identification. 
A study of explanatory practices has a number of immediate advantages in tackling a 
case study of the exploitation of Al. First., as an academic field, Al has been 
explaining itself in different contexts to different audiences for several decades. 
Much of this material is surprisingly available, partly because this is a community 
with a strong sense of its own history. Even the sort of material that might in other 
case studies have to be sought out in archives is available on the net (for example, the 
text of the funding proposal for a summer school held in Dartmouth in 1956, often 
described as 'the first Al conference", is published on the web page of the Al 
researcher who was its main author,, John McCarthy). Secondly, a public debate 
with academics from other disciplines has been ongoing also for several decades. 
This debate allows an analytic switch of location, to study explanations and 
descriptions of Al from other disciplinary locations, and also provides one sort of 
example of communication between different discursive communities, and a study of 
contested identifications. Thirdly, the project to launch Al on the market was both 
discussed and carried out at least partly in papers and seminars directed at industrial 
researchers (cf Chapter Seven). In addition, the identification of Al as a strategic 
technology and as the future of computing has left at least some traces in publicly 
available material, including programmatic lobbying (eg Feigenbaw-n and 
McCorduck's (1984) The Fifth Generation), committee discussions (eg the report of 
the Alvey Committee (DOI, 1982)), and histories told by interested parties (for 
example Brian Oakley's post mortem on Alvey (Oakley and Owen, 1989)). Finally, 
stories of the failure of Al, and what went wrong, were told by many in the industrial 
Al community in the early 1990s (and this is available to me in material that I 
gathered as ajoumalist). These stories not only provide a further location from 
which the identity of Al is told, but adduce an explanation of the failure as a failure in 
" That is, if an explanation does not convince further explanation may be required, but not usually 
explanation of the explanation. This may be a general issue when the metaphor of 'technology as 
text' is reapplied to texts. 
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communication, and specifically as a failure in explaining and describing Al. This 
explanation for the failure of AI also provides a narrative starting point, not so much 
as an hypothesis to be tested, but as a recurrent response to explanations and 
descriptions of Al. That is, the question is not whether the diagnosis (overselling) is 
right but: how do accusations of 'hype' act as a performance of community on the 
part of audiences to descriptions of Al, when it comes to their turn to speak? 
The structure of the case study should be noted. Historically, I begin at the end, 
with a study of the Al industry of the 1980s and early 1990s. The reason for this is 
to begin with the diagnosis of a problem (that hype caused the Al market to fall) 
which contains an implicit, if crude, theory of technology transfer, which I use as a 
narrative resource within my case study. The following chapters, starting with a 
study of the early days of the academic Al community from the 1950s (Chapter 
Four) are more or less in historical order, although there is some overlap because the 
primary structure is thematic, dealing first with historical narratives (Chapters Four 
and Five), then with reading and interpretation (Chapter Six), before returning to the 
implications for the industrial and political exploitation of Al in the early 1980s 
(Chapter Seven). Throughout the case study, and as a matter of analytic principle,, I 
am tracing the explanatory practices associated with Al, at different locations, 
different times, in different contexts and to different audiences. This is not intended 
merely as an historical journey through different usages, but is meant to pose the 
question of how explanations of Al differ across various locations, contexts and 
audiences, and to be able to pose the question how this history of usages was 
apparent in the strategic and tactical judgements made about the potential of Al in 
the early 1980s. The material is largely text-based (except for interviews that I 
carried out as a journalist). I have not carried out further interviews with members of 
the Al community during the writing of the case study. Although this would have 
added a further historical dimension it would have yielded material that was not 
performative within the marketing of Al (that is, the interviews would have provided 
reminiscences to a sociologist). While this would have been interesting and relevant, I 
could not justify it within the length and time allowed for writing a PhD thesis. The 
chapters in the remainder of this thesis are organised as follows- 
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Chapter Three - How the Al industry construed the problem of Al. This 
chapter is based on descriptions of Al located within the industrial Al community. I 
ask about the relationship between 'indigenous commentators' (eg analysts, 
journalists, corporate marketing departments) and the interests of the industrial Al 
community, and how these interests were performed through the production of 
market predictions and analyses of news events. Finally, I explore the terms of an 
adduced 'failure' of Al, and various diagnoses of the problem given by members of 
the industrial Al community, and ask about the implications for a theory of 
technology transfer. 
The following chapters (Four to Seven) explore how Al was described in different 
contexts and to different audiences in order to understand the socio-rhetorical 
mechanisms involved in communication between discursive communities. 
Chapter Four - Narratives and audience: Al acquires a history 
In this chapter I ask how histories of Al may vary according to audience. I focus on 
the early history of Al (from the 1950s to the 1970s), both as it has been told in 
histories for a general reader and as the field was explicated in peer discussions and 
textbooks. I ask whether the configured audience may be understood as socio- 
rhetorical mechanism determining differences in the public and peer histories. 
Chapter Five - United around the symbolic? Alliances in the field 
This chapter addresses the performativity of history, its power, for example, to 
cement alliances or overturn a previous order. I draw on two examples: first, the 
history of cognitive science as an alliance of disciplines; secondly, the rehabilitation 
of the 'neural net' or 'connectionist' paradigm at the expense of 'symbolic Al .I 
conclude by asking how an understanding of the way in which historical texts may 
perform to further the interests of a faction, may throw light on communication 
between discursive communities. 
Chapter Six - Reading and interpretation: ascribing intelligence 
In this chapter I turn from questions concerning the performative power of texts, to 
asking about the interpretive power of the reader. I do this partly by exploring 
differences between disciplinary readings of issues, in the context of the Al debate, 
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and ask whether this can generate a concept of disciplinary 'interests,. I then ask 
how the interpretive flexibility of ascriptions of intelligence may relate to attempts to 
control and configure the reader. 
Chapter Seven - Industrial and political strategies: Al as strategic technology 
This is the final chapter of the case study, and in it I look at explanations of AI 
within the context of attempts to transfer the technology to industrial use. I look at 
differences in explanations for a heterogeneous industrial audience (consisting both of 
researchers and of corporate executives) and in the explanations given within policy 
making discourse. I ask in each case how attempts are made to construe the need for 
the technology for a specific audience. In drawing the case study together, I also ask 
whether and how the trope of intelligence was deployed in explaining Al to these 
audiences, and finally whether and how Al may be said to have failed (the question 
raised in Chapter Three). 
Chapter Eight - Analytic and theoretical conclusions 
This chapter draws together the major themes in the case study and offers a 
reassessment of the methodological and theoretical issues raised in Chapters One and 
Two, as well as identifying new methodological and theoretical issues arising in the 
course of the case study. I conclude by asking how the discussion in this thesis may 
be generallsed, and what avenues for further research are suggested. 
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CHAPTER THREE - HOW THE Al MUSTRY CONSTRUED THE 
PROBLEM OF Al 
3.0 Introduction. 
This chapter has a two-fold purpose. The first is to introduce the'problem of Al', 
that is, a problem as adduced by members of the industrial Al community during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. This was perceived as a problem specifically of 
technology transfer, and one popular explanations of the problem was that 
overselling orhype' in the early days of the Al industry had led to unrealistic market 
expectations and therefore caused a collapse of the market. In this chapter, I show 
how discussions within the industrial Al community produced this explanation. I 
then argue (in 3.4) that this diagnosis may usefully act as a sort of narrative motif to 
set against my own working hypothesis that technology transfer is to be seen as 
communication between discursive communities, and that it involves the production 
of social relations between those communities. The second purpose of this chapter 
is to provide a study of the industrial Al community of the 1980s, looking at the 
explanatory practices of the industrial AI community, and whether and how these 
relate to location, context and audience as described in my methodological aims 
(section 2.4). This study will take its place within a series of historical studies 
(through the succeeding chapters of the thesis), looking at the explanatory practices 
of different discursive communities, including the academic Al community (Chapters 
Four, Five and Six), other disciplinary communities, including Cognitive Science 
(Chapter Five), connectionism (Chapter Five) and philosophy (Chapter Six), and 
corporate and policy-making communities (Chapter Seven). My purpose is to look 
at the different explanations given by these different communities, and also to look at 
any differences within a discursive community's explanatory practices that can be 
seen to be related to context and audience,, to ask whether any common or neutral 
explanation of Al may be identified, since knowledge-passing models of technology 
transfer would seem to imply such neutral explanations should be identifiable. The 
double purpose of this chapter is made easier insofar as the'problem of Al', its 
failure to attain the markets originally predicted for it, was a dominant concern for 
the Al industry through most of the 1980s. 
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In accordance with the methodological approach that I described in 2.4,1 start this 
section with an indication of the location, context and audience of these explanations 
and descriptions. One major source of the material used in this chapter was the 
specialist commentators, including my own newsletter and other Al newslettem, 
magazines and specialist market reports. The Al newsletters (like other specialist 
industrial newsletters) were not particularly visible to outsiders. They were not 
available in newsagents, and were usually sold by mail order subscription only, 
relying on a relatively high subscription rate to service a relatively small subscriber 
base,, " and they were less visible even than the mainstream computer trade press 
which is usually 'controlled circulation). 59 Among Al newsletters and subscription- 
only magazines available in the 1980s were: 
us 
Expert Systems Strategies (later Intelligent Software Strategies). US Monthly newsletter. 
Started 1985 
ICS Applied Artificial Intelligence Reporter (later AI Week-, later Intelligent Systems Report). 
US. Monthly Newsletter. Started 1983 
The Spang Robinson Report. US. Monthly newsletter. 1984-1992. 
UK 
AlBusiness. UK. Monthly newsletter. 1986 - 1989. (Afflusiness shared a publisher with 
Expert Systems User and in 1989 the two were combined in Expert Systems User) 
AI Watch. UK. Monthly newsletter. Started 1992 (still published). 
Expert Systems. UK. Quarterly magazine. Started 1984 
Expert Systems User. UK. Monthly magazine started 1984 (newsletter from 1989) Now 
defunct. 
Machine Intelligence News. UK. Monthly newsletter. 1984-1993. 
France 
Lettre dIA. France. Monthly Newsletter. Started 1985. 
This is not an exhaustive list: there are at least some US newsletters left off the list. 
I have not included any academic Al journals or publications of professional bodies 
associated with Al as I do not draw on them in this chapter. I have also drawn 
(especially in 11) on market reports by the UK market analyst Ovum. While 
several market research companies (eg Frost & Sullivan) ventured into analyses of the 
Al industry during the 1980s, Ovum began by specialising in the area. The 
company's first report (Ovum 19 84)' , written 
by founder Tim Johnson, was The 
78 For example MY s circulation was in the hundreds, an annual subscription was II 10 in 198 7, 
and L 170 in 1993 
5' A controlled circulation newspaper is sent free to computer (or other relevant) professionals and 
makes its money mainly from job advertisements. 
" The Ovum reports were written by a number of different authors. For clarity I have treated Ovum as 
the author in bibliographical references, individual authors are named 
in the Bibliography. 
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Commercial Applications ofExpert System Technology, and Ovum produced a 
number of reports on expert systems during the 1980s (while also expanding both in 
numbers of staff and the technological areas covered in its reports). Other material is 
taken both from the newsletter I edited (AWN) and from other Al specialist 
newsletters. 
The texts described above, on which I have drawn in this chapter, may be said to be 
located in a community of indigenous commentators. The audience for these texts is 
the Al industry in a broad sense, that is, not only vendors but also other analysts, 
investors and early customers. It may seem counter-intuitive to place customers 
'inside' the industry. However, what Ovum (1986a) calls 'leading users', the 
companies that were buying Al products during the 1980s,, were mainly buying 
development systems in order to explore and build Al systems either for inhouse use 
or to sell as products. That is, customers at this time tended themselves to be Al 
developers. The indigenous commentators, then, were writing about and for an 
insider audience. Not only were the commentators 'insiders' and in some sense 
shared the interests of the broad industrial Al community, but they also formed a 
specific subcommunity whose apparent role was to facilitate communication 
between other specific subcommunities. For example, when I was interviewing Al 
vendors, most of what they said to me was directed at my readership which (for 
much of the 1980s at least) was located in their main market. Such interviews are 
often highly managed,, with other corporate representatives in the room, including 
someone with technical knowledge, and a PR person. 
In addition to drawing on published material, such as newsletters and market reports, 
I have also drawn on other material that I gathered when working as a Journalist. 
This includes some material from taped interviews beyond the material that I 
published at the time. My presentation of the material is also informed by my 
memories of discussions, and occasionally I present these recollections as material 
(but always indicating that they are personal recollections). Towards the end of the 
period, I also made field notes of discussions and conversations at a Prolog users 
conference which I have drawn on especially in section 3.3. 
This chapter begins (3.1) by asking how the Al industry and Al market were 
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identified and described by members, through a study of a series of reports from one 
market research company (Ovum), asking how the interests of the industrial Al 
community were negotiated through the reports, and what this example indicates 
about the situation of indigenous commentators. In the following section (3.2) 1 ask 
how the Al newsletters represented the strategies adopted by Al vendors to manage 
the perceived problem of the Al marketplace; again this section involves looking at 
the relationship between indigenous commentators and the community of which they 
are a part. I then (in 3.3) explore some different explanations of the problem of Al, 
as given by members of different subcommunities within the broad industrial Al 
community. Finally (3.4) 1 ask what is implied for a theory of technology transfer 
and how I plan to address this within my case study. 
3.1 The Al market: identifying growth and crisis 
This section provides a brief sketch of the Al industry and its market as a 
preliminary to looking at ways in which Al vendors attempted to manage their 
situation in the market (cf 3.2). Of course, to identify a market sector is already a 
political act. " In this section I look at how the industry and its market was 
construed by members, taking as my example a series of reports written by the UK- 
based market research company Ovum (described in 3.0). 1 begin with a sketch of 
the Al industry and its marketplace, and then look at some predictions of market 
growth and ways of explaining market failure, asking whether and how such 
predictions and explanations may themselves perform community. 
The first Al vendor companies were set up, mainly by academics, in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. They sold hardware and software products that had been 
developed (or initiated) in university research labs, mainly in a small number of high 
ranking academic institutions (Fleck, 1982; Ovum, 1984). Many of these products 
were targeted at the development of expert systems (a number of prototype expert 
systems had already been developed, mainly as PhD research projects) (cf Minsky, 
1968, p v); and they were primarily written in Al programming languages such as 
Lisp or (in Britain and France) Prolog. The products in the early stages included 
"I Cf Henkel et al (1999) for a description of the Materials Panel of the UK Foresight initiative as 
attempting to renegotiate the DTI's definition of the materials industry. 
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expert system development environments (shells), some bespoke expert systems, Al 
programming languages (Lisp or Prol0g), and Lisp workstations (ie computer 
workstations optimised to run the Lisp language). The industry was largely based on 
small start-up companies. Table One shows some of the earliest small Al 
companies. As Table One indicates, most of the small companies involved in the 
first wave of commercialisation had links with university research groups, and most 
of the products were commercial versions of what had till then been research 
software or hardware. 
TABLE ONE: THE FIRST WAVE OF SMALL COMPANY START-UPS 
Yr Founded Name Main products Research'Univ 
(1979) Inference ART (ES shell)/1983 (Cal. Tech)* 
1979 Intelligent Terminals (ES shells/rule induction) Edinburgh 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1983 
Lisp Machine Inc Lambda (Lisp workstation) MIT 
Symbolics Inc (Lisp workstations) MIT 
IntelliCorp 
LPA 
KEE (ES shell) 
Micro-Prolog (prog lang) 
S-1, M. I (ES shells) 
Prolog- I (prog lang) 
(ES for financial applications) 
XCON (for DEC) 
Stanford 
Teknowledge 
Expert Systems Ltd 
APEX 
Carnegie Group 
SRL (ES shell) 
Imperial 
Stanford 
(Edinburgh)t 
cmu 
* Inference was founded in 1979 as Systems Cognition Corp, selling a maths package called SW 
developed at the California Institute of Technology; in 1983 Inference launched its Lisp-based expert 
system development tool, ART, which had originally been developed for inhouse use (Ovum 1984, 
277-8). 
t ESL was not a university spin-off, but its Prolog was the standard version of the language, 
developed at Edinburgh. 
In several cases, leading Al academics were Involved in founding the companies: for 
example, Ed Feigenbaum (Stanford) was a founder both of IntelliCorp and 
Teknowledge; Donald Michie (Edinburgh) founded Intelligent Terminals; Mark Fox, 
John McDermott, Raj Reddy and Jaime Carbonell (all of CMU) were on the 
founding board of the Carnegie Group; Keith Clark and Frank McCabe (Imperial) 
founded LPA (Logic Programming Associates); and a research team at MIT building 
the CADR Lisp machine split into two rival Lisp machine companies - Russell 
Noftsker leading the majority into Symbolics, and Richard Greenblatt and others 
joining LM1. Given that the academic Al community was small and interlinked and 
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predominantly North Amencan (Fleck, 1982), the products had a certain 
commonality and were predominantly Lisp-based. " From 1984, the number of Al 
companies proliferated. Among the 1984 start-ups in the US were several companies 
offering Lisp programming environments , including Gold Hill,, Franz Lisp and Lucid. 
Quintus, which became the leading supplier of Prolog was also incorporated in the 
US in the same year. Larger corporations which entered the market during the early 
1980s included: Xerox which produced a Lisp workstation based on technology 
developed at Stanford University; and Texas Instruments and Sperry" both of which 
sold rebadged versions of LN11's Lambda machines (called Explorer). DEC's VAX 
workstations also became popular Al development platforms, and in 1984 DEC 
launched a version of Lisp to run on VAX. By 1986 a two-volume report published 
by market analyst Ovum counted 22 software suppliers and nine hardware suppliers 
in North America, and 35 software suppliers and II hardware suppliers in Europe 
(Ovum 1986a and 1986b). " A report two years later counted a world total of 130 
vendors offering 211 products (Ovum 1988). 
The small Al industry was given a boost by the institution of a number of national 
and international Fifth Generation funding programmes, first in Japan and then 
elsewhere, as shown in Table Two. These funding programmes were significant for 
prioritising Al research within national science funding budgets. The market for Al 
in the early part of the 1980s was largely made up of systems sold to R&D teams in 
university and corporate labs for technology evaluation and the development of 
experimental and prototype systems. The fifth generation programmes meant that 
"' The smaller European Al community tended to work in Prolog (a language developed by 
researchers in France, Britain and Hungary), which was also the language adopted by the Japanese 
Fifth Generation Computing Programme announced in 1982. Some of the earliest applications of 
Prolog were made in Hungary. A 1986 briefing document produced by Balint Domolki, director of 
the Hungarian Computer Research and Innovation Centre, SZKI, claimed 'Prolog arrived [in 
Hungary] in 1975, as elsewhere through academic channels, but the environment in which Prolog was 
used happened not to be an academic one . .... 
[B]y the mid- 1970s Prolog was used in Hungary in 
several fields of computer applications including pharmaceutical research and architectural design. 
Some of these programs are now regarded as the first European achievements in 'expert systems' (a 
notion which did not yet exist at that time). ' More singular approaches included the rule-induction 
programming that Michie's company offered which was based on an algorithm originally developed 
by an Australian, Ross Quinlan. 
03 In 1986 Burroughs acquired Sperry to form Unisys which continued to market Explorer. 
"' This involves counting some of the hardware suppliers twice, since US hardware suppliers also 
figure in the European list, alongside Bull, ICL, Nixdorf and Siemens. The European list of software 
suppliers includes R&D institutes, whereas the North American list is confined solely to corporate 
suppliers of commercial packages. 
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university Al teams had a budget for Al products (hardware and/or software). " 
TABLE TWO: FIFTH GENERATION FUNDING PROGRAMMES 
Yr started Name Countrylftn Valuellength * 
1982 Fifth Generation Computer Project JapanWTI Y100,000M/10 
yrst 
1983 The Alvey Programme for Advanced UK L200m/5 yrs 
Information Technology (+f I 50m from 
industry) 
1983 Strategic Computing Program US/DARPA $600m/5 yrs- 
1984 Esprit (European Strategic Programme Europe 1500m ECU/10 
for R&D in IT) yrs** 
*Value and length as originally announced. 
tMoto-oka & Kitsuregawa, 1985; the Alvey Committee (DOI, 1982, par 3.18) translated the value of 
the Japanese programme as between $200m and $500m. -DARPA, 1983(b). 
"This was the May 1983 proposal; the initial project was for 750M ECU over 4 years (1984-8) (cf 
House of Lords, 1984-5). 
In what sense was there an Al industry, and what was its market taken to be? The 
Ovum reports largely addressed the market as one for 'expert systems' (or in the 
final report in 1989, for 'knowledge-based systems'). ' In its first report (1984) 
Ovum started by defining an expert system, in terms of likely uses (application 
areas) and its software architecture (le knowledge base, inference engine and user 
interface). The 1984 report introduces expert systems by distinguishing between 
the 'few spectacular pioneering systems' associated with Ed Feigenbaum's group and 
Stanford University (including a geological exploration system called Prospector,, a 
medical diagnostics system called Mycin, and a Dendral, a system for determining 
molecular structures) and a 'new generation of expert systems' offering 'cost- 
effective solutions' for 'day-to-'day problems'. Ovum commented (pp 1-2), on the 
latter: 
These systems are less spoken about in the media because they are in less 
glamorous applications than medical diagnosis or mineral prospecting. They are 
65 In the UK, the Alvey programme standardised on the Xerox Dandelion, a Lisp workstation that was 
considered more cost-effective than the top of the range, and more expensive, Symbolics and LMI 
machines. 
11 The reports I am drawing on are - ! he Commercial Application of Expert Systems (Ovum 19 84), 
Expert Systems 1986 Vol I- USA and Canada (Ovum 1986a); Commercial Expert Systems in Europe 
(Ovum 1986b); Expert ýi, stems in Banking and Securities (I 988a), Erpert Systems Markets and 
Suppliers (Ovum 1988b); Knowledge-based systems: Markets, suppliers andproducts (Ovum 1989). 
Ovum also published reports in other AI related language such as natural language processing. 
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carrying out such tasks as configuring computer systems, planning the repair of 
telephone cables, and helping people to use complex software. But it is in this more 
technical area that the best immediate prospects for expert systems lie. 
In subsequent reports it is assumed that the reader probably knows what an expert 
system is (and any definitions are much briefer), but the question of most likely 
application areas continued to be an issue for predicting the market. In its 1986 
report on North American markets, Ovum reported a database of 500 expert system 
projects, in which 'leading examples include fault diagnosis, analysis of complex data 
and advice on regulations' (1986a, 19). As the financial sector became increasingly 
promising, Ovum published a special report on Expert Systems in Banking and 
Securities (1988a). 
The main purpose of the Ovum report, however, was market estimation and 
prediction. The figures that Ovum gives from one report to the next are difficult to 
compare by categories, because they use slightly different terms reflecting changes in 
the market. However, a pattern of assumed growth is evident from the following 
examples: " 
- 1984: US market for expert systems development projected to be worth $95 
million in 1985 and $685 million in 1990; 
- 1986: North American product and services market for expert systems 
estimated at $400 million in 1986,, and predicted to be worth $1.9 billion in 
1992; 
- 1988: total traded ES development and delivery market in the US estimated at 
$587m in 1987 and predicted to be $2.8bn in 1992 ($5.8bn in 1995). 
In providing market figures, the Ovum reports also supplied a commentary on the 
marketplace, and reading this commentary provides a history of some of the changing 
concerns of the Al industry. In 1984, for example, it is explicitly assumed, first, that 
growth of the market Will be limited by supply rather than demand (because 'expert 
systems will be able to deliver such clear commercial benefits' (p 36)) and secondly 
that the main bottleneck will be the availability of skilled knowledge engineers. In 
1986, the report asked why there were not more operational systems (that is, real 
rather than prototype systems), and commented sceptically (1986a, p 2). 
One common reply is that commercial companies who achieve operational systems 
will not be keen to advertise this fact, but will prefer to keep secret a system that 
The figures I give here do not reflect the detail of figures given in the reports. 
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perhaps provides a competitive edge. In fact our research suggests that this is not 
usually the case. 
Nonetheless it reported that 'leading users' expected soon to implement expert 
systems and expected to derive substantial benefits. In 1988, however, the Ovum 
report bluntly opened with the words (1988b, p 1): 
The expert systems business has been through a terrible period in 1987-88. In the 
USA, the 'Gang of Four'68 - the new venture software companies which once led the 
industry - have all run into losses and cut back staff more or less severely. 
After years of growth, many expert systems companies had run into reversal and 
losses. Nonetheless Ovum (pp 2-3) confidently projected a 'second wave' of 
growth, based on three drivers: growing numbers of operational applications; a 
mature technology, 'much closer to the real needs of mainstream data processing'; 
and 'a more realistic marketing focus' . Finally, in 1989 (p 3), Ovum continued to 
perceive an increase in the number of operational systems, a better defined 
technology and a more mature supply industry and concluded that the knowledge- 
based systems (KBS) business was in 'much better health than it enjoyed only a year 
ago'. It also noted 'a change of style , in particular a tendency to use the phrase 
'knowledge-based system' instead of 'expert system'. Ovum reflected this change in 
the name of its 1989 report, commenting (p 3): 
'Knowledge-based systems' has the advantage of identifying this type of computer 
system by the technology used - search and inference from a knowledge base - 
rather than giving the misleading impression that it is the attempt to emulate an 
expert which is the key distinguishing factor. 
The above passage presents the renaming of expert systems" as'knowledge based 
systems' as a reassertion of the technological. The authoritative tone of these 
remarks belies the sense of crisis in the industry. Between 1984 and and 1989 the 
Ovum reports had moved from the expectation that the benefits of expert systems 
would drive a strong market demand (1984), to worrying about the slow delivery of 
operational systems (1986a), to reports of a crisis (1988b), to the description of an 
industry attempting to redefine itself (1989). The latter point is symbolised through 
" That is Intellicorp, Inference, Teknowledge and Carnegie Group. This use of the term 'Gang of 
Four', without explanation, acts as a test of membership for the reader which is perhaps not 
appropriate in a market report, even one for insiders. The 1989 report, however, did spell out the 
names (P 8). 
"' For further comments on this renaming cf section 3.3. It is also worth noting that the name'expert 
systems' was rejected in discussions leading to the setting up of the UK Alvey Committee in the 
early 1980s (cf section 7.2) in favour of 'Intelligent Knowledge Based Systems' (IKBS). 
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a change of phraseology. In both noting and deploying this change of phraseology, 
the Ovum report may be seen as intending to perform community; that is to say, 
f. the use of 'insider' terminology acts to sayl am a member of the community, and 
use of insider terminology also acts to maintain a discursive community. At the 
same time,, the continuing predictions that growth would still occur may, as the 1988 
report itself implies, also be seen as performing membership of the industry (1988b, 
p 1): 
The pessimist can match the current commercial difficulties with corresponding 
scepticism about the prospects for expert systems as a worthwhile and distinctive 
technology, at least as far as the mainstream dp business is concerned. Not 
surprisingly, Ovum takes a more positive view. 
The phrase 'not surprisingly' reinforces the performance of membership, configuring 
an audience of insiders that expects Ovum to champion the industry (not to be a 
'pessimist'). It is a moment of self-conscious perfon-nance of membership that draws 
attention to the fact that market predictions are not neutral. However, the 
performance of membership does not depend on the self-consciousness: for an 
indigenous commentator to be pessimistic risks'talking down'the market. 
In this section I have provided an introduction to the Al industry (and its problems) 
in which 1 have tried to show how descriptions of an industry may also perform 
membership of that industry. This applies not only in the notoriously difficult area 
of market prediction, but even in the identification of the Al industry, of 'knowing' 
which companies and products were Al. As a former indigenous commentator, I am 
tempted to say 'but of course that is the Al industry. In addition, however, the 
role of the indigenous commentator was to find the words which would represent the 
situation as resoluble or manageable. In the next section I shall look at ways in which 
Al companies attempted to manage the problems of the Al marketplace, again 
exploring ways in which membership of the community is performed through the 
identification of problems and solutions. 
3.2 How Al vendors negotiated the problem of Al 
In the previous section I described the beginnings, growth and crisis of the Al 
industry through the predictive commentary of a series of market reports. In this 
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section I look at the problem of Al as reported in the specialist Al newsletters (of 
which the newsletter I edited,, Machine Intelligence News, was one), which prov I ded a 
commentary on the analyses and strategies of the Al vendor companies. As 
journalists, the newsletter editors were not intentionally speaking for the Al 
companies, " but one major source of material was the public announcements and 
supplementary explanations made by vendors. " Reading the newsletters now 
provides some sense of the relatively unconsidered analysis of a contemporary 
response to events. The structure of this section is based on the selection of a series 
of strategic moments in the marketing of Al, as a framework for discussing the ways 
that Al vendors were represented as attempting to manage the market. 
In the summer of 1986 Teknowledge, a Stanford spin-off company set up in 1981 to 
sell expert-system development environments, announced that it was effectively 
abandoning the Al programming language Lisp in favour of C, " the programming 
language most used in corporate DP (data processing) and NUS (management 
information systems) departments. We reported this in Machine Intelligence News 
as the lead story, under the heading 'Teknowledge redescribes the universe' (August 
1986, p 1). The significance of this story was that it had been commonly assumed 
that most expert systems of any interest would be written in Al programming 
languages (primarily Lisp, but also the European Al language Prolog and some 
others). Teknowledge had also announced (AKN Aug 1986, p 1): 
It is working on a new architecture for Al tools called Copernicus - which no longer 
views Al as the centre of the universe. The sun in this new cosmology? The IBM 
world of conventional MIS and DP. 
The Teknowledge announcements coincided with the major US trade show for Al, 
which was combined with the major research conference run by AAA1 (American 
Association of Artificial Intelligence) and called AAAL Coverage of AAAI 86 in 
other newsletters had different angles on the same story. The Spang Robinson 
I have in mind here differences between journalism and, say, public relations (PR). This may be 
seen, for example, in relation to 'ownership' of the text produced from an interview: the normal terms 
of a journalistic interview include the understanding that the journalist has full control of how the 
story is handled, in a PR interview, the chent expects to set the terms of the story and to approve it 
before it is published. 
" For example, I would get information from regular press releases sent out by the vendors, possibly 
supplemented by a phone interview. For major announcements, vendors would organise press 
conferences. There were also opportunities for informal discussions at exhibitions and conferences. 
" Teknowledge had, earlier in the year, announced aC version of its expert system tool S. 1, now it 
was announcing that it would no longer supply the Lisp version (MIN, Aug 1986, p 1). 
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Report had a lead feature called'IBM validates AP, recording IBM's late commitment 
to 'the commercial potential of Al', and speculating on the implications for the small 
specialist Al vendor companies (SRR September 1986). AppliedAI Reporter 
headlined its lead story 'Al gets down to business'. All the newsletters reported a 
speech at AAAI by Herb Schorr of IBM as a sign of IBM's commitment to Al 
(focusing on expert systems, but talking also of vision, robotics, and natural language 
processing). Other Al companies had followed Teknowledge's lead to provision of 
C versions of their tools. Writing in Applied AI Reporter (Aug 86, p 3), Tom 
Schwartz commented: 
The big switch to C continues. Teknowledge is already shipping S. 1 in C. Inference 
is about to show aC version of ART at AAAL Carnegie Group is going to announce 
that we can expect C delivery version of Knowledge Craft within two years. Of the 
gang of four, only IntelliCorp would rather fight than switch .... 
The above reports all talk as if Al was about to be taken up in 'mainstream 
computing'. The switch to C might be taken as an industry getting ready for serious 
applications. However, with hindsight, it might also be taken as an industry 
struggling with a recalcitrant market. The same newsletters that reported the entry 
of IBM into the market also reported problems for the two leading Al hardware 
companies, Symbolics and Lisp Machines Inc (LMI), two MIT spin-offs selling 
Lisp workstations and associated software. Symbolics announced that its earnings 
were up in the first three quarters of the year (fiscal 1986), but it predicted lower 
earnings for the fourth quarter; LMI was predicting profits by the end of the year, 
but in the meantime had laid off 60 staff (AAIR Aug 86). Symbolics did indeed 
report 'marginal' losses in the quarter ended September 30,1986. " In October 1986, 
LMI lost seven software developers, the larger part of its Process Systems Division 
who left to form a new company, Gensym. A/ffN commented at the time (Oct 1986, 
p 1): 
The Process Systems Division is often regarded as one of LMI's main strengths and 
was responsible for the development of LMI's Picon system, a real-time expert 
system for uses such as process control ... 
" 
By late 1986, press reports in national, non-specialist publications were talking of an 
MN, prophetically as it turned out, headlined this story 'Symbolics sneezes'. 
7' Gensym went on to make a successful business selling process control systems based in expert 
systems and other techniques. In 1999 it is a publicly quoted company. 
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,) 75 'Al Winter 
. The newsletters,, 
however, tended to either ignore or challenge the 
idea. For example, The Spang Robinson Report in January 1987 (pp 1-4) labelled the 
Al winter 'a misperception, arguing that it mistakenly assumed that there was a 
'homogeneous' Al industry; and that it was based on the performance of just two Al 
companies, IntelliCorp, and Symbolics,, which had both suffered 'dramatic quarterly 
losses ... after consistent profitability. Following a survey of Al companies,, SRR 
found that: 
All companies regardless of their product niche viewed the current market condition 
not as a winter or market downturn, but as a market shift. 
AWN (Jan 1987, pp 3-4) did a similar survey of the UK Al industry and reported: 
Almost unanimously, the people we spoke to thought that the so-called Al winter is a 
misperception of what are actually changes in the marketplace - and a misperception 
based on the performance of a few high-end specialist American companies. 
However, LMI went into 'Chapter Eleven' (the first stages of bankruptcy 
proceedings under US law) at the end of March 1987, and was looking for a 
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purchaser. Symbolics, after three years of increasing revenues and profits (it went 
public in 1984), began to experience declining revenues and increasing losses from 
1987. Teknowledge experienced losses from the final quarter of 1986 onwards. 77 In 
an industry in which many of the companies were private, not all the losses were 
immediately revealed. Inference (a private company), for example, did not reveal any 
losses, but dropped 21 staff in August 1987. By the middle of 1988, another sign of 
a declining market was the drop in attendance at trade shows. AAAI 88, which had 
been booked for a large conference centre in St Paul's Minnesota, on the assumption 
that numbers would keep rising, saw 'an attendance hovering around the 5,000 mark 
for the third year running' and a smaller exhibition with 92 vendors against 100 the 
previous year (AWN Sep 1988). The vendor companies that had been started by 
" There was, for example, an article in 1he San Francisco Examiner in December 1986 (cited SRR 
Jan 1987, p 2). In the UK, The New Scientist and the computer press ran stories on the Al winter 
around December 1986 and January 1987 (cf AWN Jan 198 7, p 3). 
" It was ultimately bought by a Canadian chip manufacturer called GigaMoss and subsequently 
disappeared from sight. 
" Teknowledge's figures for the final quarter of 1986 appeared to show a profit, and this was accepted 
by most of the newsletters. However, Joan Cochran writing in AIIR (Dec 1986) argued that this was 
m=isleading: 'Adjusting for interest income and a change in accounting methods, the first quarter 
would show a pre-tax operating loss of $743,000 versus a pre-tax profit of $126,000 a year ago. ' 
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academics were increasingly put in the hands of professional management. " 
However, while expert system applications might still be rarer than once expected, 
they were going into use by the second half of the 1980s. The Spang Robinson 
Report (Aug 1988, p 2), which insisted there was no crisis, only an industry in 
transition, argued 'Al is a technology not a market: that is, the sigmficance of Al 
was not as an industry defined in terms of the early pioneering companies, but as a 
technology (ie an approach to programming and systems design) that was sold by 
many different companies and incorporated in many different products. 
The different responses to the story of the Al winter, by the outsider, national press 
on the one hand, and the insider, specialist newsletters on the other, might be taken 
as a moral example of indigenous commentators 'going native' and failing to report the 
unpleasant news in front of their eyes. However, it is also important to note that the 
indigenous commentaries did not necessarily hold out comfort for the Al industry or 
for individual Al vendors. For example, Spang Robinson's continuing insistence that 
there was no crisis,, based in the analysis that Al was 'a technology not a market', 
might be seen as challenging one of the most basic assumptions of the Al industry. 
Indeed,, it could be taken to imply that there should not be an Al industry as such, 
that the transition required was for the Al industry to disappear, and this was in 
effect a strategy adopted by some vendors, who began to look for vertical markets. 
The Camegie Group, for example, chose to focus solely on the manufacturing market 
(SRR, Aug 1988, p 6). More generally, the industry attempted to sell Al systems to 
the corporate marketplace by addressing its installed or 'heritage' computing systems, 
and indeed the move to C began to seem like the first step in this transition out of the 
Al marketplace. 
The newsletters may have initially discounted stories of the Al winter. However, 
the unfolding story of crisis in the Al industry was told in the newsletters through 
their coverage of the manoeuvres of the industry. The final strategic moment to look 
at in this section concerns a further attempt by Al vendors to capture corporate 
clients by abandoning Al. In October 1992, MN reported a visit to London by 
" Russel Noftsker, the MIT academic who had founded Symbolics was replaced as CEO in January 
1987. In January 1989, he was unsuccessful in a bid to return to the board simply as a Director, 
though he continued to hold stock (AIWeek, Jan 1 1989, p 4). When Symbolics eventually went 
bankrupt in 1998, the assets were bought by a new company called Symbolics Technology headed by 
Russel Nofisker. 
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senior executives of Symbolics, 'talking to customers and journalists in what was 
touted as a "UK relaunch" of the company'. We published a story giving a brief 
history of Symbolics according to a newly appointed VP of product development. 
He described the company as abandoning Al in favour of graphics in the late 1980s; 
then selling its graphics interests to a Japanese company in January 1992; '9 and now 
(September 1992) turning back to its 'software engineering technology' (once called 
an 'expert systems development environment') and aiming to sell this as an 
environment for developing complex real-time applications in heterogeneous 
environments. The following year, representatives from Inference, IntelliCorp and 
another leading Al company called Neuron Data visited London within a few weeks 
of each other,, also all announcing corporate relaunches. We ran the stories one after 
another, to emphasise the similarities, which can be seen in the respective first 
paragraphs (MN, June 1993, pp 6-7): 
1 )INFERENCE: Senior executives of Inference Corp were in Europe earlier this 
month, spreading the news of their new marketing philosophy, embodied in ART 
Enterprise. The new development tool is ultimately based on Inference's well 
established Al technology, ART; but on the assumption that A/ is only ever going to 
be a 'niche'market, ART Enterprise is dressed up for the 'corporate applications' 
market. This means, essentially, GUIs and objects in a client-server architecture. 
2)INTELLICORP: IntelliCorp is also getting its new market strategy in place ... It has 
launched a new version of Kappa (release 3.0), intended to bring compatibility 
between Unix and MS-Windows. Applications developed in Unix may now be 
delivered on PCs. President Ken Haas says, 'Kappa 3.0 is a watershed for 
IntelliCorp, because it allows us to take our technology to a much broader audience. ' 
Kappa 3.0 also provides new GUI tools and C++ interoperability. 
At the same time, IntelliCorp is also targeting client-server architectures through 
a new family of products called Kappa CommManager .... 
3)NEURON DATA: Senior management from Neuron Data also recently visited 
London, to promote the company's new Elements architecture, aimed at the client- 
server market. CEO Patrick Perez believes that the new architecture, with visual 
programming editors, easier data access across client-server networks, and a new 
Script language, will open the door to new users, particularly business developers. 
He says: 'The bottom line here is to broaden our market.... [Emphases NOT in the 
original] 
One Symbolics executive explained the particular vulnerability of graphics system to recession: 
4people weren't buying things, which meant the advertisers weren't placing ads, which meant the 
people who were doing the ads weren't getting the jobs, which meant they weren't buying the 
systems' (SZ Inter"ew 9/92). 
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The problem identified by each company was that Al was a niche market, and all 
three companies shared a new target market: corporate client-server computing. 
The vendors emphasised that they were not abandoning the Al market (they were, 
after all, talking to the representative of an Al newsletter). Inference, for example, 
claimed that its new product (called ART Enterprise) was also the latest release of its 
Al product ART-IM (in particular, full maintenance ART-IM customers would get a 
free upgrade to ART Enterprise). At the same time, it was acting to drop its public 
association with Al. The following month (July 1993, p 3) MN ran a report on 
AAAI 93 (contributed by David Blanchard of AI Week) which ironically remarked: 
Client/server computing literally stole the show at AAAI '93 .... Some of the best 
known expert system development tool vendors such as Trinzinc (KBMS and ADS), 
Inference (ART-IM), IntelliCorp (Kappa) and Information Builders (Level5), declined 
to participate in what used to be - for them, at least - their industry's most 
important trade show. 
The report went on to point out that this was particularly paradoxical, because a 
conference aimed at industrial developers (Industrial applications of Al, or IAAI), 
and featuring Al systems built on tools from the AI vendors, was held next door to 
the AAAI exhibition: 
Inference was boasting that 10 of the 16 applications chosen for the IAAI show were 
developed using its products, and yet when the corporate attendees of the IAA1 show 
strolled over to the AAAI trade show, Inference was nowhere in sight. 
On this evidence, the final strategy of the Al industry was to remove itself from the 
Al marketplace, and thus to cease to be an Al industry. A web search carried out in 
1999 revealed that while many of the companies survive in name, very few 
acknowledge their history in Al, " and very few are in the business of advanced 
computing. " Many of the companies are now offering products in the e-commerce 
business. " With the disappearance of the Al marketplace in the early 1990s, the 
" Some companies, such as Neuron Data and Teknowledge, give a brief history that cites their 
origins in 'artificial intelligence' and 'expert systems'. Others, however, seem to seek to hide their 
history. In the case of Inference, I took some time to assure myself this was the same company (not 
just a purchaser of the name) as the web site includes no history before 1998. 
" One exception is Carnegie Group, which was acquired by the LJK software company Logica. 
Another important exception is Symbolics Technology, which acquired the assets of Symbolics when 
it went bankrupt in 1998 and - led by the original CEO and NHT academic Russel Noftsker - is 
returning to the niche advanced computing market. 
11 For example, Inference now offers software (k-Commerce) to support web-based customer contact 
centres; Quintus, which was once the major vendor of the Al programming language Prolog, now 
offers software for corporate call centres (eContact); Neuron Data supplies 'Engines for e-business', 
rule-based systems for companies to interact with customers over the web, Teknowledge provides a 
broad range of Internet software and services. 
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indigenous commentators experienced as many problems as the Al vendors. A few 
made the transition to a broader, advanced IT arena. " Many of the newsletter 
changed their names in the early 1990s, attempting to locate themselves in a niche 
market for advanced systems design. " Several newsletters went out of business, 
including Spang Robinson and Machine Intelligence News. 
In summary, this section has looked at the strategic manoeuvres of the Al vendors 
through the commentary of the Al newsletters, showing how these commentaries 
first identified the manoeUVTes as opening up new opportunities (representing the 
move from Lisp to C as bringing Al to 'conventional' users), but finally produced a 
problem of the Al market, for which one resolution was to abandon that market. I 
have suggested that the newsletter reports of the crisis in the Al industry were 
specifically distinct from the way that it was reported by 'outsiders' in the national 
press: stories of an 'Al winter' were reported in the national press, but rejected or 
qualified in the newsletters; on the other hand, the newsletters stayed with the story, 
and provide a detailed insider's account of how the unfolding crisis was construed 
through attempts to manage it by members of the industrial Al community. Earlier 
(in section 2.3), 1 compared my situation as a former Al journalist to the situation of 
indigenous anthropologists as this was presented by Altorki (1982) and others. I 
suggested that Altorki could challenge western anthropological preconceptions about 
arab women because she was both'one of the women' and an anthropologist; 
similarly, I suggested that I could apply an ethnographic analysis to the detailed 
material that I had gathered as a journalist. It is important to note, however, that the 
indigenous commentators I have been describing in this section are in a different 
situation. The newsletters were writing both about andfor the industrial Al 
community. Their audience (as well as their subject matter) were a single 
community. For an indigenous commentator , in this case, configuring the audience 
may be said to itself involve performing community, as may other rhetorical moves, 
including the selection of what counts as a story (when and in what way the situation 
of the market is 'interesting'). 
" For example, Ovum achieved this. 
" For example AI Week changed its name to Intelligent Systems Report-, Expert Systems Strategies 
changed its name to Intelligent Software Strategies. MIN did not change its name, but like many of 
the others broadened its remit to cover not only neural networks and areas such as data mirung, but 
also virtual reality systems. 
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In the two previous sections I have shown how, within the industrial Al community, 
the problem of Al was adduced as a problem of the market and managed through a 
series of marketing manoeuvres. In this section I turn to the related but distinct 
question of how the problem of marketing Al was explained by members of the Al 
industry, with the purpose of drawing out the implicit theories of technology 
transfer involved in these explanations. The material in this section is drawn from 
several subgroups of the industrial Al community and includes interviews with Al 
vendors,, newsletter reports, and also field notes from talks and informal discussion 
among systems designers at a conference that I attended in 1994. " One issue, 
therefore, will be whether it is possible to see any differences in emphasis among 
discussions located in different sub-communities. 
The explanations for perceived problems of marketing Al tended to fall into two 
broad but complementary categories - blaming the vendors or blaming the customers. 
Significantly (in relation to my comments at the end of the previous section about the 
technological identity of Al as the minimal identity of Al), the technology was 
seldom blamed. The vendors were usually accused of overselling, and the customers 
were usually charged with excessive timidity. The following comment - from an 
interview with a then newly recruited executive at Symbolics (Interview SZ; Sept 
1992) - illustrates the accusation of overselling: 
In my opinion (and I've talked to enough people to begin actually to believe it very 
strongly) Al was oversold. It was oversold by vendors, but mostly it was oversold 
by the venture capitalist firms and people who were trying to get their return on 
investment. It was promised to be the answer to all prayers, and clearly it is not 
that. It does solve certain types of problems. But not every problem can be solved 
by Al. 
By contrast, others blamed perceptions of overselling entirely on the customer, as 
illustrated by this comment in the newsletter Intelligent Systems Strategies (IX. 8, 
Aug 1993 p 2): 
It's unreasonable to blame the early Al vendors for over-promoting their 
technologies or failing to develop a larger niche for their products. The whole 
corporate IS culture was stuck with outdated attitudes and techniques, and no one, 
" The conference, Advanced Software Solutions in Manqfacluring and Engineering, was held at the 
Regents Park Hotel in London on 7 December 1994. It was organised by the Prolog Management 
Group and Compulog Net and was described as a seminar for IT and Technical Managers. 
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More often, however,. the problem of customer perceptions was introduced in the 
context of a discussion of tips and tactics for managing the customer. The first time I 
came across the advice not to mention 'Al' was in December 1985, when Karl Wlig 
of the American consultancy Arthur D Little was a speaker at a BCS expert system 
conference in the UK. Wiig was describing a Personal Financial Planning System 
written in Lisp, which created considerable interest in the audience because It seemed 
to promise the opening of lucrative markets in financial expert systems. " MN (Feb 
1986, p 6) reported at the time: 
Wiig has only one caution about the various Al techniques used: 'We don't tell the 
banks it's Al. ' 
Similar advice is contained in the following story, told to me during conversation at a 
conference lunch attended mainly by Prolog users and vendors. It was told 
(Fieldnotes 7/12/94) by a corporate developer with inhouse clients, specifically as a 
story about the 'problems' that clients have if 'Al' is mentioned: 
In the early days, I suggested an NLP [natural language processing] system for 
query handling. They said: 'We don't want that here. It's too way out for us'. So I 
never say how it's done now. 
There were two or three other people present, and the story was followed by 
laughter: the 'problem' (and also the Joke') was that what the systems developer 
saw as a relatively straightforward system was regarded by the client as over- 
ambitious and risky. 
There were several variations on these two themes of blaming the vendor 
(overselling) and blaming the customer (conservatism). One of these was to blame 
western customers (as opposed to customers in south East Asia and Japan). This 
may be illustrated by a story in AlffN (May 1992) about the European launch of a 
software development tool from Hitachi, called ObJectIQ in Europe, but ESKemel in 
Japan; it was being marketed in Europe as a tool for object-oriented programming 
rather than expert systems, on the grounds that European customers were more 
likely to be put off by the term 'expert system' than Japanese customers. " Another 
" In fact another company, Apex, already had an expert financial planning product on the market. In 
the event, the ADL system never reached the market, nor did the Apex system remain available for 
long. 
" Hitachi had commissioned a market survey ftom Hewlett Packard LJK, which advised it on this 
marketing strategy. 
Vaux, J Chapter Three 63 
variation is to blame the conservatism of programmers. I heard several examples of 
this at the conference for Prolog users that I attended in 1994, where the opening 
speaker (Peter Reitjes of IBM's TJ Watson Research Centre) talked of 'the herd 
instinct' of programmers and their reluctance to explore unfamiliar programming 
languages. This problem was further explored by one of my neighbours at lunch, a 
system developer at a Belgian Hospital who said that he uses Prolog for all clinical 
systems. However, he could not move the main hospital systems to Prolog because 
4 we have programmers who are, say, 55, and they can only program in cobol. We 
can't simply sack them' (Fieldnotes 7/12/94). Further variants on blaming the 
programmer put the blame further back on the conservatism of university teaching 
practices. " 
Vendors were prepared to blame the vendors (or at least earlier, other vendors). This 
may be illustrated by looking further at the explanation given by Symbolics, which I 
mentioned earlier in this section, in which the company blamed overselling by 
vendors and, more particularly, venture capitalists, for the problem of marketing Al. 
For a vendor to be blaming vendors for overselling is not as odd as it might initially 
seem, particularly when, as in this case, the overselling was placed in the past, and 
used as a contrast to claims of current customer support (Interview SZ; Sept 1992): 
Historically we were a technology vendor. We used to build technology, the best in 
the world, and send it all over the world to customers, and hope that they 
succeeded. Most customers were research. They didn't know how to build the 
product. Maybe they knew something about computer science, maybe they knew 
how to do research and build a prototype, maybe they knew something about 
applications. But they didn't know how to build a large-scale business application 
and then [grow? ] it. Needless to say many of them failed. 
The only consultancy ... well, consultancy reported to sales. 
Consultants would 
get assigned to do whatever it took to sell the hardware. They built a lot of 
custornised one-off things to get the customer to buy the platform. Once the 
customer placed the PO [Purchase Order], we shook hands and went our merry way. 
It is incredibly poor. But at the time when customers were coming to our door, it 
wasn't necessary to help the customer. We had a huge backlog in 84,85,86: 
" One delegate that I spoke to at the Prolog conference (working for a Prolog vendor, but here 
speaking in the tones of personal enthusiasm), blamed universities for 'reinforcing the hold of 
sequential programming paradigms'. He said that he had been fortunate to got to a Belgian 
university where students were 'exposed to ten different programming languages in the first year', but 
nonetheless he did not appreciate 'the strengths of Prolog' until he came to write his thesis. (Field 
Notes 7/12/94). 
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people were beating a path to Symbolics' door to buy the equipment. We got spoiled. 
The company was $110 million, thinking it's going to be a one billion dollar company. 
Not doing anything to get there, but thinking it was going to get there. 
This story of customers that did not know what they were doing and a company that 
did not help them is told to highlight the extensive support and consultancy which 
Symbolics now provides within the product contract. This is seen, for example, in 
the observation that Symbolics in the early 1980s gave no advice to customers on 
how to build 'large scale business applications' -a time when such projects were still 
advanced research projects. The purpose of the history, however, was to emphasise 
that Symbolics now (1992) would not think of not giving such support. 
A further variation, which perhaps comes close to blaming the technology, but also 
has implications of overselling concerns rumours of horror stories. As ajoumalist, I 
have often been told that there are 'horror stories', attempts to build Al or expert 
systems that went disastrously wrong, and became expensive mistakes for the client 
organisation both in money and technological strategy. I have never been told an 
example of a 'horror story'; and I am not alone in this. At the 1994 meeting 
(Fieldnotes, 7/12/94), the following interchange took place between my lunchtime 
neighbours, V (marketing director of a UK Al vendor) and S (systems developer at a 
large UK manufacturing corporation): 
S: 'And of course there are the horror stories.; 
V: 'Are there horror stories? I'm never really sure about this. ' 
S: 'Oh yes, I know, it's certainly true. ' 
Systems designers as customers (ie as users of Al development systems) may have 
been most inclined to blame the technology. At the 1994 conference, Patric Taillibert 
of Dassault Electronique presented a paper which described a complex system 
written in Prolog and combining model-based (AI) and numeric techniques. He 
contrasted this with an earlier attempt using expert systems techniques which grew 
to an unmanageable number of rules (1720). The following interchange (in the 
discussion of Taillibert's paper) illustrates a consensus among the designers of 
advanced complex systems by the early 1990s (Fieldnotes 7/12/94): 
Q: Of course, expert systems are politically incorrect now, and we've abandoned 
them. Expert systems got out of control. 
PT: There's a problem of maintaining expert systems. When we changed a rule we 
had to consider all the rules, which was quite impractical. Now [using a new model- 
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based approach] we just consider the relevant model. In 1987 we had hoped to use 
expert systems; three months later we were convinced that expert systems were 
not adapted to our problem. 
It is, incidentally, worth noting that the term 'expert system I is here clearly used to 
refer to programming techniques; whether expert systems are 'successful' is 
therefore judged in terms of how well (and perhaps how elegantly) the techniques can 
be used to carry out a design task. That is, the name 'expert system' is not taken as 
implying a non-technical description in terms of the simulation of experts (in 
contrast to the remarks by Ovum (1988b, p 1) quoted in 3.1). In this interchange, 
lexpert system' names a technical failure. 
Finally, I want to turn to another type of explanation, which to some extent redefines 
the problem. An example of this is given now (1999) by Teknowledge on its web 
page, within a brief corporate history: 
The Company began producing commercial expert system products in 1984, and 
went public in 1986. By 1988, Teknowledge competed with over 250 Al companies. 
The Company learned that while Al is a very powerful technology, it is not an 
industry in its own right. 
This comment (in 1999) that Al is a technology not an industry echoes the comment 
of the Spang Robinson Report in 1988 (Aug) that Al is a technology not a market. It 
is an odd locution. How could 'a technology' ever come to be mistaken for 'a 
market' or 'an industry'? Like the accusations of vendors overselling and customer 
conservatism, this explanation acted to separate 'the technology' from the problem 
of Al. It reinforced the suggestion that the technology was wrongly marketed, that it 
should not have been marketed as Al. As vendors and others distanced themselves 
from the Al market,, they distanced themselves from the name; they avoided telling 
the client'it's AF. These moves effectively gave Al a bad name. This phenomenon 
can be interestingly compared with the power accruing to the name 'Pasteur' which, 
according to Latour (1988) should itself be regarded as an actant. However, where 
the name 'Pasteur' apparently had the power to consolidate alliances and gave 
credence to a variety of proposals and theories, the name 'Artificial Intelligence' 
seemed to have the opposite effect, and apparently had the power to dispel 
confidence, undermine proposals and lessen the credibility of a systems designer who 
was rash enough to mention it to a client. 
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In the final section of this chapter I discuss whether and how the above explanations 
of the mis-marketing of Al (which could even perhaps include calling it Al) imply a 
theory of technology transfer and of communication between social groups. 
3.4 Misdescribing and misidentifying: towards a theory of technology 
transfer? 
In the previous section (3.3) 1 described some of the ways in which the Al 
community explained the problem of AI and apportioned responsibility. These 
explanations included blaming the customers, blaming the vendors and, more rarely, 
blaming the technology. Blaming the customers and blaming the technology may be 
seen as complementary descriptions, involving a narrative of fearful customers and of 
vendors that fail to take these fears into account and who make exaggerated claims 
which they cannot deliver. On the more rarely used explanation of blaming the 
technology, I suggested first that this was an explanation more likely to be given by a 
user than a vendor or systems designer (although my example was of a systems 
designer, speaking qua user); secondly, I related the rarity of this explanation to the 
way in which identifying Al as technology provided a minimal description that the 
community could fall back on in explaining what Al is. These two points together 
may be taken to imply a theory of technology transfer as the passing of neutral 
(technical) infori-nation, which may go wrong when technical descriptions are 
abandoned. 
Hype or overselling was only one element of the range of explanations described 
above for perceived problem of Al. However, it was a common explanation, and it 
has resonances with charges made by the critics of Al, in the context of the Al debate 
(which I discuss in more detail in Chapter Six) that researchers' claims for the 
possibility (or achievement) of machine intelligence were grossly exaggerated (cf 
Dreyfus, 1979; Putnam 1988b; Searle, 1980; 1984). This suggests a question 
whether the alleged overselling of Al (by early vendors and others) was in some way 
related to explanatory practices of the Al research community who described Al in 
terms of 'intelligence' and through comparisons to human behaviour. Itmaybe 
tempting to suppose that the early vendors of AI systems did indeed oversell their 
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products, claiming that they would (or would soon) give human-like performances. 
This could, further, be blamed on the exaggerations of the academic Al community, 
who claimed they were building machines that could think like humans. In the 
chapters that follow, I challenge these suppositions in almost every respect. 
However,, it is also important to see the force of this simple story. It could be used 
to explain the problems of Al, while allowing vendors to claim that technologically 
there is a neutral description that describes the plain technical potential of their 
products. The accusation of overselling, placed in the past or laid at the door of 
other vendors, acts to distance both the overselling and the problems from the 
product as technological tool, This story also implies a theory of technology 
transfer as the passing of technological knowledge. One of the ways that 
technological transfer would go wrong on such a model is the description passed is 
not accurate (another would be if the recipients fail to understand it). That is to say, 
the local appropriation of knowledge is only recognised insofar as it is presenting 
problems. More specifically, as an explanation of what went wrong in the case of 
Al it would suggest that the problems arose because people (academics, perhaps or 
early vendors) departed from a judicious, technical description of Al, and imported 
illicit assumptions about the potential of Al, based on unwarranted comparisons 
with human intelligence. In the following chapters I both test this simple theory, and 
explore a rather different theory of technology transfer as communication between 
discursive communities, in which explanations are not easily made to cross discursive 
boundaries and there may be no commonly available descriptions. 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter I have provided a brief introduction to the industrial history of Al. In 
doing so, I have identified some initial issues in the telling of such a history: I have 
argued that the narratives told by indigenous commentators may be seen to perform 
community in adducing their own membership of a commun-Ity which is at once 
subject of and audience to the narrative; I have also suggested that commurnity 
explanations of a perceived problem of Al imply a theory of technology transfer as 
the passing of neutral, technical information, and that this theory may act as a foil to 
my own hypothesis that technology transfer involves communication between 
discursive communities. In 3.1,1 described the way that the Al market , its growth 
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and crisis, were represented through a series of market reports, arguing that the 
reports performed community in a number of ways but , importantly, through 
providing an interpretation of the problem of Al that characterised it as solvable or 
manageable. In 3.2,1 described the way that the specialist Al newsletters reported 
the strategic manoeuvres of Al vendor companies in managing the problem of Al. 
again, I argued that the newsletters perfon-ned community through representing 
issues of the market in terms that reflected the concerns of the vendors, but terins 
which were not necessarily less 'objective' than outside commentators. In. 3.3,1 
looked at some of the ways in which Al vendors and systems designers explained the 
problem of Al, tending to blame either the vendors (for exaggeration) or the 
customers (for conservatism). These explanations were also reflected in the 
explanatory practices towards customers (who were not to be toldit's AP), and in 
the marketing strategies of vendors (who ultimately abandoned Al as a marketplace). 
Through all the above sections, I noticed a tendency to identify Al as a technology or 
through technical explanations as a means of locating a minimal defensible identity. 
In 3.4 1 suggested that blaming overselling or hype for the problems of Al implied a 
theory of technology transfer as the passing of neutral or technical descriptions. 
In the following chapters of this thesis, I trace the explanatory practices associated 
with Al through a variety of locations, contexts and configured audiences. One 
reason for this is implicit in my challenge to the simple story of technology transfer, 
where the problem is alleged to be overselling based in academic habits of talking 
about Al as the building of intelligent machines. In the next few chapters, then, I ask 
just what these habits were,, and whether and how Al was explained in terms of the 
building of intelligent, human-like machines. Another reason, however, has to do 
with the implications of conceptualising technology transfer as involving 
communication between discursive communities. As I argued in section 2.4. this 
implies going beyond a narrow sense of technology transfer (particularly in relation 
to academic industrial links) and studying the broader context of technology transfer 
in the history of explanatory practices associated with Al, asking whether and how 
this history may be reflected in the way that Al was launched on the market. In the 
following chapter, I begin this study by looking at histories of the early days of Al, 
asking how the identity of Al as a field was construed for different audiences and in 
different contexts. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NARRATIVES AND AUDIENCE: Al ACQUIRES A HISTORY 
4.0 Introduction 
At the end of the previous chapter, I suggested a strategy of tracing explanations of 
Al across different locations,, contexts and audiences to produce Ia history of 
explanatory practices. The purpose of this strategy is partly to test the theory that 
Al failed because it was oversold (together with an implicit theory of technology 
transfer as involving the passing of accurate representations between different 
groups), but also to provide an understanding of some of the ways in which these 
explanatory practices differed across locations and contexts, and what this may 
imply for communication between discursive communities. In this chapter, I look at 
some historical narratives of the early days of Al, asking how the field was originally 
identified, and whether this identity may be seen to be constant across different 
contexts and locations. 
In this section, I introduce the chapter by describing the texts that I draw on, and 
explaining how I divide these into texts for a general audience and those for a peer 
audience. The differences between these texts is central to my argument, since it 
provides a way of locating the different narratives and their intended audiences. 
There is an established tradition of writing books that explain academic fields for a 
general audience. Here 'audience' may be understood both in terms of the readership 
categories deployed by book publishers and also in terms of the 'configured 
audience' as discussed in Chapter Two. Books for a general readership are those 
books which are not consigned to specific academic fields in the catalogues of 
academic publishers. The configured audience, however, is that audience successfully 
addressed within the text. In studying communication between discursive 
communities, it is the configured audience which is of interest, but the publishers' 
readership categories help supply the institutional context of publication. 
Books explaining ideas of machine intelligence to a general readership have been 
available at least since the 1950s (eg Weiner, 1950; Sluckin, 1954), although these 
books described their subject field as Cybernetics. The earliest general books 
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explaining Artificial Intelligence (under that name) tended to be hostile and written in 
the vein of exposes, - notably 
Hubert Dreyfus"s 1972 book, What Computers Can't 
Do, and Joseph Weizenbaum's 1976 book, Computer Power and Human Reason. I 
return to a discussion of some of the critics of Al in Chapter Six. It is worth noting 
their early date, however, as they predate the earliest (and perhaps the most famous) 
of the 'friendly' general books on Al, Pamela McCorduck's 1979 book, Machines 
Who Think. Section 4.1,, which looks at the histories told for a general audience, 
draws on McCorduck' s book and a history by Robert Crevier (1993), Al: The 
Tumultuous History of the Search for Artificial Intelligence, as wel I as some texts by 
Al academics which address a general readership, such as Herb Simon's (1991) 
autobiography, Models ofMy Life. Besides being histories for a general audience, 
these texts (unlike, say, Dreyfus's book) may be described as speaking on behalf of 
the academic Al community. This is a straightforward point to make in the case of 
Simon,, who was part of the academic Al community. Crevier is a professor of 
engineering who was on the fringes of Al research. " McCorduck, however, is a 
professional writer. In some respects she may be compared to the indigenous 
commentators of the industrial Al community described in Chapter Three. However, 
the very fact that she was writing for a general readership, rather than primarily for 
the Al community, means that she does not have a service role within the community 
(which was one of the reasons for describing the indigenous commentators as 
members of the broad industrial Al community). In addition, she was not a member 
of a relevant discipline. While one of the claims that I make in this thesis is that it is 
instructive to view academic disciplines as discursive communities, it may also be 
noted that they are communities with highly formalised institutional bases. 
McCorduck is, then, an outsider to the academic Al community. However, like an 
anthropologist with a favourite tribe, she speaks for the Al community in the sense 
of telling their story in their terms. She draws on interviews with Al researchers as 
the main direct source of her history, and many of her chapters are effectively made 
up of lengthy direct quotations, connected by indirect quotations. Crevier has 
followed McCorduck"s style of research and writing and also follows McCorduck"s 
narrative fairly closely for the period to the late 1970s, and provides very useful 
" Speaking of the MIT Al Lab, which is located in Technology Square, Crevier (1993, pp ix-x) said-. 
'I spent far too many days and nights in the early 1970s busily assembling a PhD thesis on a topic 
related to Al, but different enough to keep me away from the lab itself While doing my own work, I 
observed the goings on over at Tech Square with a perplexed and somewhat envious interest. 
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additional material covering the 1980s. There is an additional sense in which 
McCorduck's history may be said to speak for the Al community, and that is seen in 
the extent to which her book is cited by members of the community as a historical 
reference. In one of the odder examples, both Herb Simon (199 1) and Ed Feigenbaum 
(1992) reference McCorduck's description of an interchange between them when 
Feigenbaum was Simon's student (an interchange for which Feigenbaum was 
McCorduck's source in the first place). " More conventionally, an authoritative 
textbook, The Handbook ofAl (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1981, p 5) referenced 
McCorduck's book as a history, albeit with the qualification that it was 
4 entertaining'. In the closely related field of Cognitive Science (cf below, 5.1), 
psychologist Howard Gardner in a 1985 book The Mind's New Science (that might 
be classified either as an introductory textbook or a book for a general audience)" 
explicitly draws on McCorduck's work for a chapter on Artificial Intelligence. 
In 4.2,, by contrast with the histories for a general audience, I draw on texts 
addressing a peer or insider audience. These texts are not usually written primarily 
as histories, but may contain histories. One example is a series of papers written by 
Marvin Minsky which address a peer audience in the context of research report 
(1956), a paper presented at a research conference (1959), and a paper published in a 
reviewed journal (196 1). These papers provide a history of Alin the context of an 
argument for recognising Al as a distinct and important field. Many other texts 
written for a peer audience include at least a brief description of the field's history 
(including McCarthy, - 1978; 
Minsky and Papert; 1988; Newell, 1980; 1990; Newell 
and Simon, 1972; Simon, 1969). Textbooks are also interesting material, since they 
often address an audience which is not yet fully a peer audience, and indeed part of 
their purpose is to help enrol students in the discipline. In the case of Al, however, 
the early textbooks (before about 1980) most addressed a fairly advanced audience 
(such as gTaduate students and computer scientists), and the distinction between 
textbooks and peer texts is not always a clear one in practice. Examples of early Al 
textbooks include a 1968 collection of papers edited by Minsky (Semantic 
Information Processing), and a 1963 collection edited by Feigenbaum and Feldman 
" The interchange concerned the announcement by Simon to a graduate class (of which Feigenbaum 
was a member) in January 1956, 'Over the Christmas break, Allen Newell and I invented a thinking 
machine' (McCorduck, 1979, p 116; Simon, 1991, p 206; Feigenbaum, 1992, p 194). 
There is some overlap between these categories. Indeed, McCorduck's book (which is written from 
outside the discipline) is frequently to be found in university libraries. 
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(Computers and Thought). I have also drawn on an almost encyclopaedic, multi- 
authored,, three-volume textbook, The Handbook ofAl, ' published between 1980 
and 1982, which addressed 'colleagues' in industrial research and computer science. 
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To summarise, for this chapter I have selected two sets of texts, one set providing a 
history of Al for a general readership, and the other set being texts for a peer 
audience which include historical remarks. These histories concern the early period 
of Al, the time when the field was consolidating itself. My assumption is that 
stories about the early days of any field provide an insight into the identity which is 
claimed for it. In the case of Al, which as I have previously remarked (2.4) has a 
strong sense of its own history, the public histories (especially McCorduck, 1979, 
and the narratives following her history)" provide a story which may be seen as a 
myth of origin. In this Chapter I ask how this myth of origin is construed, and what 
other alternative historical narratives are available. The more general purpose is to 
illustrate some of the ways in which Al was identified to different audiences by Al 
researchers (or those speaking for them) in the early years of Al. 
4.1 The first Al conference, the first Al program: History for the general 
reader 
In this section I look at public histories of the origins of Al, that is, histories of AI 
told for a general reader (as identified in the previous section). I noted in the 
previous chapter (3.4) that the marketing strategies adopted by Al vendors and 
systems designers often involved avoiding the use of the name 'Al , and that this 
strategy acted to endorse 'Al' as a 'bad name, a name that could (to adapt a 
Latourian phrase) alienate allies. It is interesting to note, therefore, that the public 
histories tend to emphasise the first use of the name as an effective moment in the 
constitution of the field of Al. McCorduck (1979) and others (including Crevier ; -' The Handbook ofAI (Barr and Feigenbaum, 198 1; 1982; Cohen and Feigenbaum, 1982) was edited 
by faculty at the Stanford Department of Computer Science, but included a large cast (a little over 
100) of 'chapter editors', 'contributors' and 'reviewers'. While most of these were academics, they 
included a significant number from industrial research labs, most notably SRI and Xerox, but aJso 
individuals from IBM, Fairchild and Honeywell, among others. 
9' 1 believe that McCorduck is the public source for stories which date Al as beginning in 1956. This 
date of origin is still sometimes found even in recent documents. For example, in concluding its 
Intelligent Systems Integration Programme in 1997, the Department of Trade and Industry distributed 
a CD that provided an overview and history, including the claim (ISIP-CD, p 1) 'The field of 
computer-based intelligent systems was first defined in its modem form at a conference held at 
Dartmouth in 1956. ' 
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1993 and Simon 1991),, tell the history of the first use of the name 'Artificial 
Intelligence' as an event which effectively prefigures the field, but can be seen in 
retrospect to mark its beginning. These stories share a tale about how Al got its 
name: all agree that the name was chosen or 'invented' by John McCarthy in 1956, " 
they differ only slightly on the 'date of birth' of Al, placing it either in 1955" or 
1956; and they tend to agree on the names of the main pioneers of the field, and 
which achievements to include as early breakthroughs, although there are some 
different emphases. In this section I look at the public history of Al, primarily as 
told by McCorduck, beginning with descriptions of the choice of name and asking 
how this contributes to what turns out to be a heroic story of origins. 
'Artificial Intelligence' was, McCorduck tells us, first used to name a conference 
held in 1956. The Dartmouth Conference on Artificial Intelligence is a signIficant 
event in McCorduck's history of Al, apparently bringing together for the first time 
several pioneering Al researchers, the first Al program' and the new name. The 
conference was organised by a group of four people: two young researchers, John 
McCarthy, then an assistant professor of mathematics at Dartmouth, and Marvin 
Minsky, a Harvard Junior Fellow in mathematics and neurology; and two industrially 
based researchers, Nathaniel Rochester from IBM and Claude Shannon of Bell 
Telephone Laboratories who was already well known for his statistical theory of 
information and an innovative checkers-playing system. 
McCorduck (p 96) tells us that McCarthy chose the name 'Artificial Intelligence', 
although he may not actually have 'invented' it. She quotes McCarthy's own 
account: 
'I won't swear I hadn't seen it before, ' he recalls, 'but artificial intelligence wasn't 
a prominent phrase particularly. Someone may have used it in a paper or a 
conversation or something like that, but there were many other words that were 
current at the time. The Dartmouth Conference made it dominate the others. ' 
The name., he tells us, was available though somewhat marginal: it was the 
significance of the conference that'made it dominate the others'. However, there is 
"' Simon's account does not mention McCarthy by name, but credits the group at MIT which 
McCarthy helped found (Simon 1969,198 1, p 6). McCarthy and Minsky formed the MIT Artificial 
Intelligence Group after Minsky joined McCarthy at MIT in 1985 (cf Crevier, 1993, p 64). McCarthy 
was to move to Stanford in 1963 to found an Al lab (Crevier, p 65). In 1963, also, Seymour Papert 
joined Minsky at MIT, and in 1968 the Al Group became the MIT Al Laboratory (Crevier, p 86). 
, )5 December 15 1955 according to Simon (1991, p 206), 
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more to the story. The previous summer, 1955, McCarthy had been working for 
Shannon at Bell Labs and they had put together a book of collected papers under the 
title Automata Studies. This name, according to McCorduck (pp 96-97), was 
Shannon's choice: 
... McCarthy wanted to use a term different from automata studies for the papers 
he hoped to get for the book, but Shannon objected that any other phrase was simply 
too flashy, that the theory of automata would be sober and scientific. McCarthy 
went along with that, thinking it probably didn't make that much difference. 
But McCarthy learned that a name could make a difference: 
..... Most of the papers they received for the book were in fact about automata 
theory in the narrowest sense, that is, mathematical principles underlying the 
operation of electromechanical systems, and not about the relation of language to 
intelligence, or the ability of machines to play games, or any of the other topics 
McCarthy was becoming more and more fascinated by. 
This anecdote is interesting in its bearing on McCarthy's subsequent choice of the 
name 'Artificial Intelligence' in preference to 'Automata Theory'. The new name 
was partly defined by what it was not. Above all, it was not 'Automata Theory', 
and it was not like 'Automata Theory' in several important respects: it was not 
already 'owned' , it would not attract papers 
in any established subfield, and it was 
not (the anecdote implies) 'sober and scientific'. These negatives made it available as 
the name of a conference tackling some advanced and speculative topics, but 
apparently without a perceived need to present them as 'sober and scientific'. 
Shannon was not the only Dartmouth delegate to be unhappy with the name. The 
problem, however, seems to have been generated by the ten-n 'artificial' rather than 
implications of non-sobriety. Arthur Samuel, for example, told McCorduck (p 97): 
The word artificial makes you think there's something kind of phony about this, ... or 
else it sounds like it's all artificial and there's nothing real about this work at all. 
Herb Simon made a very similar complaint in an address delivered at NUT in 1968, 
called 'The Natural and the Artificial' - and now reprinted in a book called Sciences of 
the Artificial (Simon, 198 1). As the title of his book indicates, Simon eventually 
adopted the term 'artificial' with enthusiasm. He had already made the word his 
own by the time of his 1968 talk, where he uses the distinction natural/artificial to 
claim a territory for 'the sciences of the artificial' which would cover the behaviour 
both of humans and of computers. Nonetheless, he registers an objection to the term 
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'artificial', which is based largely on the dictionary (p 6): 
My dictionary defines 'artificial' as 'Produced by art rather than by nature; not 
genuine or natural; affected; not pertaining to the essence of the matter'. It 
proposes, as synonyms: affected, factitious, manufactured, pretended, sham, 
simulated, spurious, trumped up, unnatural. As antonyms it lists: actual, genuine, 
honest, natural, real, truthful, unaffected. Our language seems to reflect man's 
deep distrust of his own products. 
In a lengthy footnote (p 6), he first credits researchers at NET (le McCarthy and 
Minsky)" for coining the term: 
I shall disclaim responsibility for this particular choice of terms. The phrase 
'artificial intelligence', which led me to it, was coined, I think, right on the Charles 
River, at MIT. 
But he does also concede that his own prefeffed alternatives, such as 'complex 
information processing' and 'simulation of cognitive processes') may run into 
dictionary problems of their own: 
for the dictionary also says that 'to simulate' means 'to assume or have the mere 
appearance or form of, without the reality; imitate; counterfeit; pretend. ' 
And finally he consoles himself 
At any rate, 'artificial intelligence' seems to be here to stay, and it may prove 
easier to cleanse the phrase than to dispense with it. In time it will become 
sufficiently idiomatic that it will no longer be the target of cheap rhetoric. 
(In 1999, this time seems not yet to have arrived. ) 
On Simon's account it is the connotations of the word 'artificial' that have made it 
the target of easy jibes. Ostensibly, the dispute concerns the appropriateness of the 
name; however it is apparent that the dispute also relates to whose name is being 
used. In particular, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 'Artificial Intelligence' is 
perceived as a name belonging to Minsky and McCarthy, or the MIT group; at Cal 
Tech, Herb Simon and Allen Newell preferred to call the field 'Complex Information 
Processing ". The question of whose name it is has echoes of Merton's discussion 
of eponymy. Merton discussed the role of eponymy in a presidential address made 
to the American Sociological Society in August 1957, Pnorities in Scientific 
Discovery'. " He was concerned with the phenomenon of recognition as an 
Minsky and McCarthy set up the MIT Artificial Intelligence Group in 1958. 
This was first published in American Sociological Review 22,6 (December 1957). Page numbers 
refer to the reprint in Merton (1973). 
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institutional reward in science, and he identifies 'gradations' of eponymy as one of 
the major mechanisms of recognising priority of discovery. These gradations, 
Merton suggests, range from - at the highest - the naming of an age (eg, Cthe 
Newtonian epoch' or 'the Freudian age'), through assignations of the paternity of 
sciences and disciplines (as in 'Comte, the Father of Sociology'), to 'thousands' of 
eponymous laws, theories, theorems, etc (as in Boyle's Law). Wbile the name 
'artificial intelligence' does not formally include any individual's name, it was, as we 
have seen, generally perceived as John McCarthy's name or sometimes McCarthy's 
and Minsky's name. " Moreover, rival names also had owners. " 
If, as Merton suggests, a name may be deployed to reward priority, then a dispute 
over names might well form part of a priority dispute. And McCorduck does indeed 
report what looks like a priority dispute involving Herb Simon and Allen Newell on 
the one side and the organisers of the Dartmouth conference (primarily McCarthy 
and Minsky) on the other. The dispute broke out in a report-back meeting on the 
Dartmouth Conference to the Institute of Radio Engineers (at MIT in September 
1956), when Simon and Newell (who had attended the two-month conference for 
just one week)"O raised objections to John McCarthy (an organiser of the 
conference) giving the report back, "' A compromise was reached where McCarthy 
gave a general report, and Newell and Simon described a program called Logic 
Theorist that they had presented at Dartmouth. (Simon 1991,211) Speaking to 
McCorduck more than twenty years after Dartmouth, both McCarthy and Minsky 
seem to concede that Simon and Newell had a point. McCorduck reports (p 108): 
McCarthy recalls, 'They felt, perhaps quite correctly, that the situation was 
anomalous, the conference being reported on by people who hadn't actually done 
anything, when they had. ' 
Minsky told McCorduck (p 108): 
The unfairness was that they had a well-developed project that they'd been working 
" Joseph Weizenbaurn told Crevier (1993, p 64). 'In the early 1960s, Minsky and McCarthy were 
almost synonymous, bound together. You never said just Minsky orjust McCarthy, you said 
Mi nsky-and-McC art hy. 
Q') Apart from Simon and Newell's name 'Complex Information Processing', there were also some 
more remote claims to naming the field; for example, the research group started by Donald Michie in 
Edinburgh during the 1960s called the field 'Machine Intelligence'. 
Simon ( 199 1, p2 10) says he and Newell attended the conference for 'about a week'. 
The dispute seems to have been acrimonious enough to bring proceedings to a halt for a while. 
Simon confessed to McCorduck (p 108): '... poor Walter Rosenblith, who was supposed to chair the 
session, walked around with us on the MIT campus, we strolled down Mem Drive and so on, 
negotiating. ' 
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on a long time, pretty much full time, and we'd been working much more casually 
and much more as generalists for a shorter time, and wanted to share the stage with 
more or less equal authority which wasn't very nice. 
What was it that Simon and Newell had'done'? Are McCarthy and Minsky making a 
belated concession of priority, or merely conceding that a working program was an 
achievement? Simon,, in his autobiography Models ofMy Life (199 1), describes the 
development of Logic Theorist in terms which do imply a priority claim. He places 
the 'birth' of the program six months earlier than the Dartmouth Conference, at the 
point when he believes they had demonstrated the feasibility of the search technique 
embodied in Logic Theorist. It is this technique, which he describes as'heuristic 
search', which is significant in Simon's account. Indeed it is so significant, 
apparently, that it deserves to have its birthday remembered (p 206): 
I have always celebrated December 15,1955 as the birthday of heuristic problem 
solving by computer, the moment when we knew how to demonstrate that a 
computer could use heuristic search methods to find solutions to difficult problems. 
McCorduck (1979) and Crevier (1993) may be read as giving some support to 
Simon'sclaims. Both describe Logic Theorist as 'the first Al program' and suggest 
that it marked a breakthrough to a'new paradigm'. McCorduck reports (pp 103-4): 
two scientists had arrived on the scene with ... a program embodying the new 
paradigm, the information processing level of modelling, which would dominate 
research in artificial intelligence in the next decade. 
Crevier, who discusses the Dartmouth Conference in a chapter entitled'The First Al 
Program: Defining the Field', agrees. He says (p 48): 
At Dartmouth, Newell and Simon were, as the only participants with a working Al 
program, far ahead of the others. 
However, neither McCorduck or Crevier is really concerned with assigning priority 
to individuals. Indeed both stress that the importance of the Dartmouth Conference 
largely lay in bringing people together. McCorduck says (p 109): 
perhaps the most influential result of the Dartmouth Conference itself was the social 
patterns it set. 
Both emphasise the creation of Al as group achievement, and point to the continuing 
domination of the field by Dartmouth delegates and their students. (McCorduck, pp 
109-110*, Crevier, p 49) Nonetheless, both deploy the story of the 'first Al programl, 
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present like an unrecognised king at the 'first Al conference'. At the very least, this 
serves to introduce narrative tension into the story. This is seen if the passage from 
McCorduck (pp 103-4) is quoted at greater length: 
And that brings us to a fascinating puzzle. For two scientists had arrived on the 
scene with what no one else had and everyone yearned for -a working and genuinely 
intelligent program. That alone should have earned them special attention from 
their colleagues. Perhaps more important, it was a program embodying the new 
paradigm, the information-processing level of modelling, which would dominate 
research in artificial intelligence in the next decade. Why wasn't this information- 
processing level of modelling, as invented by Newell and Simon, recognised at once 
for what it was? 
One of the rhetorical devices used by McCorduck to suggest the destiny of the infant 
Al is to introduce her knowledge of how things turned out into past tense 
descriptions of what was happening. In this respect, there is a modal verb which is 
particularly interesting (pp 103-4): 
a program embodying the new paradigm, the information processing level of 
modelling, which would dominate research in artificial intelligence in the next 
decade. [my emphasis) 
This modality is identified by grammarians as future time in the past (Quirk et al, 
1985, pp 218-2 
19). 102 Logically, these constructions do no more than indicate that 
the narrator speaks with the knowledge of hindsight but, as the grammarians indicate, 
they thereby often seem to underwrite what they speak of (Quirk et al, p 218): 
"' The entry for 'future time in the past' (Quirk et al, 1985, p 219) is worth quoting in full: 
'Most of the future constructions just discussed can be used in the past tense to describe something is 
in the future when seen from a viewpoint in the past. 
a) MODAL VERB CONSTRUCTION with would <rare; literary narrative style> 
The time was not far off when he would regret this decision. 
b) BE GOING TO + INFINITIVE (often with the sense of "unfulfilled intention") 
You were going to give me your address [... but you didn't ... 
] 
The police were going to charge her, but at last she persuaded them she was innocent. 
c) PAST PROGRESSIVE (arrangement predetermined in the past 
I was meeting him in Bordeaux the next day. 
- (ii) = "arrangement" d) BE TO + INFINITIVE <formal>; (i) = "was destined to", 
(i) He was eventually to end up in the bankruptcy court. 
(ii) The meeting was to be held the following week. 
c) BE ABOUT TO + INFINITIVE ("on the point of'; often with the sense of "unfulfilled intention") 
He was about to hit me. 
Of all these constructions, only (a) and (di) can be considered genuine expressions of future-in-the-past 
meaning, in that they alone can be understood to guarantee the fulfilment of the happening in 
question. For instance: 
Few could have imagined at that time that this brave young officer was to be[lwould be] the 
first President of the United States of America. 
This sentence implies that the young officer (George Washington) did eventually become president of 
the United States. The other constructions, however (especially (b) and (e)), favour an interpretation 
of nonfulfilment. ' 
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[These constructions] can be understood to guarantee the fulfilment of the happening 
in question. 
They are therefore useful constructions both for heightening the sense of destiny and 
endorsing the veracity of the history told, and in this respect may be seen here as the 
tools of a somewhat whiggish history (cf 5.3 below). Here, this particular 
grammatical construction plays its role within a story that foretells glory against the 
odds. It is, at least, a story that may retain the interest of outsiders. 
At the end of this section, then, two more general questions are suggested concerning 
the performativity of this heroic story of origins. One has to do with the 
constitution of the reader. Is this a story directed at a general reader only, or does it 
also appear in insider accounts? To start answering this, I look in the next section 
(4.2) at some more or less contemporary accounts by Minsky and McCarthy, and 
other peer commentators, and ask whether they shared the perception that Newell 
and Simon! s program Logic Theorist (LT) 'prefigured the field". The other question 
that must be raised concerns the role of a heroic (or other) history in the constitution 
of the field; this is a question that I return to in Chapter Five. 
4.2 'The first Al program' and the scepticism of insiders. 
In the previous section, I described how the public histories of Al tend to mark a 
significant coincidence in 'the first Al program' being presented at 'the first Al 
conference'. But is this just a tale for outsiders? In this section I ask in what terms, 
if at all, insiders claim that Logic Theorist prefigures Al as a field? On the face of it, 
what was important about Logic Theorist was that it was a logic theorem proverl"' 
at a time when theorem proving was a recognised challenge, " However, for Simon 
the interest was not in merely proving theorems, but in modelling how humans did it. 
As he formulated it, the problem was how humans searched for a solution, or what 
heuristics they used. He explained to Crevier (p 44): 
We were not looking for an efficient way of proving theorems. We were looking at 
how humans, by selective heuristics, found the right thing to do next. 
` Logic Theorist was eventually able to prove 38 theorems from Russell and Whitehead's Principia 
Mathernatica (Crevier, 1993, p 46) 
" Minsky was working on a geometry theorem proving system at this time. In the late 1950s a 
researcher at IBM called Herbert Gelernter developed a Geometry Theorem Prover that could prove 
theorems involving up to ten steps (Crevier, 1993, pp 55 ff). 
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By the winter of 1955, Simon, Newell and a third research partner JC Shaw had 
developed a version of Logic Theorist on index cards, which they played out using 
the Simon family and several graduate students standing in for program subroutines 
(Simon 199 1, pp 206-207). Implementing Logic Theorist on a computer took 
another six months, and depended on the development of a programming language 
called IPL (Information Processing Language) which was based on a technique called 
"list processing". Simon, in his autobiography (1991, p212), comments: 
Writing and testing the Logic Theorist was only half of what we had accomplished in 
1956. We had also invented a whole new class of compute r-progra mming languages 
.... These languages were the direct ancestor of John McCarthy's LISP, which has 
been the standard Al language for thirty years, as well as embodying most of the 
ideas of what is now called object-oriented programming. 
For Simon, then, this was a dual achievement involving both a breakthrough in the 
modelling of human problem solving and a complementary breakthrough in the design 
of computer programming languages. 
Histories of the field provided by AT researchers for a peer or 'technical' audience 
usually include mention of Logic Theorist and IPL, and IPL is always mentioned in 
the history of Lisp. However, the status of 'breakthrough' or 'the first AT program' 
is not easily conceded. In his'History of Lisp', written in 1978 for the ACM 
SIGPLAN History of Programming Languages Conference, John McCarthy says (p 
217): 
My desire for an algebraic list processing language for artificial intelligence work on 
the IBM 704 computer arose in the summer of 1956 during the Dartmouth Summer 
Research Project on Artificial Intelligence which was the first organised study of 
Al. During the meeting, Newell, Shaw and Simon described IPL 2, a list processing 
language for Rand Corporation's JOHNNIAC computer in which they implemented 
their Logic Theorist program. There was little temptation to copy IPL, because its 
form was based on a JOHNNIAC loader that happened to be available to them, and 
because the FORTRAN idea of writing programs algebraically was attractive. 
In McCarthy's account, the idea of list processing was one among several inputs that 
led to the design of Lisp. The idea of an algebraic form of language, as exemplified by 
IBM's Fortran,, seems equally important, and the relative merits of the Johnniac" 
` The Johnniac computer had been designed by John von Neumann for RAND where Simon and 
Newell began addressing the design of a chess-playing program in 1952. Simon (1991, p 203) 
remembers that 'with a 4,096-word high-speed store supplemented by a 
drum with about 10,000 
words of usable capacity ..... nothing 
larger or faster existed. ' 
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and IBM 704 machine architectures are also given a role. 
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Minsky also tended to downplay the role of IPL and Logic Theorist, both in a series 
of papers that he produced as a consequence of the Dartmouth conference (Minsky 
1956,19591,196 1)" , and in an overview of the field written some ten years later 
(Minsky 1968). In all these texts, Minsky consistently stressed the continuity 
between earlier work in cybernetics, games theory, theorem proving and language 
translation. In the papers following Dartmouth (Minsky 1956,1959ý 1961), he calls 
the field Artificial Intelligence and describes it (particularly in the first two papers, 
1956 and 1959) in terms of 'heuristics" -a term he seems to have learned from Simon 
andNewell. "' However,, in all three papers, ' problem solving' programs are only 
one type of heuristic program, although he does describe Logic Theorist (1961, p 21) 
as 
... a first attempt to prove theorems in logic, by frankly heuristic methods. 
Minsky used the term 'heuristics' in a broadly similar way to Simon and Newell, "' 
although in the earlier papers, in particular, he has a rather broad explanation of 
'heuristic programming' as the use of 'rules of thumb' in contrast to programming 
tasks for which algorithmic formalisations are available. " He says (1959, p 8): 
'Hints', 'suggestions', or 'rules of thumb'. which only usually work are called 
"' The first of these papers, 'Heuristic Aspects of the Artificial Intelligence Problem' (Minsky, 1956) 
is an internal Group Report, written soon after the Dartmouth Conference. Simon (1991, p 210) 
suggests that Minsky's 1956 paper 'reflects very well the general body of knowledge in artificial 
intelligence that was pooled at the Dartmouth Conference'. The second paper, 'Some methods of 
artificial intelligence and heuristic programming' (Minsky, 1959), is a version presented to a 
conference at the National Physical Laboratory in England during November 1958 (NPL, 1959). 
The final version of the paper, 'Steps Toward Artificial Intelligence' (Minsky, 1961) was published 
in the peer-reviewed journal Proceedings of the IRE. 
'0' Simon (1991, p 199) points out that the mathematician George Polya, who also had an interest in 
problem solving, employed the term heuristic in a course taken by Newell when he was an 
undergraduate at Stanford in the 1940s. 
"' The Handbook of AI (Barr and Feigenbaum 198 1, p 28) suggests that 'the term heuristic has long 
been a key word in AF. It distinguishes two different definitions of the term which, it says, 'refer, 
though vaguely, to two different sets - devices that improve efficiency and devices that are not 
guaranteed'. It suggests that Newell, Shaw and Simon introduced the definition that opposed 
'heuristic' to 'guaranteed' in 1957, and that Minsky (1961) introduced the definition in terms of 
efficiency. However, while Minsky (1961) certainly emphasises efficiency as a programming issue, 
earlier versions of the paper (such as Minsky 1959) show that he also raised issues of guarantee in the 
explication of 'heuristics'. 
"' This explanation of 'heuristic' programming, as a way of getting a computer to undertake a task 
for which a full formal description is not available, earned Minsky the mockery of the automatic- 
translation pioneer Yehoshua Bar-Hiflel. At the 1958 conference at which Minsky gave this 
explanation, Bar-Hillel protested against the assumption 'that a machine, if only its programme be 
specified with a sufficient degree of carelessness, will be able to carry out satisfactorily even rather 
difficult tasks (NPL, 1959, p 85) (Although Bar-Hillel attributed this belief to McCarthy, McCarthy 
(NPL, p 90) passed the buck back to Minsky- 'Since other people have proposed this as a device for 
achieving 'creativity', I can only conclude [Bar-Hillell had some other paper in mind. ) 
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heuristics. A program which works on such a basis is cailed a heuristic program. 
However, while Simon suggested that heuristic programming was invented (by 
himself, Newell and Shaw) on 15 December 1955, Minsky provided a list of 
examples of heuristic programming which included previous work in cybernetics, 
games theory, theorem proving and so on. 
In 1968,. Nfinsky again provided an historical overview of the field of Al, in the 
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Introduction to a volume called Semantic Information Processing, which comprised a 
collection of new work in Al. "' Again, Minsky located IPL within ongoing work of 
the 1950s. In this text, he described Al as emerging from cybernetics, and he 
characterised as 'symbol manipulation' work going on prior to 1956, such as language 
translation (p 7): 
The serious programming of 'symbol manipulation' processes had started with early 
experiments on language translation and (somewhat later) on symbolic machine- 
language compilations; such techniques first became generally available in a form 
suitable for use by non-specialists in computation with the publication of the IPL 
programming system in 1956 by Newell, Shaw, and Simon. 
Here EPL is represented as a useful tool embodying existing techniques, rather than a 
breakthrough. Again, the term which he used to characterise the continuing field, 
'symbol manipulation' is one associated with Simon and Newell who were 
developing the concept of Physical Symbol Systems as a unifying model of thinking 
in humans and computers (Newell and Simon 1972). Minsky then (p 7) went on to 
make a three-fold distinction in the work which had emerged from the 'cybernetics' 
of the early 1950s: the first development, he says, related to continuing work in self- 
organising systems) including simulation of biological mechanisms; but in the second 
and third approaches that he identifies, Minsky makes an interesting distinction 
between the Simulation of Human Thought and Al: 
The second important avenue was an attempt to build working models of human 
behaviour incorporating, or developing as needed, specific psychological theories. 
.... Work in this area - 
Simulation of Human Thought - has focused rather sharply at 
the Carnegie Institute of Technology (Mellon University) where Quillian's work was 
done, in the group led by Simon and Newell. 
The third approach, the one we call Artificial Intelligence was an attempt to build 
machines without any prejudice toward making the system simple, biological or 
humanoid. 
Mostly 'slightly edited PhD theses', as Minsky puts it in the Preface to the volume (p v). 
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A few paragraphs later (p 8), Minsky adds that the content and organisation of the 
Simulation of Thought and Al are in practice close, partly because 
both are in practice using human problem-solving behaviour as their most 
important model. 
This three-fold distinction both indicates a break between the earlier 'cybernetics' 
work and Al, and it distinguishes Al from more psychological interests. Minsky's 
history gives Simon and Newell an early and important place in the history of Al. 
Nonetheless he denied Logic Theorist the title 'first Al program'. insofar as it was 
one heuristic program among others (Minsky 1956,1959,1961,1968) and in 
addition he distinguished the theoretical concerns that motivated the design of LT as 
other than 'All'. 
A distinction between Al and the 'simulation of intelligence' was also accepted by 
Simon and Newell and their pupils. In an overview publication from the Carnegie 
school (Feigenbaum. and Feldman 1963), the contributed chapters are divided into 
two parts: Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Cognitive Processes, although 
Simon and Newell feature in both sections (a paper on chess playing in the Al 
section and a paper on their problem solving system GPS, the successor to Logic 
Theorist, in the section on Simulation of Cognitive Processes). In 1972, Newell and 
Simon published Human Problem Solving, a book which provided an influential 
statement of their theoretical perspective; and this was firmly located within the 
simulation of intelligence. In the opening paragraph they state (p 1): 
The aim of this book is to advance our understanding of how humans think. ... 
The introduction also contains a statement (p 6) of their relation to Al: 
The most important influence upon our choice of tasks such as chess and symbolic 
logic is the development of the field of artificial intelligence. 
They have chosen to focus on tasks that have been studied by Al, they explainI 
because the Al studies have provided an 'array of plausible mechanisms' for such 
tasks. This complements Minsky's claim (1968,8) that the study of human 
problem solving provides useful models for Al. "' 
Another source of insiders' histories of Al is provided by The Handbook ofAl. This 
... Paul Cohen in the Hwidbook ofAI (Cohen and Feigenbaum 1982, p 7) points out an asymmetry, 
in that 'Al does not require that an intelligent program demonstrate human intelligence, but 
information-processing psychologists insist that the correspondence be proved. ' 
Vaux, J Chapter Four 84 
is a three-volume textbook published between 1981 and 1982 by Ed Feigenbaum and 
other faculty at Stanford, with the aid of a cast of more than 100 named 'chapter 
editors', 'contributors' and 'reviewers'. 112 (Barr and Feigenbaum 1981,1982, Cohen 
and Feigenbaum 1982) Feigenbaum himself was an ex-pupil of Simon's, and the 
contributors to the textbook were drawn from many academic and industrial centres 
of Al research. "' In the Handbook,, Logic Theorist has a place in a chapter on 
theorem proving, where it is presented very much as one theorem prover among 
several (albeit an early one). FPL is described (Barr & Feigenbaum 1982, pp 3-5), in 
an overview to a chapter largely devoted to the explication of Lisp, as the first 
programming language to use the list-processing techniques that were later 
incorporated in Lisp - 
the language that has become the mainstay of Al programming. 
Although it includes chapters (such as 'Models of Cognition' in Volume Three) which 
seem to reflect the concerns of the simulation of intelligence, the structure of the 
Handbook does not signal a distinction between Al and the Simulation of 
Intelligence. This is partly because it is located within Al. The Overview to the 
chapter on Models of Cognition (Cohen and Feigenbaum 1982, p 3), for example, 
spends some time explaining that the study of human and machine intelligence can 
provide mutual insights: 
What we learn about human intelligence suggests extensions to the theory of machine 
intelligence, and vice versa. 
The distinction between Al and the simulation of intelligence is reasserted at several 
points throughout the Handbook. On the other hand, the Handbook also reflects a 
new explanatory practice, which had begun to gain strength in the 1970s, of locating 
Al as a'Cognitive Science'which implies links between Al and cognitive psychology, 
linguistics, and other disciplines. In Chapter Five (5.1) 1 explore the idea that 
Cognitive Science constituted an alliance between a number of disciplines, and ask 
what the implications are for practices of explaining Al. 
Insiders' histories of Al tend to steer us away from the easy idea of Logic Theorist 
'" Each volume of The Handbook includes a section acknowledging the various researchers who have 
worked on each section. In some cases this reveals a clear author (eg the Chapter on Cognitive 
Modelling In Volume Three which may be largely assigned to Paul Cohen), but in others there are 
many names associated with any one chapter. 
'" Industrial organisations represented included, most notably, SRI and Xerox, but there were also 
individuals from 11BM, Fairchild, and Honeywell, among others. There were almost no researchers 
from outside the US, one exception being Donald Michie, then of the University of Edinburgh. 
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as 'the first Al program', a technical breakthrough that appeared in 1956, but was 
only recognised later for what it was. More interestingly, in tracing these histories, a 
distinction has been revealed between Al and the simulation of intelligence which 
researchers on either side invoke, while nonetheless citing each other's work (and 
contributing to the same journals and conferences). Newell and Simon (1972), like 
Minsky (1968), described the relationship between Al and the simulation of 
intelligence as close (for different pragmatic reasons), but nonetheless all three 
researchers also insisted upon a distinction between the two fields. This has 
consequences for the proper use of the name: in the peer histories, 'Al' is a name 
that belongs to one side only, but in the public histories, 'Al' unites both sides. 
McCorduck and Crevier presented Al as a joint work, an alliance created by the 
different researchers who first came together in Dartmouth in 1956 (cf section 4.1). 
The peer histories suggest that the public histories are wrong in their identification of 
'the first Al program' and even wrong in their use of the name 'Al'. In the 
concluding section of this chapter (4.3) 1 ask how the differences between the public 
and peer histories should be interpreted. 
4.3 Conclusion. Audience as a socio-rhetorical mechanism 
In this chapter I have looked at some different ways In which the history of Al has 
been described in texts for a general audience and in insider texts. For a general 
audience, the history of Al was presented in a structured narrative, with a date of 
origin - 1956 - and a fateful bringing together of the name, the people, and the first Al 
program. In texts for a peer audience (written by some of the very same researchers 
whose testimonies contributed to the public history), the story is contestable at 
almost every point: Al did not necessarily begin in 1956; General Theorist was not 
agreed by everyone to mark the beginning of the symbolic paradigm; nor did all C) il 
accounts endorse the story that IPL was the direct ancestor of Lisp. Is this because 
the public histories were simplified in order to make the ideas accessible to a broader 
audience, while the peer histories showed us the complexity of accurate detail? This 
appears to explain the significance of the different audiences, and also confirms the 
idea that successful technology transfer involves the accurate communication of ideas 
(cf 3.4). Thus, it might be said, it wouldn't be appropriate to trust a text for a 
general audience in judging the real value of a technology (say Al): the public 
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histories are, as it were, allowed to dramatise and simplify because they are not 
'technical' texts. 
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However, the differences between the various texts are not all explicable in terms of 
simplification and accessibility. Is it easier to understand the claim that Logic 
Theorist marked the introduction of the information-processing paradigm 
(McCorduck, p 206) than the claim that serious work on symbol manipulation 
processes began with early experiments on language translation (Minsky, 1968, p 6)? 
1 can see no difference in terms of difficulty, or use of technical concepts. Each is a 
slightly different version of the origins of symbolic processing, and the main 
difference seems to be in their roles in the presentation and making of alliances. 
Minsky represents a continuity between Al in the 1960s and earlier work in language 
translation. In McCorduck's history,, the alliance that is presented reflects the 
institutional status quo in the late 1970s, when work at such centres as MIT, CMU 
and Stanford were all represented as 'Al'. However, there is perhaps no easy or 
single way to characterise the differences between the public and peer histories. For 
example, the difference between McCorduck's 1979 story of the importance of Logic 
Theorist and IPL (told through the words of Minsky and McCarthy) conflicts, at 
least in emphasis,, with McCarthy's history of Lisp, written at about the same time 
(1978). One way of understanding this is through a distinction between stories for 
outsiders and stories for insiders, where outsiders are told a unifying story about the 
achievements of a field and insiders continue to engage in factional disputes. Indeed 
this even explains changes in the reference of the name 'Al', which was used publicly 
for the field as a whole, while in peer discussions it was used to mark an internal 
difference (cf above, 4.2). However, on other occasions this distinction can work the 
other way round. For example, John McCarthy told McCorduck that the name 
'Automata Theory' had attracted the wrong sort of papers and that he chose the 
name 'Artificial Intelligence' for the Dartmouth Conference in order to make a break 
from Automata Theory. In his funding proposal for the Dartmouth Conference 
(McCarthy et al, 1955), however, McCarthy cited his paper for the Automata 
Theory collection as relevant previous work. On this occasion the more public 
story revealed the factional differences with automata theory, while the story for 
peer reviewers represented as relevant to the conference any previous work that 
could be represented as relevant. 
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The point that I wish to emphasise, in showing the different ways in which the 
configured audience may be seen as determining the story that is told, is that there are 
no rules about how the difference works: a general audience may be told a unifying 
story or a factional one. Nonetheless, the audience makes a difference. Adducing the 
different audiences is a way of providing an explanation of the different histories. 
However, the appropriate generalisation is that audience makes a difference - not that 
audience makes such-and-such a difference. The difference, perhaps, can only be 
adduced in any specific case (and can always be challenged). The latter point is 
familiar from discussions of indexicality and interpretive flexibility (cf 2.1). The 
question that I wish to pursue concerns the presence (perhaps the pervasive 
presence) of such mechanisms within explanatory practices and within 
communication between discursive communities. One might call them socio- 
rhetorical mechanisms,, reflecting the way in which rhetorical mechanisms act to 
produce social relations (examples, following the discussion in Chapter Two, might 
include configuring the user, performing membership or testing membership). The 
question that arises is whether the configured audience is the main or primary 
example of a socio-rhetorical mechanism, or whether others may be found. In the 
next chapter (Chapter Five) I explore this question in relation to what are sometimes 
called whig histories - that act to promote a faction and cement or destroy alliances. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
UNITED AROUND THE SYMBOLIC? ALLIANCES IN THE FIELD 
5.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that there were differences in peer and public 
histories of Al that could be understood in terms of configured audience. However, 
this does not mean that the different practices of identifying and describing Al can be 
understood simply in terms of audience. In this chapter I look at some of the ways 
that Al was identified in the context of relations with other disciplines and the 
narrative terms through which the disciplines were represented as either 'close) or 
'different' (as told both by Al researchers and by members of those other 
disciplines). In section 5.11 discuss historical narratives that tell of a broad alliance 
between a number of disciplines (including Psychology and Al) under the name 
'Cognitive Science', and in section 5.2,1 look at the rewriting of history from the 
perspective of research in connectionism. Through both sections I also trace the 
growing use (through the 1970s and 1980s) of the term 'symbolic' to characterise Al, 
and ask how this characterisation acted both to build alliances around Al and to 
question the dominance of the field that was ultimately renamed 'symbolic All). 
Does this perhaps suggest that 'the problem of Al' may be explained through the 
factionalism that distorted explanations of Al? In the final section, I turn to the more 
general question of the performativity of history and ask how the various narratives 
described in this chapter and the previous chapter contribute to a more general 
understanding of communication between discursive communities. 
The material for this chapter is again (as in Chapter Four) largely drawn from 
historical narratives. The location of these histories is primarily an academic one, 
including the Al research community, researchers in cognitive science (especially 
Psychology) and in connectionism. In section 5.11 begin by drawing on a history of 
Cognitive Science by Howard Gardner (1985) which may be compared to the public 
histories of Al that I described in the previous chapter. Like those books, it is both 
accessible to a general reader and can serve as an introductory textbook. However, 
the field of Cognitive Science, insofar as it was a field, was disparate and members of 
each of the constituent disciplines of Cognitive Science were, at least relatively 
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speaking, outsiders to the other disciplines. As Gardner himself pointed out (p xii), 
his book was an early attempt to give a systematic account of the field: 
In the mid 1 970s, I began to hear the term cognitive science. As a psychologist 
interested in cognitive matters, I naturally became curious about the methods and 
scope of this new science. When I was unable to find anything systematic written on 
the subject, and inquiries to colleagues left me confused, I decided to probe further. 
I ask, first, in what terms Gardner provided such a systematic account,, secondly 
whether the claimed alliance between Al and psychology (and other disciplines) 
undercut the distinction between Al and the simulation of behaviour (noted in 4.2) 
and, finally, how narratives of Al as a cognitive science entered into explanations of 
Al as a field during the 1970s. For exploring the second and third questions, I draw 
on texts by Al researchers, all primarily addressing a peer audience, including The 
Handbook ofAI (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1981; 1982; Cohen and Feigenbaum, 1982) 
as well as works by individual researchers (Newell and Simon, ) 1972; Newell, 1980; 
Minsky 1985). 
In section 5.2,1 turn to the relationship between Al and the field that was variously 
called 'cybernetics",, 'perceptrons', 'neural nets' or 'connectionism'. I look at 
narratives of this relationship partly through the historical perspective adopted by 
several connectionist researchers in the mid- 1980s, which is also reflected in the 
narrative told by a sociologist, Mikel Olazaran (1996). 1 also draw on texts by 
researchers in Al ( Minsky and Papert, 1988; Papert 1988 and The Handbook ofAI 
(Barr and Feigenbaum 1982; Cohen and Feigenbaum, 1982)) and comments by 
connectionist researchers (eg Clark, 1987; Rumelhart et al, 1986), including an 
interview of David Rumelhart that I published in my newsletter, Machine Intelligence 
News (April, 1987). Again, most of these texts are written for a peer audience, but a 
peer audience that includes a cross-disciplinary divide (between Al and 
connectionism). Olazaran's history is the main exception, in that , in terms of where 
it is published (the journal Social Studies ofScience) it is directed at a sociological 
(science studies) audience, rather than one in Al or connectionism. It is therefore a 
text which more directly offers a sociological reading of the history of Al. 
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5.1 Al as a Cognitive Science: 
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Cognitive Science has its own histories which partly overlap with the histories of AL 
and in which Simon and Newell's program Logic Theorist is represented as a 
breakthrough and a beginning. In this section, I introduce the terms in which the 
history of cognitive science is usually told, drawing largely on the influential book by 
Howard Gardner, The Mind's New Science (1987). 1 then ask to what extent the 
consolidation of Cognitive Science was accepted by Al researchers as providing a 
location and rationale for their field, and in particular whether this was reflected in 
the terms under which they described their own field of Al. 
Gardner's narrative includes a brief survey of what he calls 'amateur' histories, that 
is, histories of the field provided by the participants. He comments (p 28): 
Seldom have amateur historians achieved such consensus. There has been nearly 
unanimous agreement among the surviving principals that cognitive science was 
officially recognised around 1956. The psychologist George A. Miller ... has even 
fixed the date, 11 September 1956. 
The date mentioned by Miller was the second day of a symposium (the Symposium 
on Information Theory) held at MIT, at which he heard papers by Simon and Newell 
(describing Logic Theorist) and the young Noam. Chomsky"' (Gardner, p 28; Miller, 
1979). Miller's own symposium paper, given on 10 September 1956 ('The Magical 
Number Seven.... % on the limits to human short-term memory) , is also widely 
regarded as a seminal paper in the history of Cognitive Psychology. Other 
witnesses cited by Gardner include three psychologists, Jerome Bruner, Michael 
Posner and George Mandler. Bruner suggested that the computing metaphor 
revolutionised Psychology in the 1950s (Gardner, p 29; Bruner 1983). Posner and 
Mandler both emphasised the influence of ideas of information processing (Gardner, 
p 29; Posner and Shulman, 1979; Mandler, 1981). Gardner's brief survey concludes 
(p, 29) with a perspective from Al, citing a passage from Newell and Simon's Human 
Problem Solving (1972), which confirms the significance of psychology and 
linguistics to the history of their own research. "' 
Chomsky's paper, 'Three Models of Language' (Chomsky 1957), argued against the possibility of 
a grammar based on Shannon's information theory, and introduced, instead, the notion of linguistic 
transformations. 
` Newell and Simon (1972, p 4) also identified the Miller and Chomsky papers as seminal- 'One 
can date the change roughly from 1956: in psychology by the appearance of Bruner, Goodnow, and 
Austin's Study of Thinking and George Miller's "The magical number seven"; in linguistics by 
Nown Chomsky's "Three models of language", and in computer science by our own paper on the 
Logic Theorv Machine. ' 
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The institutional history of the field was based in cognitive psychology, and in 
particular at the Harvard Center for Cognitive Studies, which was set up in 1960 by 
psychologists Jerome Bruner and George Miller. Gardner comments (p 32) that, 
over the next ten years: 
A list of visitors to the Center reads like a Who's Who in Cognitive Science. 
In the mid-1970s,, the Sloan Foundation set up a $20 million ftmding programme in 
cognitive science. Gardner comments (p 36): 
... the 
Sloan Foundation's initiative had a catalytic effect on the field. As more than 
one person quipped, 'Suddenly I woke up and discovered that I had been a cognitive 
scientist all my life. ' In short order the journal Cognitive Science was founded - its 
first issue appearing in January 1977; and soon thereafter, in 1979, a society of 
the same name was founded. 
Gardner identified six component disciplines of Cognitive Science: Psychology, 
Linguistics, Al, Anthropology, Neurosciences and Philosophy. However, this was 
perhaps more a programmatic than a descriptive list, as he had some difficulty in 
showing enduring 'cognitive' strains in many of these fields. He also made it clear 
that the major alliance within Cognitive Science was between Psychology and Al. "' 
How does the claimed partnership of Al and Psychology,, within cognitive science, 
relate to the distinction between AI and the simulation of intelligence noted in the 
previous section? On the one hand, it may seem to bring the two sets of concerns 
closer. Gardner identifies the influence of computers as one of the 'key features' of 
cognitive science. He said (p 40): 
While not all cognitive scientists make the computer central to their daily work, 
nearly all have been strongly influenced by it. The computer serves, in the first 
place, as an 'existence-proof': if a man-made machine can be said to reason, have 
goals, revise its behaviour, transform information, and the like, human beings 
certainly deserve to be characterised in the same way. 
The target of this argument is behaviourism which cognitive psychologists were 
reacting against. (Indeed, the argument is slightly startling until one remembers the 
behaviourists. ) However, cognitive psychologists also had rhetorical mechanisms 
for distancing themselves from the computer. Another commentator from within Al, 
Paul Cohen (writing in the Overview to a chapter on Cognitive Modelling in the 
He said, for example (Gardner 1987,136)- '1 anticipate the merger of cognitive psychology and 
artificial intelligence into the central region of a new, unified cogrutive science .... 
I 
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h undbook ofAl (Cohen and Feigenbaum 19 82,6)), suggested that: 
For most cognitive psychologists, information processing is a metaphor for human 
thought, a means of focusing attention on new and interesting questions about the 
mind. Very few cognitive psychologists have implemented information-processing 
models - programs - of their theories. Even among those who have, the strong 
position that the program is itself a theory is not universally accepted. "' 
The claim that the computer is a metaphor for human thought provided cognitive 
psychologists with a means of distancing their discipline from Al, as did the 
distinction between 'program' and 'theory'. As Nfinsky (1968) had claimed a 
distinction between artificial intelligence and the simulation of human intelligence, so 
cognitive scientists could claim a distinction between a computer simulation of 
intelligent behaviour and a theory of how human behaviour works. 
Simon and Newell (1972), for their part, explicitly rejected claims that the computer 
should be thought of as a metaphor for human thought. They argued (p 5): 
An information processing theory is not restricted to stating generalities about Man. 
With a model of an information processing system, it becomes meaningful to try to 
represent in some detail a particular man at work on a particular task. Such a 
representation is no metaphor, but a precise symbolic model on the basis of which 
pertinent specific aspects of the man's problem solving behaviour can be calculated. 
Can Simon and Newell, labouring to provide a unifying theory of infon-nation 
processing that would hold for humans and machines, be seen as boundary figures 
between Al and cognitive psychology? It seems more accurate to observe that both 
disciplines tended to marginalise them: they were distinguished from Al in terms of 
their interest in the simulation of human intelligence; but within the categories of 
cogn. itive science they were characterised as Al rather than psychology. In the 
Handbook, Cohen (p 7) summed up their situation, which he calls 'information 
processing psychology': 
Their position is so strong that it defines information-processing psychology almost 
by exclusion: it is the field that uses methods alien to cognitive psychology to 
explore questions alien to Al. This is an exaggeration, but it serves to illustrate 
why there are thousands of cognitive psychologists, and hundreds of Al 
researchers, and very few information-processing psychologists. 
Cohen cited in particular the authors of the program HAM (Human Associative Memory), 
Anderson and Bower (1973), who stated- 'We make no claim that there is any careful correspondence 
between the step-by-step information processing in the simulation program and in the psychological 
theory. ... 
The claim is sometimes made ... that the program is the theory. 
This is not the case for 
HAM, and we wish to make this denial explicit' (Quoted Cohen and Feigenbaum, 
1982, p 6). 
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Cohen went on to suggest that the rise of cognitive science involved a 'weakening ' of 
this position. He seems also to suggest (p 7) that some of the differences between 
information-processing psychology and cognitive psychology are resolved in 
cognitive science: 
Recently, the strong position has been relaxed to admit research that does not 
necessarily prove the correspondence between programs and human behaviour but 
that has some avowed concern for understanding human behaviour. This research is 
called cognitive science by its practitioners. 
But this may be Cohen's own projected programme (or perhaps the voice of the next 
generation), for Newell and Simon gave no indication of 'relaxing' their position (cf 
Newell, 1980; 1992). 
From Newell and Simon's point of view, Cognitive Science was a home location. 
They had been promoting their programming ideas among psychologists since the 
late 1950s. In their own brief history of their field (1972, p 887), they emphasise the 
significance of a 1958 RAND Summer School for 
bringing the work of the Carnegie-RAND group into effective relation with the 
other main streams of information processing psychology. 
As Cognitive Science became an increasingly active forum, Newell argued for the 
adoption of the Newell-Simon concept of physical symbol systems as a theory of 
information processing, rather than a mere metaphor. In an address to the first 
Cognitive Science Conference (organised by the Sloan-funded J, ournal Cognitive 
Science in 1980) he treated the concept of a physical symbol system as one which 
was both familiar to his audience, yet in need of an introduction (Newell 1980, pp 
136-7): 
The concept of a physical symbol system is familiar in some fashion to everyone 
engaged in Cognitive Science - familiar, yet perhaps not fully appreciated. For one 
thing, this concept has not followed the usual path of scientific creation, where 
development occurs entirely within the scientific attempt to understand a given 
phenomenon. It was not put forward at any point in time as a striking new 
hypothesis about the mind, to be confirmed or disconfirmed. Rather, it has evolved 
through a more circuitous root [sic]. Its early history lies within the formalisation 
of logic, where the emphasis was precisely on separating formal aspects from 
psychological aspects. Its mediate history lies within the development of general 
purpose digital computers, being thereby embedded in the instrumental, the 
industrial, the commercial and the artificial - hardly the breeding ground for a 
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theory to cover what is most sublime in human thought. The resulting ambivalence 
no doubt accounts for a widespread proclivity to emphasise the role of the computer 
metaphor rather than a theory of information processing. 
For Newell and Simon, the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis (PSSH) was an 
articulated theory, in which symbols played a defined role as the discrete elements of 
a PSS (connected by a set of relations into a symbol structure) (Newell and Simon 
1972, p 20). For many others in Al and cognitive science the idea of symbol 
manipulation was less theorised (or, as Newell puts it, "not fully appreciated"). 
Nonetheless, within Al at least, the looser idea of symbol manipulation does seem to 
have served as an explanatory description which applied across many of the sub- 
fields that counted as Al in the 1970s. "' Moreover, one of the effects of the 
development of the field of Cognitive Science was to help in representations of a 
broad field of Al, stretching from issues in search, heuristics and programming 
language design (all of which can be seen to be at least partly descended from the 
issues surrounding LT and IPL) to areas such as natural language processing and 
robot vision, and also including the field of cognitive modelling (all included in the 
three volumes of The Handbook ofAI (Barr and Feigenbaum 1981,1982, Cohen and 
Feigenbaum 1982). For Al, at least (if not the other cognitive sciences), symbolic 
processing became the explanation which justified the connections between the 
various components of the field of Al. On the other hand, the ubiquity of the 
concept of symbol manipulation was not a bar to the continued deployment of a 
distinction between Al and Psychology, or between programs and theories (cf Cohen 
and Feigenbaum 1982,6-7), and for designers of expert systems there remained a 
choice between modelling humans or simply designing a system that would do the 
required task (cf Barr and Feigenbaum 1982,83). 
A reading of Minsky's writings from the 1980s suggests that the consolidation of 
Cognitive Science did bring a renegotiation of the boundary between Al and the 
modelling of human behaviour which he had argued for in the 1960s (as discussed in 
section 4.2). For example, one of Minsky's explanations to McCorduck for his 
failure immediately to recognise the significance of Logic Theorist was that it 
"' Mark Derthick, an Al researcher at the industrially funded research centre, Microelectronics and 
Computer Technology Corporation (MCC), remarked in 1988 that 'The PSSH is widely regarded as 
correctly describing the intent of researchers in artificial intelligence ... 
' (reprinte d, Clancey et al, 
1994, p 368). 
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appeared to be psychology rather than Al (McCorduck 1979,105-6). Minsky also 
told McCorduck (p 107): 
My interests never again came much to coincide with Newell and Simon - that is, 
never much at the same time. Again, I did not realise until much later the great 
joke; at almost every stage, I was in various ways more concerned with human 
psychology, they with artificial intelligence - but neither of us would have agreed at 
all with that description. 
Nfinsky grew increasingly more interested in the working of the mind. He did not, 
however, approach this from the viewpoint either of cognitive psychology or Newell 
and Simon's information processing psychology, but followed a more idiosyncratic 
and original path. In 1985, he published The Society ofMind, in which he 
conceptualised the mind as a society of agents (roughly, simple processes), a 
conceptualisation very different from Newell and Simon's PSSH. This did not alter 
his perception of Al and psychology as different areas, though he appears to have 
become more convinced of the practical connections between the two. His definition 
of Artificial Intelligence in the Glossary to The Society ofMind was (p 326): 
The field of research concerned with making machines do things that people consider 
to require intelligence. There is no clear boundary between psychology and 
Artificial Intelligence because the brain itself is a kind of machine. 
While Minsky may have seen the two fields as converging, however,, researchers in 
either of the fields often viewed this book as somewhat lightweight"' (cf Clancey et 
al, 1994, pp 259-333 for a series of reviews by different authors, and Minsky's own 
reply). Despite Minsky, the distinction between Al and psychology remained 
available to Al researchers as a way of identifying their field. Crevier (1993, p 249) 
remarked on the continuing distinction between the two fields, despite the alliance 
supposedly wrought by cognitive science: 
Al workers and psychologists .... often deeply mistrust each other's work and apply 
adjectives like 'naive', 'slipshod', and 'irrelevant' to work performed in the other 
discipline. 
If one influence of the field of Cognitive Science was to support the claims of Al to 
provide a theory of mind, another was to help substantiate the sense of Al as itself a 
"' 
, 
One reviewer, Nfichael Dyer (Clancey et al, p 259), noted. 'It is unfortunate that cognitive 
scientists have, for the most part, reacted to NEnsky's book as though it were light reading or a minor 
conversation piece, to be relegated to the coffee table. Nfinsky himself is partly to blame here, since 
has has written the book in a style as though it were intended only for those uninitiated to the 
cognitive sciences. ' 
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unified field. I have suggested that symbol manipulation was often conceptual I sed in 
a loose rather than a rigorous sense to explicate the unity of Al. In the latter case, a 
reservation is still available, allowing members of the community to discriminate 
between AI and theories of mind. Nonetheless, even the broader or looser 
conceptualisation of symbol manipulation provided a means of representing the 
unity of the field. 
5.2 From 'Al' to 'symbolic Al': history and power. 
In the histories that I have explored so far in this chapter and in Chapter Four, one 
group of researchers has been identified largely as part of the 'pre-history' of Al, 
that is researchers in cybernetics. Histories of Al (both peer and public) published in 
the late 1970s tended to present cybernetics as the pre-history of Al, and to identify 
a crisis in cybernetics research in 1969, when Minsky and Seymour Papert published 
their book Perceptrons. The Minsky and Papert book was generally taken to have 
demonstrated the limitations of the 'neural-net' approach to designing intelligent 
systems. McCorduck (1979, p 89) summarised the impact of Perceptrons somewhat 
triumphalistically: 
And so much for the hope of making a machine think by trying as literally as possible 
to imitate the brain, the meat machine, at the cellular level. 
However, this version of history was itself challenged in the mid 1980s, following a 
revival of interest in some areas of cybernetics by researchers in neural networks, or 
connectionism. Crevier (1993, p 103) observes: 
Many neural-network investigators still hold a grudge against Minsky and Papert, 
whom they blame for delaying the bloom of their discipline until the 1980s. 
In this section I ask about the shift of power reflected in the histories of succeeding 
decades which told, first., of the defeat of the cybernetics or perceptron approach, 
then of the revival of the cybernetic neural-net approach. My main interest is not in 
how the histories reflect a shift of power, but in how they relate to a shift of power, 
in what sense an historical narrative may itself be effective. 
One example of how to analyse the force of historical narrative in this case is given 
by Mikel Olazaran (1996) who employs a distinction (taken from Pinch, 1977) 
between 'research area' and 'official history' modes of description. This enables him 
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to distinguish the questions of whether Minsky and Papert successfully proved the 
limitation of neural-net architectures, whether neural-net research work actually came 
to a halt, and the role of contemporary 'histories'. He answers 'noý to the first two 
questions and then accuses the 'official history' of AI of starving neural net research 
of funds (p 64 1): 
The official history of the debate legitimated the authority structure which was 
emerging in Al, and was used by the elite of the symbolic approach as a defence 
strategy against heterodox and 'deviant' interpretations and approaches. 
There is a problem in the way in which Olazaran makes the distinction between 
'research areas' and 'official history' modes of description. He implies that although 
Minsky and Papert were taken to have effected a 'closure' of the debate in 1966, 
they did not really do so because their 'proof was later effectively challenged (and, 
Olazaran further adds, they never claimed as much as some people took them to 
claim,, and the argument was never accepted by some neural net researchers). 
Therefore (he argues) the historical commentaries of the 1970s which endorsed 
Minsky and Papert's findings were doing something other than disseminating 
research findings: in effect, he introduces a conspiracy to consolidate the power of 
' symbolic Al'. That this is Olazaran's argument may be illustrated in the following 
paragraph (p 640): 
According to the official history, Minsky and Papert replied to Rosenblatt's 
overclaiming and showed that progress in neural nets was not possible - and after 
that this field was largely abandoned. But if, as I have shown here, Minsky and 
Papert did not quite show that, and if (as I will point out soon) neural nets were not 
completely abandoned, what was the role of the official history? It is my view that 
its role can only have been the legitimation of the emergence and institutionalisation 
of the symbolic approach, which came to be seen as the 'right' approach to Al, and 
as occupying the whole Al discipline. 
Olazaran seems to be reading back the ultimate perceived failure of the Minsky- 
Papert 'proof' into contemporary discussions of it (a trap for historians of science 
and technology identified by Kuhn (1962),, Bloor (1976) and others). But there is 
also an assumption written into his account about the power of historical narrative. 
The power of the 'official history I in this account comes from its use by a powerful 
group ('the elite of the symbolic approach') and the purpose of its use is to 
consolidate that power. Instead of saying that there was a consensus that was later 
challenged, Olazaran takes the success of the later challenge to imply that the 
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consensus requires further explanation. Nonetheless, there is an important issue 
which is highlighted by Olazaran's paper, about the power of a history to consolidate 
the power of a group. 
I have already (in the first paragraph of this section) illustrated McCorduck"s 
triumphal history of the 'defeat' of the perceptron model. The Handbook ofAJ 
adopted a more measured tone, but equally assigned cybernetics, the perceptron and 
other forms of adaptive or self-organising systems to the past. The editors of the 
first volume (Baff and Feigenbaum 198 1, p 5) commented: 
The ideas of the cyberneticists were part ýof the Zeitgeist, and in many cases they 
influenced the early workers in Al directly as their teachers. 
And in the third volume (Cohen and Feigenbaum, 1982, pp 378-9) it is reported. 
The original publication of the perceptron model sparked a large amount of research, 
and a fair amount of speculation, concerning the potential for building intelligent 
machines from perceptrons. Minsky and Papert (1969) attempted to quiet this 
speculation by proving several theorems about the limits of percept ron-ba sed 
learning. 
However,, perhaps the most telling element of the Handbook's treatment of self- 
organising systems is the extent to which it failed to describe them at any great 
length. Moreover, where it did describe such work (for example in Volume Three, 
pp 325-326), this is represented as not being Al, either from the point of view of Al 
researchers,, or of researchers in adaptive learning. 
In the 1 960s, attention moved away from learning towards knowledge-based 
problem solving and natural language understanding (Minsky 1968). Those people 
who continued to work with adaptive systems ceased to consider themselves A[ 
researchers; their research branched off to become a subarea of linear systems 
theory. 
A four-page description of perceptrons,, a few pages later, was introduced within a 
section dealing With learning systems in engineering and science,, with the comment 
that 'many of the problems addressed are analogous to those encountered in the 
design of Al learning systems' (p 382). As Olazaran suggests, this history acts to 
marginallse work in perceptrons (and other adaptive and self-orgarni sing systems). 
However the marginalisation is largely achieved through the small amount of space 
devoted to perceptrons, through locating them as not being 'Al' and through the 
attendant history, including reports of the Minsky-Papert proofs of the limitations 
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of the approach, and the absence of space given to any suggestion that the Minsky- 
Papert proofs might be disputable. "' This illustrates how perceptrons were 
marginalised, including the dissemination of the Minsky-Papert results through 
factual and authoritative peer reports of those results. That is to say, at the time, a 
consensus regarded them as marginal. 
By the mid-1980s the Minsky-Papert proof was under attack, largely as the result of 
work coming from the PDP (Parallel Distributed Processing) group at the University 
of California, San Diego which had been set up in about 1981 (Olazaran, 1996, p 
643). "' The publication in 1986 of Parallel Distributed Processing by David 
Rumelhart and James McClelland, based on work by the UCSD group, was largely 
taken to have re-established the reputation of neural networks (often under the new 
name of 'connectionism'). Rumelhart and his colleagues argued against Minsky and 
Papert that: 
[T]he apparently fatal problem of local minima is irrelevant in a wide variety of 
learning tasks. [ ... 
I In short, we believe that we have answered Minsky and 
Papert's challenge and have found a learning result sufficiently powerful to 
demonstrate that their pessimism about learning in multilayer machines was 
misplaced. 122 
The results of the the PDP group were discussed in academic Al circles and widely 
accepted as a disproof of the Minsky-Papert case (although Minsky and Papert 
dispute this in the second edition (1988) ofPereeptrons). "' One example from the 
UK, was the 1987 meeting of the AISB (the Society for the Study of Artificial 
Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour, the British professional association for 
Al researchers). This opened with a presentation on 'Connectioniism and Cognitive 
Science' by Andy Clark of Sussex University who provided an overview of 
connectionism for an Al audience and concluded by raising the question of the 
relation between connectionism and 'conventional Al' (Clark, 1987). David 
"' It is not clear that many arguments critical of the Minsky-Papert line would have been avAable in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the critics quoted by Olazaran were interviewed in the late 1980s. He 
does, however, cite a paper by David Block from 1970, reviewing Perceptrons and suggesting 
limitations on the assumptions made by Minsky and Papert. 
"' In 1979 a conference organised at La Jolla (California) brought together researchers working both in 
the connectionist and symbofic approaches; the papers were published in 198 1, and the PDP group 
set up at UCSD shortly thereafter (cf Olazaran, 1996, p 643). 
1" Cited Olazaran (1996, p 647). 
113 In the second edition (1988) of Perceptrons, Minsky and Papert defended themselves against the 
accusation that they had prematurely halted work in neural nets, with the claim (p xiii) that this was a 
necessary pause to consider issues of representation and that 'In any case, the 1970s became the 
golden age of a new field of research into the representation of knowledge', 
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Rumelhart gave an invited talk at this meeting, which is not included in the 
Proceedings (Hallam and Mellish, 1987). 1 reported this event and interviewed 
Rumelhart, giving the readers of MIN (Apr 1987, p 4) a very abbreviated history of 
connectionism: 
Interest in brain-style processing dwindled in the 60s and 70s, Rumelhart says 
(after early work by the likes of Oliver Selfridge, F Rosenblatt and Marvin Minsky), 
partly because Al researchers were able to make interesting contributions to the 
understanding of cognitive psychology within the limits of computing in a von 
Neumann environment. But he also blames Minsky and Papert who in their book 
Perceptrons combined a detailed mathematical analysis of perceptrons with 'a very 
negative rhetoric'. This, he believes, gave the impression that a brain-style 
approach had been proved to be fruitless. 
This paragraph (it seems to me now) captured the revised history so succinctly that 
it is almost a caricature. That the revival of 'brain style computing' is reported in 
conjunction with a retort to Minsky and Papert is evidence of the then widespread 
acceptance of the Minsky-Papert proof. However, this history also assigns Al 
research to a more limited place - in the above example this place is 'within the limits 
of computing in a von Neumann environment. "' In addition, there was a growing 
practice of using the name 'symbolic Al' to distinguish the field formerly known as 
Al from connectionism (also now 'Al'). In other words, the revised history is also 
performative, establishing new 'facts' and marginalising previous establishments. 
The 'official history' told by Al researchers till the mid-1980s and the revised 
history told by neural-net researchers and propagated by various commentators 
(including not only MfN, but also Olazaran) may both be described as whig histories: 
both act to further the cause for which they speak by presenting it as factual and 
incontestable. However, I do not mean to identify 'whig histories' as some distinct 
and reprehensible form of history. I assume that all histories (including the one that I 
am presenting here) are contestable. The epithet'whig' points to a tone of realism 
and certainty; but to the extent that whig histories deny other versions, they are 
equally susceptible to deconstruction. This is demonstrated by Seymour Papert in 
his 1988 paper'One Al or ManyT where he recasts the connectionist version of 
124 A 'von Neumann environment' meant a sequential, non-parallel environment. While 
connectionists often assigned symbolic Al to a von Neumann environment, Al researchers in the early 
1980s usually assumed that expert systems and the symbol-processing paradigm would only come 
into their own in a parallel (or 'non-Von') environment. 
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history as a fairy story in which two sisters, Al and connectionism, the artificial and 
natural daughters of cybernetics, compete for the love of the wealthy Lord DARPA 
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) until the artificial daughter slays the 
natural one. Papert's target is as much the historical assumptions of Al as those of 
connectionism, - 
however, and he identifies the underlying problem as the search for a 
single unifying model of mind (generalisable from simplified models). In this 
respect, he suggests, the revival of connectionism acts as a vindication of 
behaviourism against cognitive psychologies and may be seen as a 'return of the 
repressed'. "' 
Some of the ways in which connectionism, in its turn,. came to be taken as the future 
of computing, may be shown by describing briefly how the revised history of 
connectionism was disseminated or taken up, not only by Al researchers, but also by 
the industrial Al community. As I have already suggested, the revised history was 
presented to UK audiences of Al researchers (via meetings such as AISB) and to 
industrial Al audiences (via MIN for example) in 1987. The UK activity reflected 
what was already going on in the US - since this was a US-led revival. "' Peer 
discussions in Cognitive Science addressed the relative merits of connectionism and 
the symbolic paradigm for modelling minds. 127 Industrially, the Al newsletters began 
reporting neural net developments from early 1988.121 In November 1988, AlWeek 
(I Nov, 1988) reported that the first INNS (International Neural Network Society) 
Conference had attracted 1600 delegates, and that at the conference, Jasper Lupo, 
Deputy Director of DARPA's Tactical Technology Office announced 'Neural 
125 Papert says (1988, p 9): 'Behaviourism has been beaten down in another version of the Snow 
White story, but the response of academic psychology to connectionism may turn out to be a classic 
example of the return of the repressed. ' 
12 ' Academically, work in adaptive systems had been going on outside the US before the setting up of 
the PDP group - for example, by Igor Alexsander and others at Brunel University. These groups were 
in some sense outside the battle of the histories. For example, Frank Field, Professor of Cybernetics 
at Brunel, retained a cyberneticist approach to the field in his 1979 book, Man the Machine, where he 
presented self-organising nets as the paradigm of machine intelligence. He used the term 'Artificial 
Intelligence', but his book made no reference to the group of researchers who thought they had 
invented the term in Dartmouth in 1956. 
"' in an overview, in a special edition of the journal, Cognition (Vol 28,1988), Mark Derthick 
remarked: 'Over the past five years there has been tremendous growth in interest in connectionist 
theories for their claimed ability to learn automatically from an environment, generalise behaviour to 
novel situations, gracefully degrade in the face of conflicting input or in the face of internal damage, 
and their superficial similarity to the organisations and behaviour of massively parallel networks of 
neurons. These properties are at best less than central in traditional theories of cognitive science, 
which are based on the manipulation of symbol systems' (Reprinted in Clancey et al, 1994, p 363). 
"' A small neural network industry already existed in the US, the lead company being Hecht -Nielsen 
Neurocomputers (I-INQ which offered its first products, the Anza coprocessor and Anza 
neurocomputing workstation, in August 1987 (AlWeek, 15 Aug 1988, p 4) 
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networks is a more important technology than the atom bomb'. Lupo also unveiled 
the results of six-month DARPA Neural Network Study which recommended a $400 
million program over eight years; but the funding actually announced, by another 
DARPA speaker (Barbara Yoon), was a two-year 'seed' funding program (AIWeek, I 
Nov 1988, p 1): 
[T]o determine the advantage of neural networks over conventional electronic 
systems, expert systems and connectionist approaches. 
The different technologies were to be compared over three application problem areas: 
speech recognition, sonar signal recognition and automatic target recognition. In the 
same issue of A] Week (p 8), Al consultant Tom Schwartz, speculating on the 
strategy behind DARPA's announcements, commented 
[T]his program was the most expedient way to bring peace to the technology 
factions inside and outside DARPA. 
In this judgement of the main funding body, however, it is not only neural nets that 
has to take its chance as one of many competing technologies for advanced 
application tasks. Expert systems was also just one of many. The revival of 
connectionism, along with the consolidation of the idea of Cognitive Science, effected 
a shatteri ng of explanations of Al. This is illustrated in a 1994 review by MG Dyer 
of Minsky's (1985) Society ofMind Dyer (who described his own speciality as 
4' symbolic and connectionist models of language comprehension 
!, 129 ) remarked (p 
270): 
One can view the society of cognitive science as an 'ecology, in which different 
founders of Al and their colleagues have 'invaded' and gained control of 'niches'. 
For example, McCarthy and his colleagues at Stanford, eg Genesereth and Nilsson, 
hold the 'mind-is-logic' niche; Rumelhart, McClelland and their colleagues hold the 
'mind-is-a-connectionist-network' niche; Newell and his colleagues hold the 'mind- 
is-rule-chunking' niche. Within this ecology, Minsky's book has most affinity to 
connectionism and conceptual dependency theory. 
This passage, it seems to me,, stands as a telling obituary to the practice (during the 
1970s and early 1980s) of deploying the 'symbolic paradigm' to represent Al as a 
unified field, and it was the return of connectionism which marked the change. 
129 This self-description was made in the contributors' biographies section of the collection in which 
Dyer's paper was reprinted (Clancey et al, 1994, p 526). 
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5.3 Conclusion. 
103 
In this chapter I have traced the way that Al was identified within the context of the 
negotiation of alliances, both with friends (in Cognitive Science) and between 
competitors (Al and connectionism). In section 5.11 discussed how the 
consolidation of Cognitive Science from the mid-1970s served as a unifying field 
which not only united AI and Psychology (and other disciplines) but also helped 
cement the alliance between factions Within AI,, and that this alliance had available (as 
a representation of its unity) the 'physical symbol system hypothesis'. In section 
5.2 1 discussed how the history of connectionism both revealed a previous anti- 
connectionist history as being partial and itself acted to rewrite history in favour of 
itself. The histories that I have discussed in this chapter and the previous one may be 
summarised as follows: 
4.1 A public history of Al that presented a unified field within an unfolding 
narrative; 
4.2 Internal divisions and distinctions that qualified or denied aspects of the 
pu ic istory; 
5.1 The history of Cognitive Science in alliance with Al, represented Al as 
unified around the symbolic paradigm; 
5.2 The history of connectionism redefined 'Al' as 'symbolic AF, thereby 
marginalising the field. 
Some of these histories are more whiggish than others. I take a whig history, firstly, 
to be a history that acts to consolidate the power of the powerful, and to represent 
what has happened as the most reasonable outcome or the right outcome. This is 
why Kuhn is often described as attacking whig history through his injunction to 
return to scientific disputes with an open mind about the outcome. "' Realist and 
naturalist voices, which present facts as facts, are the allies of whig history; and this 
tone of voice may be the most useful way of describing what whig is,, since all 
histories (including this one) are written to convince the reader. The examples I have 
looked at here illustrate that the rhetoric of whig history may also be deployed in 
bids for power and in response to attack. The connectionist history, for example, 
was both a response to what it represented as the unjust marginalisation of 
"' I'd always assumed that Kuhn used the phrase 'whig history' in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962). But this does not appear to be the case. 
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connectionism and a moment in the rehabilitation of connectionism. Similarly, 
McCorduck's (1979) book, with its heroic tale of a machine (and a science) that was 
bound to triumph may be seen as a response to the public challenges of authors such 
as Dreyfus (1972) and Weizenbaum (1976), as well as providing an empowering 
narrative for Al. Further, not all factional histories are easily described as'whig' 
histories; for example, histories which argue one interpretation against another are not 
always appropriately characterised as whig, perhaps insofar as they acknowledge 
alternative possible histories (for example, the various attempts to propose or 
discount the significance of the physical symbol hypothesis, discussed in 5.1, retain 
implicit references to alternative interpretations). A clue to the best way of 
understanding why some histories attract the epithet 'whig' may be found in Papert's 
(1988) description of the connectionist revival as the return of the repressed: whig 
histories may usefully be characterised as histories which suppress alternative 
readings (or alternative groups of readers) through a variety of mechanisms,, including 
a realist tone of voice. 
It is important to note that there are many other possible narrative threads that I 
could have pursued in looking at the history of the field of Al. In particular, I could 
have told more stories of splits and divisions, such as the split between the 'neats' 
and the 'scruffies' (cf Bundy, 1988, p 89; Crevier 1993,172-6 ). McCarthy and his 
colleagues at Stanford represented the 'neats' and Minsky spoke for the 'scruffies' 
with his concept of frames (Minsky 1975), which allowed for the opportunistic 
invoking of properties associated with any frame. Herb Simon,, for his part, had no 
time for either camp. "' Ina footnote in his autobiography, Simon (1991, p 192) 
commented on McCarthy and his colleagues: 
An influential coterie of contemporary artificial intelligence researchers, including 
Nils Nilsson, John McCarthy, and others, believe that formal logic provides the 
appropriate language for Al programs, and that problem solving is a process of 
proving theorems. They are horribly wrong on both counts .... 
Once one starts pursuing splits and divisions, it may seem that any field is always 
further divisible. But, as we have seen, unifying explanations are also available, for 
Simon also distanced himself from Minsky's frames-based approach through a claim that there was 
nothing original in it: 'I have my share of amour propre when it comes to getting credit for scientific 
discovery ... 
I've been unable to discover in what respects [Minsky's frames] are an advance over 
description lists. ... As 
far as I'm concerned, I've been using frames since 1956' (quoted in Crevier, 
1993, p 174). 
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example in a public history (section 4.1) or within a broader alliance (section (5.1). 
But by showing, for example, that a unifying history acts to configure the audience as 
not-a-peer-audience I do not mean to suggest that there are rules of deployment, or 
ways that outsiders must be addressed, or conventions for carrying on a dispute with 
one's peers. Sometimes the understanding of why alliances are rejected or claimed 
may be seen to be unique and specific. For example , in a review of Newell's last 
major work, Unified Theories of Cognition (1990), Minsky (1994a, p 107) attacked 
the very attempt to provide a unified theory of cognition and argued the need for 
understanding how 
to build a machine that used several different representations. 
Most of the review is based on this argumentative distinction. In the final sentences 
of the final paragraph, however, Minsky says (pp 107-108): 
From the moment I met him in 1956, Allen Newell was one of my heroes. At least 
five times his ideas transformed mine; I was never the same person after 
understanding LT, GPS, HPS, or MERLIN, and now Soar in the context of UTC. This 
latest work will surely stand as a basic advance in Al's theories of knowledge 
machines. Reading this monumental book recalled to me my sense of awe in seeing 
the power of GPS, first in its original form and then in the version with learning. I 
hope others who read it carefully will have the same experience. 
Newell had died before the review was published. "' Minsky's tribute, which is so 
different in its claims from any of the remarks he makes about Newell (or Newell and 
Simon) in the texts that I have quoted so far, cannot be understood merely in the light 
of obituary conventions. It seems to sum up the whole disputatious relationship 
between Minsky and Newell, recognising the relationship which the disputation 
constituted. 
Finally, there is one more thread that must be picked out from the explanatory 
practices discussed in these two chapters. The distinction made by Nfinsky in his 
1968 description of the field, between Al and the simulation of thought, provided a 
way of identifying Al in contrast to Psychology and in contrast to the simulation of 
behaviour which was still deployed in descriptions of the field in the Handbook in 
1980 (cf section 4.2). In discussions of the relationship between connectionism and 
"' The editors conu-nent- 'All of the reviewers of UTC wrote these reviews with the expectation of a 
response by Newell. Tragically, Newell died just as the reviews were completed. ' (Clancey et al, 
1994,5) it is possible that I have read this context into Minsky's final paragraph as the editors also 
comment elsewhere that 'the reviews themselves appear as originally published' (ibid, xii); however 
I find it almost impossible not to read Minsky's tribute as a response to Newell's death. 
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Al in the 1980s,, however, the texts I have cited all appear to be concerned with the 
question of how to model minds (cf section 5.2) and Minsky (1985) reports his own 
conversion to an interest in modelling minds. Does the idea of Al as an approach to 
systems design disappear in the 1980s, to be replaced by a consensus that Al is 
concerned with modelling minds? Turkle (1984, p 251) implies that this is not the 
case when she remarks that the more speculative (or 'philosophical') ideas of Al 
were mainly the province of 
a small number of people in Al whose ways of looking at the question of mind and 
program are starting to have an influence in the world beyond the academy. 
She adds in a footnote (p 25 1): 
The people I discuss in this chapter do not represent the Al community as a whole, 
but a subset characterised by a sense of the discipline as a theory of mind. 
However, the people she refers to include many of the most famous and influential 
Al researchers. They were active in explaining Al to the world at large, including 
industrial users and governmental funding bodies. Did these theories enter into 
explanations of Al in the context of technology transfer? In other words, how did 
claims and beliefs about the intelligence of Al systems enter into explanations of Al 
for industrial and government audiences? I approach these questions in the next 
chapter, first by exploring the charges made against Al researchers of philosophical 
naivete and exaggeration (6.1), then by exploring examples of the way that 
'intelligence' was deployed in explanations of Al and discussion within the Al 
community about 'Intelligence' as an explanatory resource (6.2). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
READING AND INTERPRETATION: ASCRIBING INTELLIGENCE 
6.0 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters I used the idea of a 'whig history' to suggest that there 
are competing histories associated with Al that can each be seen to be promoting a 
factional narrative that endorses one point of view and marginalises others. In 
particular, the public history of Al served to consolidate the reputation of Al in a 
unifying narrative that repressed or resolved internal peer disputes; this was 
emphasised by the eventual rewriting of history from a connectionist perspective 
that demonised the unifying power of the previous history, which it renamed 
' symbolic Al'. My analysis served to show first how explanations of Al differed in 
relation to audience (Chapter Four), and how they differed in relation to historical 
context (Chapter Five). In each case I emphasised the power or performativity of 
the text. In this chapter, however, I reassert the power of the reader. The reader in 
this case is not the individual reader, but different academic disciplines (or the reader 
qua member of a discipline), and one of the general points that I explore in this 
chapter is how, for disciplines, community may be performed and tested through the 
reading of texts (as well as through historical narratives). I look at this in the context 
of disputes and debates about whether or when it is appropriate or useful to ascribe 
'intelligence' to a computer; this includes the so-called 'Al debate' and some other 
discussions among Al researchers. In focusing on the question of reading, 
sociological discussions about interpretive flexibility are relevant. I suggested in 
Chapter One (1.2; 1.3) that Pinch and Bijker (1989) assume that social interests in an 
artifact somehow predate or are logically prior to the artifact. One of the issues to be 
explored in this chapter (particularly in 6.1) is whether, by using the idea of 
performance of community, it is possible to speak of interests determining an 
interpretation (reading) without supposing that the interests are prior to texts. The 
second question to be explored (particularly in 6.2) is whether and how the 
availability of different interpretations is managed in the context of explanations of 
Al. For example, does the claim that Al is concerned with building intelligent 
machines perform community for the discipline (is the belief used as a test of 
membership) and does this suggest that disciplines are usefully conceptualised as 
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discursive communities; is it an explanation that is deployed across all contexts and 
for all audiences; or is its use confined to some sorts of contexts and some sorts of 
audiences (and if so, how may this be analysed)? 
I begin this chapter (6.1) by a selective discussion of issues raised by the Al debate 
as it took place between Al researchers and philosophers. First, 1 explore some of 
the ways in which each side represented the claims of either discipline to have 
something relevant to say about theories of knowledge and mind. Then I look at 
differences in readings of a particular text (Turing's description of a test for machine 
intelligence) and whether this may be described as performing community. Finally I 
ask what the analyses in this section imply about the relationship of disciplinary 
interests to interpretations of what counts as an interesting issue. In 6.2 1 look at 
the availability of alternative readings and the argument that interpretive flexibility 
associated with ascriptions of 'intelligence' may be exploited in explanations of Al. I 
ask what implications this has in relation to communicating or explaining Al to other 
groups, and in particular whether different ways of argumentatively exploiting the 
interpretive flexibility of 'intelligence' may act to configure different readers or 
audiences. Finally (6.3) 1 ask how perceived problems of defining 'Intelligence' were 
played out in the explanatory practices associated with Al,, and whether the charge of 
'exaggeratiorf made against Al researchers in the context of the Al debate can in 
practice be abstracted from the performance of discipline. That is to say, is it the 
case that 'Wilful' exaggeration by Al researchers can be dissociated from the 
performance of discipline; and if so, does it follow that this contributed to the 
'problem of overselling Al' identified by some Al vendors (cf Chapter Three). 
6.1 Reading and interests: the Al debate 
The Al debate, as it came to be known, involved critiques of Al from a number of 
different disciplinary perspectives, mainly attacking the claim that Al researchers 
sometimes call 'the machine intelligence hypothesis% that human intelligence can be 
adequately simulated on a computer. I am not interested in trying to adjudicate this 
debate, but in seeing how disciplines perform community in the context of the 
debate. In this section I look at some selected texts associated with the Al debate, 
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asking to what extent differences of interpretation are associated with different 
disciplines; for example, how do different d1sciplines identify what the issues are, 
what counts as a question, what counts as an appropriate answer, and so on? I focus 
on the differences between Al and philosophy, as the debate between some Al 
researchers and some philosophers was one of the most extended episodes of the Al 
debate; and also because the debate was taken up within philosophy (that is, 
philosophers are to be found on either side of the question) giving greater 
opportunity to ask about the terms in which the philosophical issues were identified. 
I begin by looking at some ways in which members of the two disciplines each 
represented the appropriate location for solutions of the Al debate; then I study a 
particular example of different interpretations of what the issues are taken to be in 
Turing's (1950) description of a test for intelligence. 
On the Al side, philosophical interventions in what has come to be known as 'the Al 
debate' were often seen as an unprovoked attack. "' In a recent radio discussion, for 
example, the British neuro-computationist Igor Aleksander, reflecting on some of the 
themes of the 'bickering' between scientists and philosophers (Start the Week, BBC 
Radio 4,16/3/98), called for: 
... a healthy form of discussion, rather than saying 
'Oh you can't do it at all'. 
The Al side has tended to hear its critics as saying, again and again, 'Oh you can't do 
it at all", and has speculated on causes ranging from a love of mystery and 
confusion"' to technical incompetence"'. Some philosophers havejustified a 
uniquely philosophical interest in the field of Al in terms of a distinction between its 
'philosophical implications' on the one hand and the 'technical achievements' of Al 
researchers on the other. So Dreyfus, for example, in the introduction to What 
Computers Can't Do (1972, p xxxv), begins by making this distinction: 
I want to make absolutely clear from the outset that what I am criticising is the 
implicit and explicit philosophical assumptions of Simon and Minsky and their co- 
workers, not their technical work. 
In this and some other respects, the Al debate has some echoes of the more recent 'Science Wars', 
which involves what are often perceived as an unprovoked attack by some scientists on discussions of 
science in sociology, cultural studies and philosophy (cf Sokal and Bricmont, 1997). 
"' Igor Aleksander, for example, implies this in his remark (during the radio discussion mentioned 
above): 'There is a lot of mystique and mystery around discussions that have to do with the brain 
and the question of consciousness. ' (Start the Week, BBC Radio 4,16 March 1998). 
135 cf Minsky that 'the self-made critics of Al have virtually no merit at all ... 
in technical matters' 
(Article 14265 in Mail Group comp. ai. philosophy) 
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He then contrasts the importance of their technical work with the naivete of their 
philosophical assumptions, pointing to: 
[TIhe importance and value of their research on specific techniques such as list 
structures, and on more general problems such as database organisation and access, 
compatibility theorems, and so forth. [But ... ] their philosophical prejudices and 
naivetd distort their own evaluation of their results ... 
Putnam (1988b)"' makes a similar distinction. The distinction does several things: it 
locates the field of Al in 'engineering' and situates Al claims about intelligence (about 
simulating human intelligence or providing a theory of knowledge) as outside the 
field; at the same time it implicitly claims theories of knowledge and intelligence as 
the proper object of Philosophy. Some Al researchers, on the other hand, make a 
distinction that is in some respects similar to the engineering/philosophy distinction, 
but acts to validate engineering ('the technical') as the proper location for settling the 
Al debate. Minsky, for example , in a 1993 contribution to a Mail 
Group discussion 
on the Al debate (article 14265 comp. ai. philosophy) says of the critics: 
Anyway, there are plenty of serious 'critics' inside the field, arguing about serious 
problems of scaling, knowledge structure, etc. Unfortunately, the self-made critics 
of Al have virtually no merit at all, that is, in technical matters. 
The implication is that the question of whether intelligence can be simulated is a 
technical matter and that philosophical discussion has nothing to offer. McCarthy 
(1988, pp 305-6) subverts the philosophers' complaints about the philosophical 
naivete of Al in a comment that assumes that the point at issue is programmability: 
Artificial Intelligence cannot avoid philosophy. If a computer program is to behave 
intelligently in the real world, it must be provided with some kind of framework into 
which to fit particular facts it is told or discovers. Here I agree with the 
philosophers who advocate the study of philosophy and claim that one who purports 
to ignore it is merely condemning himself to a naive philosophy. 
Because it is still far behind the intellectual performance of people who are 
philosophically naive, Al could probably make do with a naive philosophy for a long 
time. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to say what a naive philosophy is, and 
philosophers offer little guidance. 
He goes on to complain that it is not even possible to derive ways of representing 
Putnam (1988b, p 270) says'. 'Computer design is a branch of engineering (even when what is 
designed is software and not hardware), and AI is a subbranch of this branch of engineering. If this is 
worth saying, it is because Al has become notorious for making exaggerated claims - claims of 
being 
a fundamental discipline and even of being an "epistemology ... .... 
Al has so far spun off a good deal 
that is of real interest to computer science in general, but nothing that sheds any real light on the 
mind (beyond whatever light may have already been shed by Turing's discussions). ' 
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knowledge from any philosophical theory: 
Either no one in Al (including retreaded philosophers) understands philosophical 
theories well enough to program a computer in accordance with their tenets, or the 
philosophers have not even come close to the required precision. 
Al researchers, he finally suggests, need to develop their own philosophy, resolving 
issues of ontology, free will, non-monotonic reasoning and the provision of a realist 
objectivity to robots. These all sound like topics to which philosophers might 
contribute (or , indeed, believe they are already contributing to), but, McCarthy 
complains, philosophers seem to find "that the working systems are too trivial to be 
of interest" (p 307). By representing what is at issue (what is interesting) in terms 
of programmability McCarthy thereby marginalises philosophy, which has nothing 
relevant to say about programmability. 
Philosophers also, I assume, may be seen performing disciplinary interests. One 
example is the identification of philosophical implications in non-philosophical texts. 
This may be explored through looking at some different ways of reading Alan 
Turing's (1950) description of a test for deciding whether a computer is to be deemed 
'intelligent'. Turing was a mathematician and normally published in mathematics 
journals. "' However, the 1950 paper ('Computing Machinery and Intelligence') was 
published in a philosophy journal Mind (then edited by Gilbert Ryle). Turing was 
therefore publishing outside his own field, although Mind had previously published 
at least one other cybernetics paper (Ashby, 1947)"' . The paper seems to 
have 
arisen in an inter-disciplinary context, in a debate in the Philosophy Department at 
Manchester University in October 1949, in which Turing had participated (Hodges, 
1983, p 415). 139 Its publication may be seen as an attempt to communicate between 
disciplines (an attempt both by Mind in publishing the paper, and Turing in 
"' Turing's 1937 paper, 'On Computable Numbers, with an application to the 
Ent scheidu ng sproblem', which is often credited with responsibility for the birth of modem computing 
and which conceptualised computability through the Turing Machine, was published in the 
Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society. 
"' The paper was entitled 'The Nervous System as Physical Machine with Special Reference to to the 
Origin of Adaptive Behaviour'. 
"9 Turing had been also involved in informal debate with the philosopher Michael Polanyi and, to a 
less extent, Karl Popper. At the Manchester meeting, held on 27 October 1949, according to 
Turing's biographer Andrew Hodges 1983 (pp 414- 415), 'Just about everyone in British academic 
life with a view to express had assembled. It began with Max Newman and Polanyi arguing about 
the significance of Godel's theorem, and ended with Alan [Turing] discussing brain cells with JZ 
Young, the physiologist of the nervous system. In between, the discussion raged through every other 
current argument, the philosopher Dorothy Emmett chairing. "The vital difference, " she said during a 
lull, "seems to be that a machine is not conscious", ' 
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addressing an audience primarily of professional philosophers). With this in mind, 
the opening paragraph is interesting. Turing (p 433) says: 
I propose to consider the question, 'Can machines think? ' This should begin with 
definitions of the terms 'machine' and 'think'. The definition might be framed so as 
to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is 
dangerous. If the meaning of the words 'machine' and 'think' are to be found by 
examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
the meaning and the answer to the question, 'Can machines think? ' is to be sought in 
a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting 
such a definition I shall replace the question by another which is closely related to it 
and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words. '40 
In a journal that regularly published papers devoted to issues of usage, Turing') s 
reference to Gallup polls might be taken to betray some unfamiliarity with the 
context in which he was publishing. "' Instead of using a dictionary, or observing 
usage or consulting his linguistic intuitions, Turing devised a test to stand as an 
objective definition of 'intelligence'. This is the Turing test, in which an interrogator 
attempts to distinguish between a computer and a person on the basis of a series of 
freely chosen questions for a period of five minutes. "' That is, the Turing test is a 
functional - or operational - definition, to be agreed beforehand, in order to be able to 
avoid defining or otherwise explaining the term 'thinking': if a computer can pass 
this test, let us call it 'intelligent', let us say it is 'thinking'. Read as a functional 
definition, the point of Turing"s paper is a claim about the potential capabilities of 
computing, and he suggested that by about the year 2000, digital computers would be 
powerful enough to pass the Turing test. 
"' The 'more accurate form of the question', which is not in fact a question, was put by Turing in the 
following passage (1950, p 442): 'Consider first the more accurate form of the question. I believe 
that in about fifty years' time it will be possible to programme computers with a storage capacity of 
about 109, to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have 
more than 70 per cent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning. ' 
"' The question of how (and why) criteria are 'stretched' in accepting cross-disciplinary papers would 
make an interesting study, and has implications for a more recent cross-disciplinary publication, the 
so-called 'Sokal hoax' (cf Sokal, 1996). 
"' The idea of the imitation game is introduced in terms of a game where the interrogator is trying to 
tell a man from a woman, and where the man is trying to fool the interrogator he is a woman, but the 
woman is trying to convince the interrogator she is a woman. This has led some commentators to 
suggest that the point of the Turing Test is for a computer to imitate a woman, although this is based 
on a single ambiguity and not supported by anything else in the paper (cf Collins, 1990; The Boston 
Computer Museum Catalogue), Simon Schaffer also apparently supports this view (cf a paper given, 
with Adam Lowe, at CRICT, Brunei University, 17 February 1999, 'Digital Cabinet of Wonders'). 
Andrew Hodges, in a web site devoted to Turing (www. wadham. ox. ac. uk/-ahodges/scraptest. htm]), 
calls this interpretation 'the Pink Herring'. 
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It is not entirely self-evident how the Turing test is to be read. Minsky (1959) in 
one of his early papers attempting to delimit the new field of Al, expressly rejects 
Turing's use of a functional definition. He argues (p 5) that what counts as 
'intelligence' is always changing, so by 'tying' the concept to a particular piece of 
behaviour we may fall out of step with usage: 
Certainly there are many kinds of performances which if exhibited by a man we 
would all agree, today, require or manifest intelligence. But would we agree 
tomorrow? For some purposes we might agree with Turing to regard the same 
performances in a machine as intelligent. In so doing we would be tying the 
definition of intelligence to some particular concept of human behaviour. 
Turing's biographer Andrew Hodges (1983, p 415), himself a mathematician, 
describes the test as 'an operational definition of "thinking") or "intelligence" or 
cc consciousness"'. In the philosophical literature, on the other hand5 especially in 
introductory textbooks, the Turing test is used as an illustration of philosophical 
functionalism, or the thesis that functioning intelligently is equivalent to intelligence. 
For example, Roger Scruton in his introductory survey,, Modem Philosophy (1994, p 
549) states that 
The original inspiration for functionalism was the 'Turing Machine' described by 
Alan Turing, 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind, 1950 [ ... ]. Turing's 
conjecture is that mental operations are sufficiently like those performed by 
computational systems to warrant explanation in the same way. In particular, 
mental questions seem to be iterative, leading to results by the repeated application 
of algorithmic devices. Maybe the brain is a Turing Machine. Turing proposes a test 
for artificial intelligence (the Turing test), which is that the machine should be able 
to match any given human performance: if it can do that, what grounds have we for 
withholding the description 'intelligent' from machines? 
This passage elides two separate papers by Turing, a 1937 paper conceptualising 
computation in terms of the Turing Machine"' and his 1950 paper describing the 
Turing test. This is perhaps not ultimately misleading, if a little careless of historical 
detail. 144 Unlike the problem that Nfinsky saw in the test, that it tied intelligence to 
"' The Turing Machine was explicated by Turing (193 7) in terms of a scanner reading a tape marked 
off into squares which might be either blank or contain a 1. The system responded to the scanner 
reading, according to a table of instructions. The Turing Machine was devised by Turing as a means 
of conceptualising mechanical computing (in the context of an attempt to resolve a mathematical 
problem (Hilbert's problem)). It is often described as the beginning of modem computing. It has 
also often been used as a way explaining the idea of computing to novices (eg Weizenbaum., 1975). 
"' The Turing Machine was perhaps more important in the history of functionalism than the Turing 
test as Putnain, who is often cited as one of the originators of functionalism (cf Mautner, 1996; 
Blackburn, 1994; Scruton, 1994) used the Turing Machine analogically in a significant early paper 
(Putnam, 1959). Putnam later changed his views on functionalism (cf 1988a). 
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descriptions of particular behaviour, Scruton suggests the machine 'should be able to 
match any given human performance'. But it is not clear how this would act as an 
objective test in the sense required of a functional definition. Scruton takes the point 
of the Turing test to be an illustration of functionalism, rather than merely the 
production of a functional definition. In another introductory philosophy textbook, 
Jenny. Teichman (1988, p 26) complains that the conditions of the Turing test are 
arbitrarily overspecified: 
I do not know why Turing said 70 per cent and chose five minutes; nor do I see why 
he thought these figures indicate that the machine's 'intellectual' behaviour is 
indistinguishable from the man's. The argument does not seem very convincing, and 
indeed John Searle has used a somewhat similar thought experiment (the 'Chinese 
Room') as a way of trying to show that machines don't think. 
Teichman, again, takes it that the issue in the Turing test is philosophical 
functionalism (although she takes Turing to be arguing for functionalism, rather than 
simply assuming functionalism, while complaining that it is not much of an 
argument). 
The two different readings of the Turing test do not conflict. The point is not that it 
is wrong to identify Turing as functionalist (or implicitly functionalist), but that the 
interest of the Turing test is read differently by each discipline. The mathematical or 
engineering reading takes the test to be a functional definition, and the philosophical 
reading takes it to be an illustration of functionalism. However, both may agree that 
it is a functional definition and that it is functionalist; the difference is in assumptions 
about which is the relevant (or interesting) characterisation. These different readings 
cannot be put down simply to the taking of sides in the hostilities of the Al debate, 
since the internal philosophical debate was often waged around the question of 
functionalism (that is, philosophers on both sides of the Al debate took 
functionalism to be one of the central issues). Further, as McCarthy indicates in his 
comment about 're-treaded philosophers' not having much to contribute by way of a 
programmable philosophy, the irrelevance of philosophy was also a charge by Al 
researchers even against friendly philosophers. "' The sociological interest in 
noticing the difference between the two readings is not to choose between them., in 
115 1 also recall a conversation in a pub near Sussex University, between a pro-Al phflosopher and an 
Al researcher, in which the philosopher was describing how Hofstadter's (1979) book G6del, Escher, 
Bach had first interested him in Al, to which the Al researcher commented dryly that he had found the 
book 'content-free'. 
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the sense of deciding that one is right and the other wrong, but to see the way in 
which disciplinary assumptions are performed through those readings. Following 
Pinch and Bijker (1989), these readings could be analysed in terms of interpretive 
flexibility, and the selection of a reading explained in terms of the interests of each 
discipline. But it should also be noted that such readings serve to negotiate and 
maintain the identities of the different disciplines. Indeed, being trained in a 
discipline involves learning how to read appropriately. This may be used to suggest 
that in the case of academic disciplines (though not perhaps so neatly in the case of 
other discursive communities), 'interests' may be understood as 'what is taken to be 
of interest'. 
Another important question relates to what this example implies for the possibility 
of cross-disciplinary communication. Contrasting the two readings shows some of 
the barriers and defences which each discipline erects to defend its own terms and 
marginalise the interests of other disciplines. What would it take for Al researchers 
to see philosophical Implications as relevant, or for philosophers to recognise 
empirical investigations as relevant? John Searle's (1980; 1984) 'Chinese Room" 
argument seems to suggest that no development in the functionality of computers 
could have any effect on the philosophical argument, since he starts by supposing 
that the full simulation of natural language use is possible and that nonetheless such a 
system would not be said to 'understand' language. Dreyfus (1972; 1992), by 
contrast, argued against the possibility of simulating intelligence in the case both of 
chess systems (where he argued that a computer would never match even a good 
amateur game) and in the case of language use (an argument directed particularly 
against the possibility of scaling up 'toy' systems, such as Winograd's (1972) 
SHRDLU system). Winograd effectively accepted Dreyfus' criticisms (cf Winograd 
and Flores,. 1986), while a chess program in 1997 defeated Grand Master and world 
chess champion Gary Kasparov. Does this mean that Dreyfus was right about 
language and wrong about chess? (I do not take the answer to either part of this 
question to be obvious. ) 
In this section I have illustTated some ways in which Al and philosophy each deploy 
different assumptions about how theories of knowledge and mind are resolved. The 
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AT debate provided a context in which AT researchers claimed their field as the 
appropriate location for settling disputes about intelligence and mind. However, in 
earlier chapters I have shown that a distinction was maintained, at least in peer 
discussions, between AT and Psychology. Is this compatible with identifying AT as 
the location for explaining intelligence? In the following section I explore some of the 
ways in which 'intelligence' was invoked in explanations of AT and ask whether and 
how these may be seen as performative of the field. 
6.2 Interpretive flexibility: 'intelligence' as an explanatory resource 
In the previous section I discussed some different readings of the Turing test, asking 
whether the differences might be seen to be performative of community. These 
different readings may also be analysed in terms of interpretive flexibility (cf sections 
1.2 and 1.3), but in this case it is not clear that this adds much to the claim that 
alternative readings are available. It has been suggested, however, that in the case of 
ascriptions of 'intelligence', alternative interpretations may sometimes be exploited 
within the deployment of the ascription. Woolgar (1989, p 319) suggests that the Al 
project of building an intelligent machine sustains itself through playing on the dual 
possibility of denying or ascribing intelligence to a given machine: 
Instead of bringing research to a close, a 'successful' manifestation of intelligence 
occasions the redefinition of what, after all, is to count as intelligence. 
That is,, the mechanisation of 'real intelligence' is always a future task, because the 
achievement of automating any particular task thereby enables it to be represented as 
merely mechanical. In contrast to Pinch and Bijker (1989), in this example, closure 
never comes. There is a moving horizon in which 'intelligence' always sits in the 
next task to be computerised. This might seem to be an interpretation that was 
primarily of sociological interest. However, the moving horizon was also noted by 
the Al community itself, and features in some of the discussions and general 
explanations of what the field is. The British Al researcher Donald Nfichie (Michie 
and Johnston., 1984, pp 17-18), for example, complained about the behaviour of the 
critics of Al through the following imaginary conversation: 
'Would it be intelligent if a machine could read a newspaper and give you a summary 
of its contentsT asks the Al scientist. 
'Certainly! ' concedes his critic. 
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'My student', replies the At man, 'has just written a program to do that (and it does 
not cheat simply by printing out the headlines). ' 
'But how does his program work? ' asks the critic with an air of suspicion. After a 
spell with blackboard and terminal he decides that his suspicion was justified. 'So 
that's all! I don't call that intelligent. ' 
There appears to be a feeling that if one understands how something works, it is not 
intelligent. This leads to the idea coined by Larry Tesler"' that 'artificial 
intelligence is whatever hasn't been done yet', placing At workers in a 'no-win' 
situation. 
Here the moving horizon becomes moving goal posts. The Al scientist, in this 
dialogue, is trying to establish some prior agreement on what would count as 
intelligence, to establish a functional definition, but the critic refuses to play by those 
rules. Minsky, on the other hand, has sometimes attempted to incorporate the 
moving horizon in explications of 'intelligence'. He does this, for example in an early 
conference presentation (1959, p 6) where, as I mentioned in the previous section 
(6.1), he rejected Turing's use of a ftmctional definition, and turned instead to 
4 usage'. However, Minsky selects just one usage: 
In what situations are we less reluctant to attribute intelligence to machines? 
Occasionally, a machine will seem to be more resourceful and effective than one 
might expect from casual inspection of its structure. We may be surprised and 
impressed and we tend to remain so until through analysis or "explanation" the 
sense of wonder is removed . ..... In the same way, our judgements of intelligence on 
the part of other humans are often related to our own analytic inadequacies, and 
these judgements do shift with changes in understanding. 
Several decades later, Minsky (1988, p 307) was still making a similar point: 
For practical purposes we usually tell passers-by this easy definition: 'Al concerns 
performances that a person needs intelligence to do. ' For instance, when Slagle 
wrote the SAINT program in 1960, that was 'Al', because solving college calculus 
problems then seemed to need intelligence. However, once Jim Slagle showed us 
how, such problems somehow no longer seemed to need so much intelligence; in fact 
it left us wondering why students take so long to learn to solve those kinds of 
problems. 
So, in this sense, the term 'intelligence' itself seems only to describe the moving 
horizon of our growing understanding of how minds might work. 
can recall hearing talk of 'Tesler's Law', that 'Al is whatever has not been done yet' in informal 
discussion among the industrial Al community. My memory is that (contrary to MIchle and 
Johnson's purpose) the implication of mentioning Tesler's Law was to express reservations about 
academic Al projects. I have not been able to locate the original reference. 
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In Minsky's interpretation, human Intelligence keeps disappearing, draining Out Of 
task after task as we come to understand it. "' However , in contrast to Woolgar's 
(1989) observation that the invention of intelligent machines is constantly deferred, 
Minsky does imply a closure at least in principle: the eventual death of the mystique 
of I inexplicable intelligence. On the other hand, the remark about the students 
requires some comment. I take it that this remark is ajoke (it is difficult not to read 
it as a joke), but the joke undercuts the idea that the moving horizon changes our 
understanding of 'intelligence' irrevocably. 
If AI researchers, consciously or unconsciously, exploited interpretive flexibility in 
ascribing intelligence to machines, what did this mean for communication with other 
groups? Did it enable them to get away with exaggeration (is this the source of the 
alleged hype and misdescription (cf 3.4))? This may be approached by looking in 
more detail at some examples of comparing human and machine intelligence in 
explaining Al. In fact the practice of comparing computers to human intelligence 
predates Al and is found in the discussion surrounding Babbage's machines (cf 
Schaffer,, 1998), as well as some writings by the pioneers of modem computing 
(Turing, 1950; von Neumann, 1958) and among early cyberneticists (Wiener, 1950). 
The funding proposal for the Dartmouth Conference, made famous by the heroic 
public histories of Al (cf Chapter Four), began with a broad programmatic statement 
about the possibility of the mechanical simulation of intelligence (McCarthy et al, 
1955): 
The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning 
or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a 
machine can be made to simulate it. 
The proposal continues by bringing under the aegis of this project both ongoing work 
in areas such as 'neuron nets' and areas of interest to the proposers (including issues 
of programming). The purpose of this document was to convince the reader (le, the 
Rockefeller Foundation and other researchers invited to participate) that these 
various topics were both coherent and interesting as the subject of a summer school. 
Minsky (1956; 1959-7 1961), in a series of three papers (briefly discussed in Chapter 
Four), provided a more sustained attempt to bring ongoing work under the title 
There is evidence of the influence of Minsky's description of 'Intelligence' from some widely 
spaced citations. For example, Armer (1963, p 391) quoted below in this section; and John Seely 
Brown (1984, p 83) 'One of the founders of Artificial Intelligence once defined intelligence as being 
that attribute of human behaviour that we admire but do not understand. ' 
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Artificial Intelligence'. In this context, in a paper (1959) addressing a conference at 
the National Physical Laboratory in the UK, he introduced the description of 
'Intelligence' mentioned earlier in this section, where intelligence is used of skills that 
have not yet been explained. Why does Minsky try to describe intelligence at this 
point (why not leave it to the audience's general understanding of the ten-n to indicate 
the sort of tasks he means, as the Dartmouth Proposal had done)? Or, to put the 
question in a way that can more sensibly be answered, what does this description 
achieve,, in this context? One answer may be found in the figure of the hostile critic, 
who is addressed soon after Minsky (p 6) has introduced his description of how 
'intelligence' is used: 
Many people are hostile to such an investigation, maintaining that creativity (or 
intelligence) is some kind of 'gift' which simply cannot by understood or mechanised. 
This view can be maintained only through a constant shifting of definition. As soon 
as any process or performance has been mechanised, it must be removed ... from 
the list of creative performances. .... The weakness of the advocate of inexplicable 
creativity lies in the unsupported conviction that after all machines have been 
examined some items will still remain on the list. 
The hostile person can be portrayed as bent on a fruitless task (although the critic 
might ask whether Minsky's conviction that the list will be empty is not equally 
unsupported). In addition, perhaps, the requirement to say what is meant by 
'intelligence' may be considered a critical question, since as we have already seen 
(6.1) there is an assumption on the Al or engineering side that the question cannot be 
rigorously put, but will be decided by technical developments. Minsky's text may 
thus be said to include,. among its configured readers, a hostile one who must be 
disarmed. He also pre-empts the situation described by Michie and Johnson, where 
it is the hostile critic who exploits interpretive flexibility. The NPL conference 
proceedings"' suggest that there was some anxiety among some of the audience 
about claims that intelligence could be fully simulated. This is the response Minsky 
got from one of the industrial delegates5 Dr LC Payne of Decca Radar (p 3 1): 
I should first like to congratulate the author on what I thought was a most 
stimulating paper. ... Although there are extremists on both sides I don't think 
anyone is under any illusion about whether a machine can think in the same sense as 
a human being can think. 
The conference proceedings (NPL, 1959) include transcripts of the discussion fbHowing each paper. 
The Preface states (p ii): 'The discussion was recorded and all contributors and authors were asked to 
edit their contributions. The discussion is reproduced in full. ' 
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Payne went on to suggest that 'the human being can be regarded as a digital computer 
par excellence' (although he drew the line at supposing computers could handle 
induction), and his comment about extremists does not seem to be directed at 
Minsky. Indeed, it reads almost as if he was inserting a disclaimer (on Minsky's 
behalf as well as his own) to disarm any critics. In his final paragraph, Payne (p 33) 
observed 
I think a lot of obscure metaphysical thinking surrounds discussions of intelligence 
today. 
This also suggests the lurking figure of the hostile critic. Payne's method of dealing 
with the hostile critic was to avoid sounding 'extreme". What Nfinsky achieved (and 
Payne failed to achieve) was a programmatic view of the field of Al where no task 
was ruled out ahead of time, just because some critic said (as Aleksander put it more 
recently, cf 6.1) 'Oh, you can't do that at all'. 
Does the hostile reader have to be pre-empted whenever Al is explained in terms of 
intelligence? This may be approached through a comparison of publications for a 
general readership and textbooks addressing a relatively technical readership. In 
publications for general readers and other public forums such as television, AI was 
invariably explained in terms of 'intelligence', without any qualification. The most 
provocative statements of leading Al researchers are more likely to be made, and 
quoted (reproduced), in general books than in textbooks. The following, from Herb 
Simon in 1957 (Cited in Crevier, 1993, p 1)" illustrates how the general reader might 
be configured and managed: 
It is not my aim to surprise or shock you - but the simplest way I can summarise is 
to say that there are now in the world machines that think, that learn and that 
create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until - 
in a visible future - the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with 
the range to which the human mind has been applied. 
This is the voice of the author as expert. The opening disclaimer is interesting: it 
prepares the reader to be surprised or shocked, presents what is to come as 
potentially shocking, but negates or disallows this reading. The reader therefore 
becomes responsible for her own alarm. The author speaks for science and the reader 
"' Crevier gives a year of publication, but no bibliographic details of this quotation, which he uses as 
the inotto to his introductory chapter. 
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is invited to leam from science. " 
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The authors of Al texts sometimes directly tackled the question of how to address 
different audiences. For example, Feigenbaum and Feldman's (1963) introduction to 
Al, Computers and Thought attempted to make technical texts directly accessible to 
a wider readership. It consisted of reprints of papers from technical journals in a 
number of specialised areas, subdivided into Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of 
Cognitive Processes, "' with an introduction for each of the two subdivisions. A 
final section, "Survey of Approaches and Attitudes" provided an overview of 
arguments about machine intelligence by Paul Armer, and an overview of the field by 
Minsky (a reprint of Minsky, 1961). In the Preface to the book (pp vi-vii), readers 
were given guidance as to the order in which they should read it, depending on 
whether they were general readers, computer scientists and management scientists, or 
psychologists and philosophers: 
For the general reader. - The major introductions to Part I on artificial intelligence 
and Part 2 on simulation of cognitive processes, the introductory article by Turing 
[a reprint of Turing 1950], followed by the other articles in a sequence dictated by 
the tastes of the reader and his competence in the subject matter discussed, and 
finally the summary and review articles by Armer and Minsky. The Minsky critical 
review might also usefully be the midpoint in a reading of this collection. 
For the computer scientist and the management scientist: The major introductions, 
followed by Minsky's critical review. Perhaps of high-lighted interest, Samuel's 
treatment of learning programs, Tonge's management science application, and the 
research on theorem-proving programs (Newell, Shaw and Simon, and Gelernter). 
For the psychologist and the philosopher The introduction to Part 2 on simulation of 
cognitive processes, the articles on problem-solving, verbal learning, two-choice 
behaviour, concept formation, social behaviour and decision-making, in a sequence 
dictated by the interests of the reader, and finally the papers on artificial 
intelligence research. 
The general reader, then, might avoid the technical articles altogether. "' The 
introduction to the Al section and Armer's overview both argue for machine 
intelligence. The Al overview (specially written for this volume) presents this as the 
"' A provocative tone may therefore act to control the reader, and simply by ascribing intelligence to 
machines, the text may be read as provocatively breaking a boundary between machines and humans 
(cf Mays, 1952, Woolgar, 1989). 
"' The distinction between Al and the Simulation of Cognitive Processes was discussed above 
(Chapter Four). 
"I it may be noted that Turing's 1950 (Turing test) paper, although grouped among the technical 
articles, is described as an 'introductory article'. 
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only scientific position on the subject, "' and presents the reader with the option of 
agreeing or being unscientific. However, Armer's overview'Attitudes toward 
intelligent machines' (reprinted from a Symposium on Bionics organised by the 
USAF Air Research and Development Command) addresses the reservations of the 
4 scientific' reader. This paper is praised elsewhere in the volume for its 'middle of 
the road approach' (p 387). Its main drift is to counter what Armer calls 'negativist' 
arguments against machine intelligence, and he expresses concern (p 389) that 
The negative arguments existent today tend to inhibit such research. 
He introduces the issues (p 390) with an anecdote that locates negativism among 
'builders and users of computers' (his former self included): 
The topic came into prominence in the late 1940s when Babbage's dreams became a 
reality with the completion of the first large digital computers. When the popular 
press applied the term 'giant brains' to these machines, computer builders and 
users, myself included, immediately arose to the defence of the human intellect. We 
hastened to proclaim that computers did not 'think'; they only did arithmetic quite 
rapidly. 
Anxiety about ascribing intelligence to machines is here blamed, not on the 
unscientific attitude of the reader,, but on the popular press. "' The reader as 
scientist is then invited to reconsider the question by viewing intelligence as a 
continuum, on which people and machines may be distinguished, and on which it 
may (or may not) turn out there is an upper limit to machine intelligence. "' This 7 
M The editors (Feigenbaum and Feldman, 1963, pp 2-3) ask: 'Is it possible for computing machines 
to think' and answer their own question: 
'No - if one defines thinking as an activity peculiarly and exclusively human. Any such behaviour in 
machines, therefore, would have to be called thinking-like behaviour. 
'No - if one postulates that there is something in the essence of thinking which is inscrutable, 
mysterious, mystical. 
'Yes - if one admits that the question is to be answered by experiment and observation, comparing 
the behaviour of the computer with that of human beings to which the term 'thinking is generally 
applied. 
'We regard the two negative views as unscientifically dogmatic. 
"' Armer repeats this point later in his paper (p 397): 'Exaggerated claims of accomplishments, 
particularly from the publicity departments of computer manufacturers, have resulted in such a strong 
reaction within the scientific community that many swing too far in the opposite direction. ' 
"' Armer's main concern was to persuade the scientific reader not to pre-judge the limits on 
automating 'intelligent' tasks, partly in order to enrol members of other disciplines in an 
interdisciplinary project. He concluded with an appeal (p 405): 'The success of our efforts will 
depend on how well we do in bringing the various discipfines together and on the number of well- 
qualified scientists who are attracted to this research area. ' In his attempt to enrol other disciplines 
in the Al project, Armer (pp 399-405) appeals to national interests, including an overview of the state 
of the debate in Russia, and quotes a Russian professor as saying that Newell and Simon were 
conservative in suggesting that it would take ten years for a computer to be world chess champion. 
This foreshadows some of the arguments from national interests put in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
except that in the later period the threat was represented as Japan (eg Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 
1984), which I discuss below, 72 
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approach attempts to disarm the reader, not by overruling her as unscientific, but by 
enrolling her scientific open-mindedness. "' The paper goes on to claim (p 396) that 
there is 
[a] mounting list of tasks which can now be carried out on a computer but which we 
normally consider requiring intelligence when performed by humans. "' 
The idea of the continuum provides a way of evading the problem of providing an 
operational definition of 'intelligence". Armer both approves of Minsky's 
description of intelligence as what has not yet been understood, "' but chides a critic, 
Meszar (In a 1953 paper entitled 'Machines Can't Think'), for arguing that any 
mental process which can be automated is not thinking. "' As descriptions of usage, 
Minsky and Meszar seem to be making equivalent claims. The difference is in the 
way the description is argumentatively deployed, in Minsky's case to keep the field 
open (the temptation to describe behaviour as 'Intelligent' will gradually disappear, 
as more and more tasks are automated), in Meszar's" to attempt to rule it 
impossible (whatever you automate, you will thereby not have achieved an 
I intelligent' machine). Both of these are defensible moves which construe the issue, 
in the first case, as what can be programmed; in the second case, as how ascriptions 
of intelligence are deployed. The first case may be seen as an example of the 
performed interest of Al as a discipline in programmability. 
The above discussion suggests that one difference between Woolgar's and Minsky's 
description of the interpretive flexibility (or moving horizon) of 'Intelligence' is the 
difference between what the general reader is told and what the technical reader is 
told. The general reader, configured as unscientific and uncritical, will always be 
unable to challenge the authority of the Al scientist who keeps producing further 
I use the female pronoun as neutral, according to common practice, though it rings slightly odd for 
a group ('the users and builders of computers') which was overwhelmingly male (with some notable 
exceptions, such Admiral Grace Hopper, the designer of Cobol). 
"' The list includes geometry theorem proving, checker and chess playing, assembly line balancing, 
composing music, designing motors, recognition of manual Morse code, and solving calculus 
problems (Armer 1963, p 396). 
"' Armer ( 1963, p391) says: 'It's easy to underestimate the advances, for "intelligence" is a 
slippery concept. As Marvin Minsky put it, "You regard an action as intelligent until you 
understand it. In explaining, you explain away". ' 
"' Armer (1963, p 396) quotes Meszar as saying- 'Perhaps the most flexible concept is that any 
mental process which can be adequately reproduced by automatic systems is not thinking. ' Armer 
comments that this 'gambit' means that the lower bound of what counts as thinking can continually 
be redefined 'so that it is continually above what machines can do today. ' 
"I I have not had access to Meszar's paper, published in Bell Telephone Laboratories Record. 
However, niv point here has to do with how the paper was read by Armer. 
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stories of future 'intelligent' (and 'conscious' and 'creative') machines. The 
technically competent reader, on the other hand, is reassured that this Is an empirical, 
programming project which acts merely to demystify unscientific prejudices about 
'Intelligence'. The hostile critic, meanwhile, seems rarely to be addressed directly. 
She is present, however, in the pre-emptive arguments of the case for machine 
intelligence. This is a situation which, I suggest, may be understood in terms of the 
difference between the intended reader (the reader the author wishes to address) and 
the configured reader (cf section 2.4): the hostile reader is not intended, however she 
is configured through the various pre-emptive arguments intended to divert her 
criticism. Nonetheless, hostile readers may appear where least desired or guarded 
against. The physicist Roger Penrose (1989, p ix), for example, reported that he was 
goaded into writing The Emperor's New Mind after watching 'proponents of strong 
Al' on a BBC TV programme. More generally, this is a reminder that readers do not 
always behave as the text demands. 
6.3 Conclusion: Exaggeration as a disciplinary performance? 
In this chapter I have looked at explanations of Al in the context of the Al debate. 
This raised two sets of issues which , initially at 
least, seem somewhat separate: 
problems of interdisciplinary communication in the context of an interdisciplinary 
dispute; and problems raised by attempts to control readings of the claim that 
machines may be intelligent. In 6.11 looked at the debate between Al and 
philosophy as a dispute between discursive communities. I suggested that each 
discipline negotiated and maintained its own interests through the way in which it 
adduced issues, posed questions and interpreted and recognised arguments. This 
revealed some of the ways in which disciplines police their own boundaries, but 
implied real difficulties for interdisciplinary communication. In 6.2 1 looked at some 
of the occasions on which Al has been explained through claims of the possibility of 
machine intelligence, and discovered that these explanations may be seen to be 
exploiting the interpretive flexibility of attributions of 'Intelligence I in an attempt to 
control how this claim was read. This may be understood as an attempt to pre-empt 
the criticisms of the hostile reader, and is deployed differently for different 
configured readers (particularly for general readers and for technical readers). This 
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provides the link between the two sets of issues, since this may be seen as an 
attempt to impose an appropriate (disciplinary) reading and pre-empt an 
inappropriate (uninteresting, non-disciplinary) reading. 
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The discussion in this chapter still leaves open the question of whether practices of 
explaining Al in terms of intelligence are at the root of 'the problem of overselling' as 
perceived by some Al vendors (cf Chapter Three). Certaiffly,, in the context of the 
Al debate, one of the accusations bought against some Al researchers was that they 
exaggerated their results. It is worth briefly reviewing some of these accusations in 
the light of discussion in this chapter about performance of community and attempts 
to manage the reader. For example, Dreyfus (1963, p 46) charges Minsky with 
leaving out the scare quotes round the word 'understand' in an article in Scientific 
American, reviewing work in Al. Dreyfus noted that the researcher cited by Minsky 
(Danny Bobrow) had been 
careful in noting he has given a special meaning to the word 'understands'. 
By dropping the quotation marks, Dreyfus charged, Minsky exploits an ambiguity in 
Bobrow's use of 'understands' as a technically defined term, then goes further and 
makes claims conceming the 'learrung' abilities of the system (p 47): 
Once he has removed the quotation marks from 'understand' and interpreted the 
quotation marks around 'learning' to mean superhuman learning, Minsky is free to 
engage in the usual riot of speculation. 
Putnam (1988, pp 270-1) made a similar accusation of a wilfully exaggerated claim of 
the achievement of computer understanding against 'a famous name of Al', who 
apparently backed down as soon as he was challenged. "' John Searle in the Reith 
Lectures (1984, p 30) complained: 
My all-time favourite in the literature of exaggerated claims on behalf of the digital 
computer is from John McCarthy ... [who] says even 'machines as simple as 
thermostats can be said to have beliefs'. ... I once asked him: 'What beliefs does 
your thermostat have? ' And he said: 'My thermostat has three beliefs - it's too hot 
in here, it's too cold in here, and it is just right in here. ' 
161 Putnam reports (1988, pp 270- 1) - 'Many years ago I was at a symposium with one of the most 
"famous names" in Al. The famous name was being duly "modest" about the achievements of Al. 
He said offhandedly, "We haven't really achieved so much, but I will say that we now have machines 
that understand children's stories. " I remarked, I know the program you refer to" (it was one of the 
earliest language recognition programs). "What you didn't mention is that the program has to be 
revised for each new children's story. " (That is, in case the point hasn't been grasped, the "program" 
was a program for answering questions about a specific children's story, not a program for 
understanding children's stories in general. ) The famous name dropped the whole issue in a hurry. ' 
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Searle invites us to be shocked; but why? (Is it worse to say a thermostat has beliefs 
than to say a computer has beliefs? ) The charge has something in common with 
Dreyfus' complaint about the removal of the scare quotes: that a conceptual 
confusion is introduced. McCarthy, however, is not trying to elucidate the concept 
of 'belief , he is trying to reduce the concept to an operationally useful one. 
However, are these all cases merely of wilful exaggeration, or is it possible to see 
them as differences of disciplinary interest? A comment by McCarthy (1979)"' 
suggests that they may be both at once: 
Ascribing beliefs to simple thermostats is unnecessary for the study of 
thermostats, because their operation can be well understood without it. However, 
their very simplicity makes it clearer what is involved in the ascription, and we 
maintain (as a provocation to those who regard attribution of beliefs to machines as 
mere mental sloppiness) that the ascription is legitimate. 
A difference in interests or what is interesting (cf 6.1) might be suggested, for 
example, in the value put on simplification, which is useful for McCarthy but for a 
philosopher like Searle is a way of missing the point. However, this passage also 
confirms the impression that McCarthy and some other Al researchers enjoyed 
provoking their critics. 
This raises the question of the relation of a discipline as a discursive community to 
the slightly more ephemeral groups which inhabit disciplines, and may be 
charactensed as 'provocative' or 'boring', and so on. For example, an outsider may 
miss ajoke that is 'obviously' ajoke to insiders - however, while this may be a test 
of community, it is not usually likely to be a test of disciplinary competence. 
Moreover, just because McCarthy was being provocative, this does not mean that 
Searle was wrong to be provoked (being provoked in such circumstances can be a 
way of reasserting the seriousness of the issue). McCarthy"s provocation may be 
wilful (he didn't have to insist on thermostats being intelligent) but it is not divorced 
from the performance of discipline as a discursive community - and nor is Searle's 
(shock'. A similar point may be made concerning the relation between the 
performance of discipline and claims about machine intelligence. Putnam (1988), as I 
mentioned (above 6.1) distinguished between the engineering achievements and 
"' I accessed this paper in its web, rather than its paper version. The page reference for the web 
version is page I of www-formal. stanford. edu/jmc/ascfibing/node4. htn-d. 
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philosophical claims of Al, arguing that Al had done little that was of any 
philosophical interest. In the same paper he went on to say (p 277): 
[AIrtificial Intelligence as we know it doesn't really try to simulate intelligence at 
all. Simulating intelligence is only its notional activity; its real activity is writing 
clever programs for a variety of tasks. 
What is captured by the phrase 'notional activity) is the way in which the simulation 
of intelligence is available to be invoked as the aim of Al, but that it is also possible 
to distance the discipline from that aim by explaining technical aims in technical 
terms. Because the 'technical' explanation is only available for use with a very 
specific (ie technically trained) audience, the explanation in terms of the simulation of 
intelligence was used by Al researchers, in lieu of being able to to give a rigorous 
(technical) explanation. In this sense, it might be said, it was always a boundary 
explanation, carrying with it assumptions about the priority of the technical, which 
configured the reader either as an insider who is complicit in the compromise 
involved in a non-technical explanation, or an outsider who is either nervous or 
hostile, or thrilled at the fantastic future. The danger of this strategy was that the 
reader would hear the claims as outrageous (as, from some perspectives, they were). 
In the context of a discussion of technology transfer, however, the general reader and 
the philosophical reader are less important than an audience of industrial strategists 
and policy makers. Were these audiences being sold the intelligent machine or just 
some very clever programming? I address this in the following chapter. 
Vaux, J Chapter Seven 
CHAPTERSEVEN 
INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES: Al AS 
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY 
7.0 Introduction 
My assumption in this thesis (cf 2.4) has been that communication between 
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discursive communities involves both a history of representational practices and a 
multiplicity of socio-rhetorical purposes and achievements. In chapters Four to Six I 
have explored some of the explanatory practices deployed by Al researchers and 
those speaking on their behalf, looking at differences between the way Al was 
explained to general readers and to technical readers (4.1; 4.2), and how attempts 
were made to build alliances with other disciplines, and to forestall rivals and critics 
(5.1; 5.2). In addition, I have shown how attempts were made to manage the 
perceived 'slipperiness' of the concept of 'Intelligence', and in doing so to control the 
reader (6.2). 1 discuss some of the general theoretical and analytical issues raised by 
this study in Chapter Eight. My purpose within the case study, however, is to 
consider the communication involved in technology transfer narrowly understood (cf 
2.4), that is: how was Al explained to, and understood by, industrial users and 
policy-makers? In this respect, Chapters Four to Six serve a dual contextual 
purpose: on the one hand to provide a broader context of comparison or contrast, to 
help in the analytic perception of formulations specifically deployed in the narrower 
sense of technology transfer; on the other to locate those formulations within a 
history of explanatory practices. In addition, Chapters Four to Six also serve to 
provide a fuller picture of the way that social relations are performed through 
communication between discursive communities. However, my aim is not to 
present the history of explanatory practices as a chain of influences, like a biblical 
genealogy. My intention is to show how different sorts of explanatory practices 
were deployed in different specific contexts and used to co-produce, say, audience, 
community, facts, authority, reassurance (and so on, in any number of 
combinations). The generalisation that I wish to make is that the socio-rhetorical 
aspects of explanation are not 'rhetorical' flourishes, or 'cultural' weaknesses which 
could and should be dropped in the interests of accurate communication. I return to 
this in Chapter Eight, arguing that the model of technology transfer as the passing of 
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neutral or discrete items of knowledge is flawed in its understanding of the social 
practices of communication and sets up an inappropriate ideal of communication. 
In the preceding chapters, I have (in historical terms) gone some way beyond the 
point when Al was first brought to market, that is, in the early 1980s. One reason 
for this, again, is to give a fuller picture of the variation in explanations of A15 within 
a changing historical context. However, it may be useful briefly to locate the first 
attempts at exploiting Al in the early 1980s in relation to some of the events and 
discussions covered in earlier chapters. In particular,, in terms of the discussion in 
Chapter Five, it may be noted that in 1980 the 'symbolic paradigm' was at its height, 
and connectionism, in the guise of perceptrons, was widely considered a dead end. In 
terms of publications: McCorduck's evangelising history had been published in 1979; 
and for technical audiences The Handbook ofAl (Barr and Feigenbaum, 198 1; 1982; 
Cohen and Feigenbaum, 1982), was in process of being completed. My aim in this 
chapter is to look at texts describing Al to industrial and political audiences, asking 
how it was explained and understood. I begin (7.1) by looking at some of the ways 
in which Al was explained to industrial researchers, configured as technical 
colleagues, particularly through The Handbook ofAI. I then ask how these 
discussions may be compared to the explanations given in some of the early 
'technology transfer' events of the 1980s, which targeted another element of the 
industrial audience,, the corporate executive and business community. I draw 
particularly from a book based on a colloquium organised by the MIT Industrial 
Liaison Program (Winston and Prendergast, 1983), asking both about the terms in 
which Al was described and how the audience was configured. In 7.2 1 look at texts 
produced by and for the policy making community, asking in what terms Al was 
represented as a strategic technology. I draw on policy discussions including 
government publications (such as the Alvey Report, DOI, 1982), industrial 
conferences (eg SPL, 1983) and some publications addressing a more general audience 
(eg Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1983). Finally,, in 7.3,1 draw the case study 
together by returning to the question of the failure of Al. as represented by members 
of the industrial Al community, asking how their diagnosis (Al failed because it was 
oversold) should be understood in the light of the variety of ways in which Al was 
g sold' (as shown in Chapters Four to Seven). 
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7.1 What computers can do: non-numerical computing for an industrial 
audience? 
I have previously (Chapter Five) suggested that symbolic processing provided a 
loose but unifying description of Al within the context of cognitive science, and 
discussed the extent to which this unifying description may have been reinforced by 
the (temporary) abandonment of neural nets as a possible model of intelligence. Such 
descriptions and distinctions were invoked within internal discussions, in textbooks 
for students (new members of the community) and in overviews that enabled the 
community to reflect on its own position. There is another distinction which the 
symbolic paradigm served to enforce, and that was the distinction between Al and 
the rest of computer science. The history of Al can be told as part of the history of 
computer science, or in opposition to it. For example, Feigenbaum famously"' told 
McCorduck the story of his simultaneous introduction to Al and to computing, as a 
member of Simon's graduate seminar in 1956. Simon announced to the seminar that 
over Christmas he and Allen Newell had invented a thinking machine. Feigenbaum 
recalled (McCorduck 1979, p 116): 
And so we said, 'Well, what do you mean by a thinking machine? And in particular, 
what do you mean by a machineT In response to that, he [Simon] put down on the 
table a bunch of IBM 701 manuals and said, 'Here, take this home and read it and 
you'll find out what I mean by a machine. ' ... 
So we went home and read the manual - 
I sort of read it straight through, like a good novel. And that was my introduction to 
computers. 
In a later telling of the story, Feigenbaum (1992, p 194) reports that he stayed up all 
night reading the computer manual, and 
as the dawn came, I rose a born-again computer scientist, though of course the term 
had not been invented yet, and would not be for another decade. 
This is the Al researcher as computer scientist. Most of the public histories of Al, 
however,, emphasise the difference between Al and other approaches to computing. 
Simon, for example, told McCorduck (p 129) about a visit to an air defence lab in 
Santa Monica in 1952: 
But that air-defence lab was really an eye opener. They had this marvellous device 
there for simulating maps on old tabulating machines. Here you were, using this 
thing not to print out statistics, but to print out a picture, which the map was. 
Suddenly it was obvious that you didn't have to be limited to computing numbers - 
This anecdote is repeated in Simon (1991) and Feigenbaum (1992), in both cases they reference 
McCorduck 0 979). 
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you could compute the position you wanted a spot to appear on a piece of paper. You 
could print pictures with things that weren't even a modern computer, just old card 
calculators. 
Al researchers tended to claim for themselves the insight that computers could do 
more than crunch numbers as Claude Shannon complained to McCorduck 
(describing a conference held at MIT during World War 11) (pp 100- 10 1): 
You may say [it] isn't artificial intelligence, that it's a different thing, but I see that 
as everybody trying to find the farthest reaches of computers. We realised that 
this was a lot more than an adding machine, a much more general and powerful tool 
than that. 
Shannon's complaint testifies to contemporary assumptions among Al researchers 
that Al constituted a 'break' from numerical processing (and incidentally indicates 
that there are other histories available). 
In The Handbook ofAl, a distinction between numeric and symbolic computing was 
introduced at the beginning of the first volume, in explaining the purpose of the book 
and identifying its intended readers (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1981). Theeditorsfirst 
explained the need for such a book in terms of 'bridge building' to other disciplines 
(including 'our own colleagues in computer science' (p xi)), as a source of texts for 
college courses, and as a means of educating industrial researchers. They explained (p 
12): 
Most scientists and engineers, though very knowledgeable about the 'standard' 
computer methods (eg numerical and statistical methods, simulation methods), 
simply had never heard about symbolic computation or Artificial Intelligence. 
That is to say, the point of the book was given as explaining symbolic computing to 
those already proficient in numeric computing. In addition to identifying its 
readership as being largely from the world of numeric computing, The Handbook also 
configured its readership as one for whom it was appropriate to explicate specific 
concepts by reference to more familiar computing ideas. An example of this is the 
explanation of AI programming languages by reference to familiar programming 
languages. In the introductory overview to the section on Al programming languages, 
volume two of the Handbook (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1982, p 3) explained that, just 
as Fortran and Cobol provide'higher level algebraic and business primitives, 
respectively', so Al programming languages provide higher level concepts for 
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demonstrating and developing Al ideas. " The Handbook went onto explicate 'Al 
ideas' in terms of the manipulation of symbols rather than numbers. It stated (p 3): 
The first and most fundamental idea in Al programming languages was the use of the 
computer to manipulate arbitrary symbols - symbols that could stand for anything, 
not just numbers. 
At the same time, the article also appealed to the needs of its readers as 
programmers, and remarked on the excellence of Al programming languages as 
programming environments: 
Most Al programming languages, in addition to supporting many quite novel high- 
level features, offer splendid environments for writing, debugging and modifying 
programs. 
The more detailed articles focused on technical explication, in which the more general 
explanation of what Al is would be out of place, and references to the symbolic 
paradigm tend to be absent within the technical articles. Nonetheless references to 
the symbolic are to be found in the introductory explication of a broad range of Al 
sub-fields, "' and may be said to provide a unifying description of the field, which 
also implies the radical novelty of the approach. 
Besides describing Al as a radical new approach to computing, the Handbook also 
presented Al as opening up a novel range of applications, primarily expert systems. 
However, in adducing the use of (or need for) expert systems, the Handbook had 
resource not only to the claim that Al was non-numerical computing, but also to the 
idea that it was concerned with simulating human behaviour (that is, the distinction 
between Al and the simulation of behaviour was not insisted on in this context). 
The authors of the overview claimed (p 79) that the field of expert systems aimed at 
a general understanding of 'the nature of knowledge': 
"' The Handbook explains (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1982, p 3): 'Al programming languages have had a 
central role in the history of Artificial Intelligence, serving two important functions. First, they aflow 
convenient implementation and modification of programs that demonstrate and test Al ideas. Second, 
they provide vehicles of thought- as with other high-level languages, they allow the user to 
concentrate on higher level concepts. Frequently new ideas in AI are accompanied by a new language 
in which it is natural to applV these ideas' 
"' The role of the symbolic in explicating Al programming languages has been mentioned. The 
symbolic paradigm was used in explications of expert systems ( Barr and Feigenbaum, 1982, p 79)- 
'These systems were designed to manipulate and explore symbolically expressed problems... ' and 
expert systems, are both referred to in this section. Another example is in natural language 
processing (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1981, p 227): 'The computer, like the human mind, has the 
ability to manipulate symbols in complex processes, including processes that involve decision 
making based on stored knowledge. It is an assumption of the field that the human use of language is 
a cognitive process of this sort. ' 
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both in terms of formal representational systems and as an essentially social 
phenomenon - knowledge as something that must be shared and transferred between 
men and machines. 
And they implied (p'80) that the goal of expert-systems design was to produce a 
system which would be quasi-human: 
For an expert system to be truly useful, it should be able to learn what human 
experts know, so that it can perform as well as they do, understand the points of 
departure among the views of human experts who disagree, keep its knowledge up to 
date as human experts do (by reading, asking questions, and learning from 
experience), and present its reasoning to is human users in much the way that 
human experts would Oustifying, clarifying, explaining and even tutoring). 
The need for such systems was given rather broadly in terms of supporting experts, 
replacing experts and knowledge archiving. In the context of the Al debate (as 
discussed in Chapter Six), some critics of Al challenged the coherence or feasibility of 
such claims. However, in the context of technology transfer some slightly different 
questions arise concerning the need for such a system, or how specifically the need 
for it is construed in the text. Whereas the reader as computer scientist was argued 
into accepting Al as a good way of programming, the reader as user of Al was 
presented with a future that is discontinuous With her present working life, in which 
computers are co-workers rather than tools. Indeed, even from a computer science 
point of view, this involved a number of what Feigenbaum and McCorduck (1984, p 
156) described as 'scheduled breakthroughs'. One problem with this view of the 
future is that it was arbitrary, other futures might happen. Another problem is that 
it failed fully to enrol users in construing new needs. However, the Handbook was 
not addressing users, but systems designers and programmers. 
One problem in explaining Al to industry was that industry was not a homogeneous 
audience. That is, it was not enough to sell Al to industTial systems designers; 
corporate executives had also to be convinced. This audience became important to 
the Al community during the early 1980s when technology transfer conferences and 
books began to be produced, explaining Al to a corporate audience. One early 
example was a colloquium organised by NUT's Industrial Liaison Program in 
collaboration with an investment banking firm (F Eberstadt and Company). The 
papers and edited discussion from this colloquium were later published as The A] 
Business. Commercial Uses ofArtificial Intelligence (Winston and Prendergast 
Vaux, J Chapter Seven 134 
1984). " The colloquium included speakers from the MIT Al Lab, from Al vendor 
companies, from user companies (including Schlumberger and DEC) and from two 
venture funding companies. "' Recognition of the specific interests of corporate 
(entrepreneurial) listeners was signalled in an overview address by Patrick Winston, 
then Director of MIT's Al Laboratory, which opened with the words: 
The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter. The 
secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the 
Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial 
purpose). 
Randall Davis (an associate professor in the MIT Al Lab) warned the audience that 
expert systems were slow to build, "' and that very few had yet been fully 
implemented. He said (p 27): 
On a scale from a gleam in somebody's eye to wide commercial use, five systems 
have reached the stage of commercial use. 
The five systems identified by Davis as in commercial use included two of the 
earliest, Macsyma"' and Dendral"' (both started in 1965); the other three were 
Stearner, "' RI (otherwise known as XCON) and Dipmeter Advisor. XCON (which 
was developed and used by DEC for configuring computer systems) and Dipmeter 
Advisor (developed and used by Schlumberger for log analysis in oil exploration) 
were both the topics of papers given at the colloquium, along with a description of an 
experimental medical diagnosis system (Caduceus). Arnold Kraft of DEC (p 42) 
stressed both the regular use and the benefits of XCON: 
We have used XCON daily in our plants since 1980. So far XCON has analysed nearly 
20,000 unique orders and is running now with 95 to 98 percent accuracy. It has 
... The Al topics discussed at the colloquium went beyond expert systems, and also included 
discussion of robotics and some other topics such as natural language front-ends. 
""' The Preface to the book (Winston and Prendergast, p 1984) explains that the purpose of the 
colloquium was 'to bring together four groups of people. one group to supply the academic 
perspective, another group to represent the hard core, financially oriented people, a third to represent 
the industrial research and development people who can look at the questions from both sides, and a 
fourth to represent solutions-oriented people, who use Artificial Intelligence without admitting it, 
because there is a job to be done. ' 
"' He estimated 'at least five man-years of effort' for 'a substantial expert system' (Davis, 1984, p 
26). 
... Macsyma was designed to assist in the solution of mathematical problems. According to the 
Handbook (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1982, p 143): 'Macsyma is used extensively by hundreds of 
researchers from government laboratories, universities and private companies throughout the United 
States. ' 
Dendral assisted chemists in identifying molecular structures. 
This is described in the Glossary to Winston and Prendergast (1984, p 316) as: 'Experimental 
instruction system that teaches propulsion engineering. ' The qualifier 'experimental' raises a 
question as to whether it was in real use. 
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become an indispensable and effective business tool. 
For a corporate audience, the expert system is judged in terms of cost-effectivenessý 
not 'intelligence'. 
172 
A further problem of marketing Al to industry was also illustrated by two 
presentations at the MIT colloquium, given by representatives of venture funds 
(William Janeway, from the investment bank Eberstadt and Frederick Adler from 
Adler and Co), both of whom were sceptical about the value of selling products as 
Al. Adler (1984, p 258) distanced himself from the very idea that his company had 
financed Al: 
Someone recently told me that he understood my company put more money into 
Artificial Intelligence than any other company had. I told him that I did not know 
what he was talking about. We have not put a dime into Artificial Intelligence. 
Adler's point was partly that the companies he invested in were at best 'on the edge 
of Artificial Intelligence', but partly that investments in Al companies would be 
based on the same decisions as for any other companies. "' Nonetheless, his remark 
is reminiscent of the advice 'Don't tell the client it's Al' (cf 3.3). Janeway (1984, p 
266) remarked on a paradox in corporate perceptions of Al: 
Beyond a small number of industrial projects and a comparable number of 
missionary entrepreneurs, we found widespread disdain of Artificial Intelligence and 
even more widely spread ignorance among a variety of people who in fact were 
engaged in projects recognisably similar in purposes and even in approach to 
artificial intelligence programs. What is Al? We formulated a tentative 
proposition: Artificial Intelligence ceases to be Artificial Intelligence when it enters 
the real world, at which point it becomes something like advanced Computer Science. 
In this passage, Janeway obliterates the difference between Al and computer science 
- suggesting that 'Al projects' were at least similar to some non-Al projects - and 
also appears to reinvent the 'moving boundary' of Al remarked on in 6.2 It is 
interesting, therefore, to compare Janeway's description of the moving boundary of 
172 XCON became something of an iconic case study, as an expert system that was in use and saving 
DEC money. Eventually most of the computer mainframe manufacturers adopted similar systems. 
The UK computer manufacturer ICL claimed that its system SD Adviser saved it 15 million a year 
(AEN, Nov 1987, pp 2-3). 
" In illustrating the commercial questions, Adler (1984, p 260) asks- 'Is the need large enough so it 
will be reproducible in volume? Can it reach the $50 million figure? Is the team good enough to do 
it? Is the management profit oriented? If the motive is to bring Artificial Intelligence into the 1980s, 
or something romantic like that, that is wonderful, but if not done at a profit, it will not happen. It is 
a waste of time. ' 
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Al with a rather similar description by Minsky (1988, p 
307)171 
, made shortly after 
the remark (quoted in 6.2) that 'intelligence' describes 'the moving horizon of our 
growing understanding of how minds might work': 
Indeed, from yet another point of view, I sometimes think of Al as 'the current 
frontier of computer science'. ... Then, in that view, Al is simply finding ways to 
make computers do the useful things that no one yet knows how to make them do. 
This lazy comprehensiveness has one annoying side-effect of making Al's cumulative 
reputation subject to a continual 'exponential decay' - wherein each achievement 
fades away to be credited to some other speciality. "' 
For both Janeway and Minsky here, the moving horizon is not related to the 
semantics of 'intelligence'. It is a phenomenon related to the academic discipline and 
its relation to computer science and to industrial implementation. In Minsky's 
description, the loss of sub-fields makes AI a field of no achievements (which is a 
problem in relation to institutional requirements of accountability), but this could 
perhaps be explained simply in terms of its fast development, a problem of success. 
Janeway's point (pp 269-271) is slightly different and contains a moral for those 
selling Al (a caveat vendor rather than a caveat emptor): 
[I]n the financing of any technology high enough to lie beyond the comprehension of 
the vast majority of potential investors, the guiding rule should be caveat vendor, 
let the seller beware, for it will be the seller who will be called to account once the 
hype has ended ... 
It is interesting how the word 'hype' is introduced into the argument. Janeway's 
advice was to avoid investment in Al as Al. "' However,, he deploys the trope of 
the moving boundary not simply to represent Al as an unproven technology, but as 
an unprovable technology, a technology that will always be too new to judge and 
which (therefore) will always involve mis-selling or hype, since once it can be 
realistically evaluated it will no longer be'Al'. Insofar as Janeway accurately 
"' The original publication date of Minsky's article was before 1985.1 am quoting from a collection 
of papers reprinted from Al Magazine, entitled Readings from Al Magazine, 1980-1985 (Engelmore, 
1988). It is not therefore clear whether Minsky or Janeway has precedence on this particular 
formulation of the moving horizon. However, the question of precedence does not seem to me to be 
an interesting issue here; the interest is in the specific differences in how each deploys this 
formulation. 
"" Minsky (1988, p 307) gives a number of examples of the decay of subfields: 'In Al's early days 
we were concerned with recognising patterns of many kinds. Today, "pattern recognition" has 
become a separate field; it has journals of its own, nor will Al journals accept papers on that subject. 
Similarly a new field of "symbol manipulation" emerged from Al research efforts like our 
MACSYMA project, now seen as in the field of 'symbolic applied mathematics "., 
176 1 Janeway concluded his paper (p 271) with the words: 'Only some pieces of the future of Artificial 
Intelligence should be financed [... ] and those may be the ones that by definition no longer are 
Artificial Intelligence. ' 
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reflected the views of industrial investors,. these remarks suggest that the Al 
community failed to retain full control of its audiences in the context of technology 
transfer: the claim that this was an effective new form of non-numeric computing, 
capable of cost-effective application, met a sceptical audience. 
7.2 The fifth generation as the future of computing 
During the early 1980s a number of 'fifth generation' computer funding programmes 
were set up around the world which identified Al as providing the paradigm for the 
future development of computing. The identification and promotion of Al as a 
strategic technology suggests an approach to technology policy which is nowadays 
often dismissed as 'picking winners' (cf Henkel et al, 1999, p 190). The texts that I 
look at in this section are all concerned with technology policy but range from books 
for a general readership (such as Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1983 (1984)) to 
policy texts produced by committees for an audience of policy makers and academic 
researchers. In between are some texts which were accessible to general readers but 
address rather specialist interests; for example, books produced by individuals with 
personal knowledge of the Japanese programme (Moto-oka and Kitsuregawa, 
19 84)"' or the Alvey programme (Oakley and Owen, 19 89)" , and conference 
proceedings (eg SPL Insight 1983; 1984). In this section I ask how Al came to be 
identified as a strategic technology by policy makers. That is to say, in what terms 
was Al identified as a strategic technology, who was convinced (who was the 
configured audience) and what was the context in which the identification of a 
strategic technology was made? I ask these questions with particular reference to the 
UK Alvey programme. This is partly because the Alvey programme may be seen as 
taking place at an interesting moment in the history of UK technology policy, and 
partly because the discussion round the Alvey programme is relatively well 
documented and provides snapshots of some of the terms through which fifth 
generation programmes were argued for. 
... Tohru Moto-oka, professor of Electrical Engineering and director of the Computer Centre at Tokyo 
University, was chairman of the Fifth Generation Computer Systems Project and the National Project 
of Scientific Super Computers. Masaru Kitsuregawa was a member of the parallel processing 
mechanism working group of the Fifth Generation Computer Project. 
17' Brian Oakley was Director of the Alvey Programme from 1983 to 1987 (and previously Secretary 
of the SRC), Kenneth Owen was a freelance writer and editor of Alvey News, the newsletter published 
by the Alvey Directorate. 
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UK science policy in the early 1980s was still governed by the ideas of the 1971 
Rothschild report whereby government supported applied research on a contractual 
basis,, and basic research in responsive mode (cf Tisdell, 1981)"9, and industrial 
policy was still influenced by the approach introduced by Tony Benn in the 1960s 
of support for a single chosen company in each sector. In this context,, the Alvey 
Programme is often represented as a significant move towards collaborative research 
involving multiple industrial and academic partners (Guy and Georghlou, 199 1, pp 
153-6, Oakley and Owen, pp 97-98). Faulkner and Senker (1995, pp 14-15) note 
several trends in the period from about 1980, including an emphasis on university- 
industry links and a growing stress on the exploitation of publicly funded science. 
Among these trends, they comment on a conflict between, on the one hand, the 
Thatcherite emphasis on minimising government intervention and, on the other hand, 
an increasing tendency towards directed (as opposed to responsive) research through 
strategic programmes such as the Biotechnology Directorate and the Alvey 
Programme. Oakley and Owen (p 8) trace criticism of responsive mode science 
funding back to lann Barron's membership of what was then the Science Research 
Council (SRC)"' in 1974. "' However, they also remark (p 40) that in comparison 
with funding programmes in the US (such as the DARPA Strategic Computing 
Initiative which was funded on a contractual basis) and in Japan, the Alvey 
Programme was not regarded as 'directed'. In 1980, early in the period of the 
Thatcher government, Kenneth Baker (then a backbencher) called for a national 
strategy for information technology. "' Baker presented a ten-point plan concerned 
with mechanisms for developing a technology strategy and for exploiting the results. 
His first demand was for a Minister for Information Technology. By 198 1, not only 
"" Tisdell (198 1, p 130) comments 'Recent developments in British science policy can only be 
understood by reference to the Rothschild Report'. 
"' The Science Research Council became the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC) in 
April 198 1. In 1993, following publication of the white paper Realising Our Potential (OST, 1993), 
the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) was created. 
"' Barron (who went on to found the semiconductor company Inmos) said he was 'appalled' at the 
procedures of the SRC and told Oakley and Owen (1989, p 8)-. '1 proposed that instead of what they 
were doing, which was peer review of arbitrary programmes, there should be some directed research. 
There should be a specific goal, and the research should be directed by SRC with specific targets. 
People should be requested to do particular items of research, rather than coming up and saying 
"We'd like to play in this area". ' 
"I Baker presented a paper entitled National Strategy for Information Technology in June 1980 at an 
Online conference on telecommunications. The paper is said to have been written in consultation 
with the Chairman of Logica, Philip Hughes (cf Oaklev and Owen, 1989, pp 10 ff). 
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had this position been created, but Baker himself was installed in it. 
193 
1A 
In the search for a UK IT strategy in 198 1, funding for Al might not have seemed a 
prime candidate, given the legacy of the Lighthill Report (1973)"' for the SRC. 
Lighthill criticised research in Al (suggesting, among other things that it was not a 
unified field) and his report led to ftuiding cutbacks, especially in robotics work led 
by Donald Michie and Richard Gregory at Edinburgh University. "' Itisworth 
remarking briefly on the terms in which Lighthill criticised Al, since this involved him 
describing the field in terms of his own categories, or what he called the 'A, B5 C of 
AK On Lighthill's account, A stood for Advanced Automation; C for Computer- 
based research into the Central Nervous System; and B stood for a Bridge between A 
and C, and also for Building Robots (I am following Lighthill's own use of upper case 
here). He suggested (p 13) that A and C were legitimate areas of research (even if 
likely to have a high failure rate), but that B 
raises doubts about whether the whole concept of Al as an integrated field is a valid 
one. 
Interestingly, much of contemporary work in Al could have been placed under 
category A, particularly work that was later called 'expert systems"" ; LIghthill 
expressed guarded approval for Heuristic Dendral (p 11) in particular, and more 
generally (p 4) for: 
combining a well structured knowledge base and an an advanced problem solving 
capability. 
Indeed, when I interviewed him in 1986 (NRN, Feb 1986, p 3), he claimed that his 
report correctly predicted the fruitful aspects of Al. He said: 
I think my report may have helped by damping down the enthusiasm for a particular 
way of trying to go forward - by cooperation between biologists and computer 
scientists. 
In the report, he objected equally to claims that Al represented 'another step in the 
"' Baker was the second Minister for IT. Adam Butler was the first, lasting only two months 
(November and December 1980). 
"' The Lighthill Report was presented to the SRC in July 1972 and published by the SRC in 1973, 
with replies by the Al community. 
"' I remember that in informal discussion, the Lighthill Report was often characterised as a personal 
attack on Donald Michie. Cf also a remark to that effect by Feigenbaum and McCorduck (1984, p 
202). 
"' I am not sure exactly when the term 'expert systems' came into use, but it seems to have been in 
the late 1970s. it is used in the Handbook (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1982); but not by McCorduck 
(1979), although she discusses Dendral (calling it a 'knowledge-based system') and some other 
systems that were later known as'expert systems'. 
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general process of evolution' (p 14) and to two particular topics within robotics - 
'hand-eye co-ordination' and 'visual scene analysis' (p 7) - which are (in 1999) still 
considered advanced research areas. "' The tone of his report, however, seems to 
have been at least as important as its content. Eight years after publication of the 
Lighthill report, in 1981, a group of UK researchers met to try to 'rehabilitate !, M 
and to suggest an SERC specially promoted programme (SPP) in Al; John Taylor'18 
told Oakley and Owen (p 15): 
We were sitting around a table wondering what to call this new area. [ ... 
I Should we 
call it artificial intelligence? We didn't want to call it artificial intelligence because 
of all the Lighthill connotations, and we didn't want to call it expert systems, and 
we came up with this awful phrase 'intelligent knowledge-based systems' or IKBS. 
The plan for an SPP was merged into the Alvey programme, and the phrase IKBS 
survived into Alvey. How was IKBS transformed from a field in need of more 
support, to the focus of a strategic technology programme? Part of the answer, at 
least, has to do with the spate of fifth generation programmes that were instituted 
around the world in 198 1. Indeed,, it was explicitly claimed in the Alvey Report 
(DO15 1982, para 1.2): 
The catalyst to the formation of the [Alvey] Committee was the unveiling last 
October of Japan's Fifth Generation Computer Programme. 
This, however, raises the question of how the Japanese programme acted as a 
catalyst, or in what terms it was adduced in justification of the Alvey Programme. 
The idea that the Japanese Fifth Generation Computer Programme (FGCP) led to 
other fifth generation programmes around the world is open to a number of 
interpretations. Feigenbaum and McCorduck in their lobbying book, The Fifth 
argued that US dominance in computing was under threat from Japan Generation, il 
while conceding that the US was actually some way ahead of Japan. They set the 
tone in the first chapter (1984, pp 13-14): 
Today we dominate the world's ideas and markets in this most important of all 
modern technologies. But what about tomorrow? 
Moto-Oka and Kitsuregawa (1984, pp 8-10) listed six fifth generation projects 
around the world which they claimed were a 'response' to the Japanese FGCP: the 
I am grateful to Paula Gomes for confirming this latter judgement. 
Taylor at that time was head of the Command Systems Division of the Admiralty Surface 
Weapons Establishment and also Chair of the Computing and Communications Subcommittee of the 
SERC Information Engineering Committee. 
Vaux, J. Chapter Seven 141 
Alvey Programme in the UK; DARPA's Strategic Computing Initiative, and an 
industrially-funded collaboration centre, the Microelectronics and Computer 
Technology Corporation (MCC) in the US; the European Community's plan for the 
Esprit project and funding or projected funding in Germany and France. This list of 
fifth generation projects was reasonably well established, in the sense that it is 
repeated elsewhere (cf, for example, the proceedings of SPL Insight, 1983, which 
included presentations from, or descriptions of, all these projects). However, there is 
some variation in the extent to which those various projects were justified by 
mention of the Japanese FGCP. The DARPA Strategic Computing Programme 
announcement (1983), for example, described itself as 'new generation' rather than 
'fifth generation' and did not mention the Japanese FGCP. Indeed, DARPA 
'insiders' apparently told Feigenbaum and McCorduck (p 303) that the Japanese 
announcement had 'simply served to sharpen' ideas they already had. The Alvey 
Report, by contrast, had recurrent references to the Japanese programme, including 
(as noted above) citing It as the catalyst for the Alvey Committee meeting. It also 
mentioned the content of the Japanese programme and summarised the aims (paras 
1.3; 3.18). However, the Japanese programme was not the only one remarked on by 
the Alvey report; it cited the existence of programmes elsewhere as a reason for 
mounting a UK programme (para 2.18)1": 
The US, Japan and countries in Europe are now all mounting programmes comparable 
to the one we propose for the UK. These rival programmes present a serious 
challenge to the UK, which we must face. 
It seems that the number of fifth generation programmes being planned (of which the 
Alvey Programme was itself one of the earliest) became aJ ustification for proceeding 
with the Alvey Programme. Indeed, it might be said that the list of fifth generation 
programmes provided (was available as) justification for each of the constituents of 
the list. " 
There was some overlap between the various fifth generation programmes. The 
common themes included areas that were usually recognised as Al, but the idea of the 
"' The paragraph quoted is from the executive Summary. The point was made at more length in 
Chapter Three of the Report (DOI, 1982). 
"' This may be said also of the Japanese programme, as may be seen from the deployment of the list 
by by Moto-oka and Kitsuregawa (pp 8-10), as noted above. That the list provided Justification for 
each of the programmes, does not mean that it was necessarily deployed as justification, in particular, 
it appears that DARPA avoided such a justification for its Strategic Computing Programme (cf the 
comment bv Feigenbaum and McCorduck, p 303, noted above). 
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fifth generation was also linked (more or less closely) to developments in hardware. 
Before asking about the terms in which Al was linked to the fifth generation, it is 
worth looking briefly at how the computing generations were adduced, and how the 
'fifth' was formulated. There are some variations in the way that the generations 
were described and these may be indicated by looking at the descriptions given by 
Moto-oka and Kitsuregawa (pp 31-32) and by Feigenbaum and McCorduck (pp 31- 
32)"' . Both sets of authors agree on the first three generations: the first generation 
was based on valves or vacuum tubes; the second on transistors; and the third on 
integrated circuits (chips). Both agreed that, at the beginning of the 1980s, the third 
generation was just coming to an end and that the fourth generation would be based 
on contemporary developments in chip technology in which an increasing density of 
logic elements were integrated on a single chip, known as large scale integration (LSI) 
and very large scale integration (VLSI). "' Moto-Oka and Kitsuregawa describe the 
fourth generation as based on LSI, commenting (p 32) that 'we might say that we are 
just entering the era of the fourth generation'. Fifth generation computers, they 
suggested, would be based on VLSI which they dated as coming into full use in the 
1990s. Feigenbaum and McCorduck, however , identified VLSI as the 
fourth 
generation commenting (p 3 1) that 'VLSI will dominate during the 1980s'. The fifth 
generation, for Feigenbaum and McCorduck involved the abandonment of a serial or 
von Neumann architecture. They said (pp 31-32): 
instead there will be new parallel architectures (collectively known as non-von 
Neumann architectures), new memory organisations, and new operations wired in 
for handling symbols and not just numbers. 
Indeed Moto-oka and Kitsuregawa also saw the fifth generation as involving the 
development of parallel architectures and hard-wiring for symbolic operations. Both 
sets of authors also described fifth generation computing as involving a software 
revolution, based on then current work in Al, which they described as knowledge 
information processing systems or KIPS. The major difference between the two 
descriptions, then, related to forecasts of when VLSI chips would come into use and 
is partly an indication of the lead that the US had in this technology. The field of 
VLSI was a major component of the Alvey Programme, despite a minority on the 
The coincidence of page numbers is a coincidence, not a typing error. 
Adrian Stokes (1986) in his Concise Encyclopaedia of Information Technology, describes LSI as 
'A technology for constructing computer components in which a high packing density of logic 
elements is achieved on a single chip (of the order of 10,000 per square inch). ' 
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Committee who thought that, as a enabling technology for IT in general (and not just 
for Al), VLSI had no place on a fifth generation programme (cf Oakley and Owen, p 
284). 
All the fifth generation programmes included constituents that were described as Al. 
The Alvey programme was based on four'enabling' technologies of IKBS, VLSI, 
software engineering and NM"' or man/machine interface. The Alvey Report (DOI, 
1982, para 3.6) said: 
We see these priority areas as basic enabling technologies. We have had little 
difficulty in identifying them or the associated infrastructure and systems which 
link them. Necessary for any electronic based activity is secure access to world 
class software tools and technology together with the design tools and technology 
for Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI). Also essential for IT is a leading edge 
knowledge of handling information - especially what is now developing as Intelligent 
Knowledge Base Systems (IKBS) - and of the interaction of man with machine (MMI). 
While the choice of areas is represented as obvious and consensual, Oakley and 
Owen (1989, pp 38-42) report some of the criticisms and disagreements expressed 
among the policy making community about this choice of four areas. These included 
criticism (from Philip Hughes of Logica and Ian Barron of Inmos) about the failure to 
include a programme devoted to computer architectures so that, as Hughes put it, 'the 
work on architecture subsequently had to be cobbled together by stealing from other 
programmes'. That is, discussion among members of the policy making 
community"' (in committees or elsewhere) involved difference and disagreement, 
but the statements in the report suggest consensus and unity. While this may again 
suggest that the difference is audience, with a unified position deployed in a public 
document (cf Chapter Four), it is also worth considering the institutional purpose of 
government reports, that is, to recommend policy. A report that reflected 
differences of opinion (as opposed to claiming to have satisfied diverse opinions) 
would fail as a decisive policy recommendation, and in addition would lack authority, 
would fail to inspire confidence and would give ammunition to opponents and 
"' Now more usually described as Human Computer Interface or HCI (to avoid the gender-specific 
connotations of'man') - however NM was the name used within the Alvey programme, and I 
therefore retain it. 
"' By members of the policy making community I refer primarily to those who were involved on 
conunittees but more broadly also to those whose views were sought through various consultation 
mechanisms. The Mvey Committee included individuals representing academia, industry and 
government. 
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Treasury officials for arguing against its implementation. In this context, terms 
which come to represent a consensus are likely to be further strengthened by 
repetition. Just as the list of fifth generation programmes could serve to justify the 
individual programmes, so the selection of the four programme areas by the Alvey 
Committee strengthened the authority of each one of them. This may be seen in the 
report of a workshop sponsored by SERC and the Department of Industry (SERC- 
D%P 1983)19' to begin developing a programme in IKBS, following the 
recommendations made by the SERC proposal for an SPP, the Alvey Report and 
another IKBS review meeting organised by the SERC in 1982. After identifying 
future developments in IT as being driven by innovations in software rather than in 
hardware, the report (p 3) went on to state 
The foundations for ways round these problems, 1116 and hence for the next major 
advances in computing, have been laid by research in artificial intelligence, 
software technology and man/machine interaction, coupled with work on novel 
approaches to computer architectures. [... ] The term 'intelligent knowledge based 
systems' (IKBS) has been coined to denote the first main generation of these 'semi- 
intelligent' systems that will emerge during the next few years. 
In the next paragraph (pp 3-4), the report ftwther underlined the significance of 
IKBS: 
[ ... ] The likely significance of IKBS for all industrial nations has been pointed out 
recently by a number of major initiatives including the Japanese Fifth Generation 
Computer Project, the Alvey Report, the SERC IKBS proposals and the EEC Esprit 
programme. All these agree that IKBS will become an increasing major part of 
Information Technology as a whole and IKBS are therefore likely to be of enormous 
economic significance for all industrial nations. 
It seems that a consensual authority had become attached to the idea that Al (fKBS) 
represented the future of computing. 
"' The workshop, known as the IKBS Architecture Study, was chaired by John Taylor and sat 
between December 1982 and May May 1983. 
'9' The report (p 3) had identified a'software crisis' in 'limitations inherent in the current 
"conventional" approach to specifying, designing and programming complex systems'. 
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7.3 The importance of not being extreme 
If the policy discussion was, as I suggested in the previous section, driven by 
consensus and an accruing consensual authority, there remains a question whether 
influences from the surrounding, non-policy discussions of Al were drawn on in 
policy discussions to justify and explain Al. In particular, since it is one of the 
alleged causes of the supposed problem of overselling Al,, did the question of 
machine intelligence play any part in these discussions? On the whole, policy 
discussions tended to eschew these questions in preference to technical descriptions 
and appeals to the authority of academic opinion. "' However, some broad 
questions about the value of fifth generation computing were raised in the context of 
a House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities into the ESPRIT 
programme (HOL 1985). On the first day of evidence (28 June 1984), the first 
witness was Brian Oakley, Director of the Alvey Programme. The Earl of 
Halsbury 118 (p 3) asked for explanation of the aims of the fifth generation computing, 
complaining: 
In the early days of computers a very few very distinguished people could specify 
on a sheet of paper what they were trying to do [ .... ] and always there was a 
concrete something at the end of the road they were trying to build, a piece of 
control software they were trying to write, and so on. I find the difficulty is in 
assessing what is going on in the extreme abstraction with which all these schemes 
are ascribed. [ .... 
] 
Oakley replied: 
Underlying perhaps all of what are called the Fifth Generation projects is a certain 
relatively limited number of objectives. 
The first that he mentioned was 'conquering the problems of parallel computers'), 
which he discussed briefly. He then continued: 
But the excitement lies in the new areas which are now beginning to become 
practical, of which the most important probably is what is known as inference 
"' Of the texts discussed in the previous section, the only exception to this is Feigenbaum and 
McCorduck's (1983) book, but this in any case is somewhat orthogonal to the policy discussion (and 
one way of approaching the question might include asking whether and in what terms Feigenbaum 
and McCorduck's book is adduced within policy discussions). 
"' Lord Halsbury had previous experience of the field of Al. He had in 1963 been in charge of setting 
up a specialised computer board in the predecessor organisation to the SRC, the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). Fleck (1982, pp 183-184), who had interviewed Halsbury, 
claims that this board gave early support to AI following a report by Donald Mchie Oust returned 
from a visit to the US): 'Michie's report indicated a widespread positive assessment of the potential 
of Al among young computer scientists and this undoubtedly formed the basis for the proportionately 
generous funding by the computing broad of the SRC for research in the area during the mid to late 
1960s. ' 
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computing which differs from normal computing, which is based on the laws of 
arithmetic and [E3]oolean algebra by being more like the way the human being reaches 
decisions, where the human being thinks of the problem, probably has some degree 
of abstraction of rules for dealing with that problem, even if the human does not 
realise that he weighs up a whole number of uncertainties because the chances are 
that the 'facts' on which he is trying to make a decision are far from being facts, 
and finally, infers what the right thing to do is. Well, it is now becoming possible 
through the developments of the Artificial Intelligence community to tackle such 
problems in computers. There is no question that this will influence the whole 
development of society. Computers will find a vastly increased range of 
applications through this type of computing. 
This paragraph seems to be making a claim about the possibility of machine 
intelligence, based on a theory of human reason, and using it to predict the future of 
computing. Under further questioning, Oakley also suggested that human-like 
computers would avoid the mistakes of humans,, "' but conceded that professional 
knowledge might be more difficult to encode than the knowledge of technicians. A 
hostile critic might identify a danger of exaggeration. A member of the committee, 
Lord Kearton, remarked: 
I agree very much with the tenor of Mr Oakley's answer. It seems to me to be at an 
entirely different level than this rather vague talk of artificial intelligences. 
Oakley responded to Kearton: 
I have to say, that I believe that the artificial intelligence community, though it has 
done us a great service in pushing forward the techniques, has done us a great dis- 
service in trying to draw close parallels with the way human beings work. There is 
no doubt that we are vastly inferior in our machines to the capabilities of even the 
most uneducated of human beings. 
What is interesting in this interchange is that, although Oakley initially did nothing to 
pre-empt hostile criticism (cf the practices described in 6.2), Kearton effectively 
invited him to do so. Oakley then distanced himself from what he implies is a more 
extreme position of drawing 'close parallels with the way human beings work', and 
assigned that position to 'the artificial intelligence community One of the points 
of interests of this sort of interchange is the suggestion that what is to count as an 
exaggerated claim need not relate to the content of the claim, but to the way in which 
log He said (p 4): 'One of the joys is that if the laws of arithmetic are fight, then, in general, 
computers will reach the right answers, providing one looks after small problems like the rounding 
errors. ' 
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it is presented: as if disclaiming exaggeration is a means of avoiding it. ' In this 
respect, the above interchange is similar to the remarks by Dr Payne quoted in 6.2 (p 
119) where, as I suggested, a preliminary disclaimer is used to pre-empt accusations 
of extremism. 
One of the implications of the position adopted by Oakley (that AI machines are 
intelligent like humans but not nearly to the same level) is that it enables intelligent 
machines (machines that are as intelligent as humans) to be represented as the 
ultimate or extreme case. This may be compared to explanations of expert systems 
in the IKBS Architecture Study(SERC-DOI, 1983, p 3), which represents the current 
generation of IKBS or expert systems as 'first generation' and "primitive: 
The term 'intelligent knowledge based systems' (IKBS) has been coined to denote the 
first main generation of these 'semi-intelligent' systems that will emerge during the 
next few years. 
Primitive examples of such 'applied Al' systems already exist as commercial 
systems doing not-trivial tasks, in particular the so-called 'expert' systems. 
Here the importance of IKBS is represented, not simply in terms of what they may 
be shown to be doing now, but as a beginning: a 'first' generation implying N 
succeeding generations; a 'primitive' system implying more sophisticated ones. In 
this case, without invoking claims of 'intelligence' (except in the name, IKBS), a 
trajectory is implied. In Chapter One, I briefly discussed the argument (Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Dosi, 1982,1984) that 'technological trajectories' may be understood 
as beliefs held by the developers of technology. Nelson and Winter (p 259) also 
point to the pervasiveness of the idea of technological trajectories in the economic 
literature: 
[I]n any era there appear to be certain natural trajectories that are common to a 
wide range of technologies. Two of these have been relatively well identified in the 
literature: progressive exploitation of latent economies of scale and increasing 
mechanisation of operations that have been done by hand. 
The idea of a trajectory, whatever its faults as an explanatory mechanism (cf 
MacKenzie., 1992, pp 30-35), is one that is familiar in discussions of technology in 
the economic and policy literature. There is, as MacKenzie suggests, an implication 
of technological determinism in the concept of technological trajectory, an 
... This is quite a common form in ordinary speech - but can act as an excuse as much as a 
disclaimer, eg, 'I don't want to be rude but ... 
' 
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assumption that the trajectory will be followed. My interest here, however , is how 
the practice of representing a technology in terms of a tTaJectory, acts to situate that 
technology as having a progressively important future - as the Architecture Study 
does in the case of IKBS. Further, as the remarks by Oakley demonstrate, the 
assumption of a trajectory may in effect also be applied to the simulation of 
intelligence in such a way as to both enhance the importance of IKBS (which may be 
represented as more intelligent than conventional systems) but at the same time 
attempt to disarm a hostile critic (ie that this claim is not 'extreme, it is not claiming 
that the system will be as intelligent as humans). 
The trajectory of intelligence - seen as the future of computing - also relates to the 
construction of user needs. I noted above, in 7.1 , that when it came to construing 
user needs, The Handbook ofAl (Baff and Feigenbaum, 1982, p 80) represented a 
useful system as a human-like system. DARPA's Strategic Computing Programme 
was also based on the assumption that human-like computers would be useful. In 
the programme announcement (DARPA, 1983, p 1) it claimed: 
In contrast with previous computers, the new generation will exhibit human-like, 
'intelligent' capabilities for planning and reasoning. The computers will also have 
capabilities that enable direct, natural interactions with their users and their 
environments as, for example, through vision and speech. 
Using this new technology, machines will perform complex tasks with little human 
intervention, or even with complete autonomy. Our citizens will have machines that 
are 'capable associates', which can greatly augment each person's ability to 
perform tasks that require specialised expertise. Our leaders will employ 
intelligent computers as active assistants in the management of complex 
enterprises. As a result the attention of human beings will increasingly be available 
to define objectives and to render judgements on the compelling aspects of the 
moment. 
Similarly, in describing the purposes of the Japanese FGCP, Moto-oka and 
Kitsuregawa (1984, pp 80-82) claim: 
The first thing that users can expect from fifth generation computers is that they 
will be easy to operate. To achieve this, not only will the human-machine interface 
have to be 'near human' in nature, but the computer itself will also have to possess 
scommon sense', ie common knowledge on a par with that possessed by humans. 
Further: 
The second capability that users can expect from fifth generation computers is that 
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they will gradually assume the monotonous, boring jobs now being done by humans, 
thus freeing the user to devote him/herself to more complicated and challenging 
tasks. 
The construed needs (human-like computers) and the assumed trajectory 
(increasingly intelligent computers) therefore seemed to support one another. 
Interestingly, insider critics of Al, and others in the business of advanced systems 
design, frequently attacked the construed needs of the Al story, arguing that what 
was required was better tools not more human-like systems (cf Cooley, 1980; 
G6ranzon and Josefson, 1988; Rosenbrock, 1989; Winograd and Flores, 1986). 
The question nonetheless remains whether the policy makers of the fifth generation 
computing programmes (or the Al research community before them) can justifiably 
be blamed for overselling or misdescribing Al as the future of computing in the 
1990s. From the perspective of the late 1990s, this is not a straightforward question 
to answer. If the question concerns the development of 'intelligent' computers, then 
we may look around and not see any; however, this was only to be expected from 
what we have learned about the moving horizon of ascriptions of intelligence (cf 
section 6.2; Minsky, 1959; 1988; Woolgar, 1985; 1989). If the question concerns 
the application of Al, then again we may look around and not immediately see Al in 
use. However, it may also be argued that there are a number of socio-rhetorical 
mechanisms at work acting to render Al invisible. These include another case of a 
moving horizon, this time the moving horizon of Al (cf section 7.1; Janeway, 1984; 
Minsky, 1988), as well as the prevalence of deliberate marketing strategies not to tell 
the client it's Al (cf section 3.3; 7.1). If the question concerns the application of 
expert systems (IKBS), then the answer may refer either to the perceived limitations 
on expert systems (cf the remarks by Patric Taillibert reported in 3.3) or to 
widespread use of rule-based or knowledge-based systems as one more tool for 
systems designers. It's worth also noting in respect to both these answers, that 
expert systems are no longer 'Al' - that is, they are no longer deployed in tasks 
considered Al (which are mostly connectionist projects), and where they are used, 
they are not considered Al. This may be illustrated by the following paragraphs 
from the FAQ (frequently asked questions) section of IBM's Deep Blue web page, 
put up following Deep Blue's victory over chess champion Gary Kasparov in 1997: 
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Its strengths are the strengths of a machine. It has more chess information to 
work with than any other computer, and all but a few chess masters. It never 
forgets or gets distracted. And it's orders of magnitude better at processing the 
information at hand than anything yet devised for the purpose. 
'There is no psychology at work' in Deep Blue, says IBM research scientist 
Murray Campbell. Nor does Deep Blue 'learn' its opponent as it plays. Instead, it 
operates much like a turbocharged 'expert system, drawing on vast resources of 
stored information 
What is interesting about this interchange is that the answer 'No' is justified by a 
description that includes the system's access to 'information' and its similarity to an 
I expert system'. More generally, it may be said that the technology of Al (as 
described for example in The Handbook ofAI), that is, the programming languages 
(such as Lisp and Prolog) and paradigms (such as rule-based programming and object- 
oriented programming) continue to be used, although they are not (as the fifth 
generation programmes claimed they would be) at the strategic heart of computing in 
the 1990s. However , it is also often argued that the contribution of Al to computing 
cannot be measured simply by what counts as Al, but that it has had a hand in most 
aspects of computing advance (cf for example, Minsky 1988). Many specific 
predictions of the fifth generation programmes are difficult to evaluate, such as the 
claim that by the 1990s personal computers with human-like interfaces would be in 
widespread use. Is that true or false? The PCs on our desks in the 1990s are not 
based in Lisp or Prolog as the fifth generation programmes predicted. However, we 
do mostly have personal computers on our desks, which was a radical prediction in 
the early 1980s. Do they have human-like interfaces?. Well, at least one document 
explaining the Japanese FGCP (Stewart, 1985, p 55) identified the Apple 
Macintosh as the first Al computer: 
The Macintosh [ ... ] is designed from the bottom up to handle object-oriented 
programming, making it a perfect environment for 'windowed' software, 'icon' 
languages and graphics in general. 
Windows, icons and graphics are all familiar on our desktops,. all based on work from 
Xerox Palo Alto Research Centre (PARC), which Stewart (p 55) describes as 'one of 
the seminal centres of Al research', first taken up by Apple then reproduced in 
Microsoft Windows. This might be said to be a good reason for describing familiar 
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computer systems of the 1990s as 'Al' and 'fifth generation'. At the very least, 
these interfaces have acted to make DOS line-command interfaces look like something 
from a previous generation. 
Where then, was the hype? In the variety of predictions associated with the Al 
research community and fifth generation computing programmes, it is possible to 
identify some that seemed particularly outrageous when made; and some that may 
be argued to have come about and some that may be argued to have failed. Perhaps 
'hype' is to be identified in the provocative style adopted by some Al researchers (cf 
6.3); however, this tone was avoided in technology transfer contexts, where Al was 
justified through academic authority and national expediency (cf 7.2); and it was also 
avoided in the industrial marketing of Al (cf 3.3; 7.1). Perhaps 'hype' is to be 
identified in the outrageousness of particular claims, but then these claims have had 
variable outcomes: the claim that a computer would one day beat the world 
champion at chess, for example, was for many years considered one of the most 
outrageous claims (and chess machines were one of the targets of Dreyfus (1979) 
attack on Al). Now that it's happened, this claim cannot be considered 'hype. For 
the critics, in the context of the Al debate (cf 6.1), the claim that computers would be 
(or already were) intelligent was an example of 'hype'; however, this accusation can 
be partly dissolved in substantive differences and in differences in disciplinary 
interest (cf 6.3); more importantly, claims of machine intelligence were largely 
suppressed in the context of technology transfer (cf 3.3; 7.1). Perhaps 'hype' is 
located in the melodrama of some of the public histories (cf 4.1); but again this tone 
was avoided in marketing Al. 
If the hype seems always to disappear (at least as an agent of 'the problem of Al'), 
it may be more fruitful to notice the way in which speakers positioned themselves in 
relation to 'hype', that is to say, at a distance from it, It might be said that 'the 
hype is always elsewhere', echoing an observation by Woolgar (1985, p 563) that, 
according to the responses given by scientists to ethnographic visitors, 'the science is 
always elsewhere'. However, while it may be odd to find scientists locating the 
science as elsewhere, it is not so odd to find speakers distancing themselves from 
hype. The interest is in the way in which locating the hype as elsewhere acts to 
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signal the measured judgement of the speaker. This position was all the more 
available in the case of Al because of a history of provocative statements by some 
members of the academic Al community - starting, perhaps, with McCarthy's choice 
of the name 'Artificial Intelligence' which failed to be 'sober and scientific' (cf 4.1), 
as well as the exotic scaremongering of some the narratives for general readers, from 
early stories of 'electronic brains' to Al claims that computers would be our 
evolutionary successors (cf 6.2). 
Earlier in this section, I quoted a remark by Oakley (HOL, 1985, p 4) , in which he 
made such a distancing move: 
I have to say that I believe that the artificial intelligence community [ ... I has done us 
a great dis-service in trying to draw close parallels with the way human beings 
work. 
I previously suggested that this move (like the one made by Dr Payne of Decca 
Radar (NPL, 1959, p31; cf 6.2)) involved the pre-empting of criticism through the 
disclaiming of a reading that might otherwise be made - that is that Oakley was trying 
to draw close parallels with the way human beings work. Now, however, I am 
making a further point to do with the performative proprieties of technology transfer 
discourse,, where distancing oneself from hype acts to justify the speaker's authority, 
contributing to a tone of sober and realistic assessment. A similar move was made, 
for example, by the investment banker William Janeway (1984) when (as I noticed in 
7.1) he identified Al with hype and recommended avoiding investment in Al as Al. 
To summanse my argument in this section: in the history of explanatory practices 
associated with Al. invocations of 'intelligence' and of similarities between humans 
and computers have played a recurrent role; however, in the context of technology 
transfer this history has been deliberately marginalised, not only through avoidance 
of the terms, but through identifying them as 'hype' and locating them as elsewhere. 
This suggests that it cannot straightforwardly or crudely be argued that exaggerated 
claims of the computability of intelligence led to exaggerated predictions of the power 
of Al and fifth generation computing which led to the undermining of the Al industry 
when these claims and predictions could not be met; further I also suggested that 
most cases of claimed'hype' could in any case be argued. This does not entirely rule 
out a more sophisticated version of the argument; I have for example noted that 
'intelligence' was sometimes treated as a trajectory, so that the simulation of 
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intelligence could simultaneously be represented as'hype' (and as elsewhere) and as 
the direction of development. However, a more sophisticated version of the 
argument would involve recognising that communication between discursive 
communities is based in the performance of social relations, and is not a case merely 
of the passing of knowledge between social groups. This is the thesis that I have 
been arguing throughout the case study, and I provide a detailed summary account of 
the arguments in Chapter Eight. 
7.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have looked at explanations of Al in the context of technology 
transfer, that is, explanations which primarily address an audience of industrial 
customers and political funders. In section 7.11 suggested that the industrial 
audience was not configured as homogeneous: that industrial researchers were 
addressed as fellow-researchers and given a privileged (technical) explanation; while 
corporate executives who were being asked to invest in the technology (primarily by 
adopting it) were given explanations in terms of needs (applications) and in terms of 
4 proven' examples of implemented systems. The corporate audience, on this 
account, appeared to be (and was configured as) sceptical and conservative. By 
contrast, explanations of Al for a policy-making audience (7.2) adduced that same 
conservatism as a problem for a nation that needed to stay ahead of, or as close as 
possible to, the competition. In this context, explanations of Al tended to rely on 
citing academic authority and asserting (and thereby revalidating) a consensus on the 
strategic importance of Al as the 'fifth generation' of computing. Finally (7.3) 1 
suggested that for this audience the idea of machine intelligence and the possibility of 
simulating human intelligence was not frequently invoked; and usually invoked to be 
denied; and that this undermines the crude argument that academic hype was 
responsible for undermining the Al industry. The more general purpose of this 
chapter, as in the earlier chapters of this case study, has been to challenge the idea 
that technology transfer involves the passing of knowledge which in principle, if not 
or all audiences. I present an in practice is available in some neutral, single narrative f 
over-arching review of the case study in the final chapter (Chapter Eight). 
Vaux, J Chapter Eight 
CHAPTER EIGHT. 
ANALYTIC AND THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
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In this chapter I conclude my thesis with an overview of the arguments and material that 
I have presented. I begin (in 8.1) by restating the issues raised in chapters One and 
Two in the light of the examples and interpretations offered in the course of the case 
study. In 8.2 1 recap the issues and conclusions presented in the case study and then 
draw out a number of relevant themes. Finally, in 8.3.1 ask to what extent and in what 
way the findings are generalisable, and also what outstanding questions are suggested for 
further research. 
8.1 The analytic and methodological framework 
In Chapter One I began by noticing the variety of different disciplinary interests 
apparent in discussions of technology transfer and drew out two main themes: the first, 
associated particularly with the school of evolutionary economics, concerned ways of 
theorising the impact of technological innovation and stressed the uncertainty of 
technological outcomes; the second, associated with science and technology policy 
studies, included an interest in modelling links between social groups and in the 
movement of knowledge, and suggested an unresolved question concerning the local 
appropriation of knowledge. I noticed that in the case of both these themes it is 
possible to draw parallels With discussions in science and technology studies (STS) in 
relation to an interest in the uncertainty of technological outcomes. In the light of 
discussion in Chapter Six (especially section 6.1), it is relevant to emphasise some 
differences in disciplinary interest apparent in the way that the three disciplinary fields 
approach the question of uncertainty in these discussions. For evolutionary economics 
(cf section 1.1) the uncertainty of technological outcomes is both a problem for 
economic actors (the impossibility of making a fully rational choice) and an important 
level of explanation in the macro-economic model, where the behaviour of firms in 
attempting to manage uncertainty is adduced as a cause of discontinuities (economic 
growth or collapse). In STS, by contrast, the uncertainty of technological outcomes has 
been explained (Pinch and Bijker, 1989) in terms of the power of users to determine the 
meaning of artifacts (what they are and what they are for) and provided an important 
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contribution to an ongoing sociological debate concerning the relationship between the 
social and the technical. In attempts to model technology transfer as the flow of 
knowledge between social groups (cf section 1.2), differences in local uptake of 
knowledge may be understood in terms of interpretive flexibility and provide a possible 
contribution to understanding and managing problems associated with different local 
appropriations of knowledge. From an STS perspective,, the questions generated by this 
overview of issues may be summarised as relating to how actors judge technological and 
scientific products (in a broad sense of product)20' and how these products are 
appropriated locally - an issue that in this thesis I relate to questions of reading. In 
approaching these questions in terms of discussion within STS, it is possible to further 
criticise the 'social shaping' approach (mentioned above) as making an unwarranted 
assumption about the priority of the identity of users as social groups. In particular, 
arguments by Latour (1987) and Woolgar (1991) point to the creation of the user in the 
design of technological artifacts. However, this risks understating the persistence of 
local interests. I concluded Chapter One (in section 1.3) by suggesting that what is 
needed is a way of theorising social groups which allows for the co-production of 
artifact and user, as well as the persistence of local interests. I proposed that 
conceptualising technology transfer as involving communication between discursive 
communities might provide a way of remaining alert to the co-production of community, 
artifact and audience (user). 
My proposal to study technology transfer in terms of communication between 
discursive communities already implied some methodological parameters - In particular 
that I was committed to a discursive analysis - and I explored the main issues and some 
of the specific detail of this methodological approach in Chapter Two. I showed (in 
2.1) that ideas of performativity of texts are present through a number of approaches to 
STS (and in related disciplines), and argued that this provided a way of studying how 
discursive communities are performed through the negotiation of boundaries and through 
the co-production of community, audience and technology. In section 2.4 1 explored in 
more detail what this methodological approach implied for my selected case study 
(which I had introduced in section 2.2) and in the light of my ethnographic situation as 
an 'indigenous commentator' (discussed in section 2.3). 1 stressed that in my case 
study I was looking at the exploitation of Artificial Intelligence (Al) primarily as an 
example of technology transfer, rather than as a substantive claim about the possibility 
20 ' By a broad sense of 'product' I mean to include not only exploitable technological artifacts, but also 
new scientific knowledge, skills and the users and needs configured in the artifacts, knowledge and skills. 
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of machine intelligence. It is evident from the case study (especially Chapter Six) that 
the topic of ascribing intelligence to machines could not be entirely ignored, even in a 
discussion of technology transfer. However, my approach to the topic still maintained a 
distance 
, insofar as I discussed the ascriptions as explanatory practices, asking how they 
acted both to perform community and to configure an audience. This study produced 
some interesting material about both the explicit and implicit management of audiences 
which I discuss further below. The discussion of my own ethnographic situation 
(relevant because the case study is based on material gathered when I was working as a 
specialist journalist) showed that the methodological issue of ethnographic distance was 
itself related to questions of the discursive performance of community. This became 
particularly evident in Chapter Three, where I showed how the broad industrial Al 
community included a range of indigenous commentators who contributed to 
performative explanations of Al. In section 2.4 1 introduced the terms in which I 
would approach the task of studying communication between discursive communities as 
the study of explanatory practices, interpreted in relation to location, context and 
audience. I gave initial descriptions indicating that I took 'location' to refer to the social 
situation of the author of the text (ie as vendor, academic,, etc); I took 'context' 
paradigmatically to refer to the context of publication or production, but indicated that 
there might be further relevant senses, such as historical context; finally I took 
4 audience' to mean both intended and configured audience, where the intended audience 
referred to the author's or speaker's intention and the configured audience to the 
rhetorical mechanisms of capture. This distinction was exemplified in my discussion (in 
section 6.2) of the difference between the unintended hostile reader, who was 
nonetheless configured in attempts to pre-empt her criticism. 
8.2 Major conclusions of the case study 
In this section I recap the issues explored and the conclusions reached in the case study, 
chapter by chapter, as a preliminary to identifying some critical themes and issues that 
require to be made more explicit. 
The case study began (in Chapter Three) by looking at the explanatory practices of the 
industrial Al community, that is, how Al and in particular the Al market were 
explained and described in the period following its launch on the market (the 1980s and 
early 1990s). This chapter focused on explanations of the market, showing how 
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problems of the market were adduced in different contexts., but usually in terms that 
suggested a strategic solution. At the same time, it addressed the question of 
performance of community through the relationship of indigenous commentators to their 
audience. In 3.11 looked at a series of market reports, showing how early predictions 
of rapid growth gave way to recognition of a crisis, but a crisis that was represented as a 
bringer of realism and maturity in the industry (allowing further predictions of growth). 
Similarly, in 3.2 1 traced the strategic manoeuvres of the Al vendor companies, as 
represented by the Al newsletters, as they first abandoned the Al programming language 
Lisp in favour of the 'conventional' but widely installed language C, and eventually 
abandoned or marginalised the Al marketplace itself These strategic manoeuvres were 
accompanied by diagnoses of what had gone wrong (discussed in 3.3), and various 
assignments of blame, to the vendors (for overselling), to the customer (for being 
frightened of innovation) and more rarely to the technology (for being inadequate). 
Blaming the technology was not, however, common among vendors since it was difficult 
to distance their products from the technology. By the early 1990s, vendors frequently 
deployed the accusation of overselling, which could be used to make a distance between 
the immaturity of the early days of the market and claims of a mature and realistic 
industry that could now identify and avoid the early faults. I concluded Chapter Three 
by suggesting that the perceived problem of the Al market and its diagnosis in 
overselling contained an implicit theory of technology transfer as the passing of accurate 
descriptions between social groups. The diagnosis and the implicit theory of technology 
transfer therefore served as a starting point from which to question the history of 
explanatory practices associated with Al, asking whether, where and to whom Al had 
been oversold, and whether this could be linked to the alleged failure of Al. The theory 
implicit in the question was also to be set against my own working assumption that 
technology transfer involves the coproduction of community, audience and explanation. 
In Chapter Four I began (in 4.1) by looking at the early history of Al, in a study which 
contrasted the history of the field as told to a general audience with the more factional 
and divisive histories told to peer audiences. I noted that the public history told a story 
of destiny in which the birth of Al (in 1956) was marked by the coming together of the 
name, the main actors and the first Al programme. While this history (as exemplified by 
McCorduck's influential 1979 book) was robust in public contexts and was approvingly 
cited by members of the academic Al community, it was effectively denied by the 
stories told to peer audiences by the same researchers who acted as McCorduck's 
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witnesses. In 4.2 1 described some of the variations available histories told by Al 
academics for a peer audience, in which there were differences of opinion on the starting 
point of Al and the identity or significance of 'the first AI programme'. In addition, I 
noted that in explanations of Al for a peer audience, a distinction was usually introduced 
between Al and the simulation of behaviour which cut across the unified field described 
in the general histories. In 4.3 1 argued that it should not be concluded that the public 
histories distorted because they simplified, nor that the peer histories presented the 
differentiation of accurate detail. The variation in the histories was not entirely 
explicable in terms of being easy to understand, and histories for a peer audience did, in 
some contexts, provide a unifying narrative. 
In Chapter Five I explored the performativity of historical narratives, in the context of 
relations between Al and other disciplines which might be represented either as allies or 
as competitors, in respect both to intellectual authority and access to research funding. 
In section 5.11 showed how an interdisciplinary alliance, under the title Cognitive 
Science, provided a context in which Al was represented as united around the symbolic 
paradigm (or the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis, or PSSH); I argued that while 
(by the 1970s) this provided a way of representing Al as a unified field, in contrast to 
earlier habits of distinguishing between Al and the simulation of behaviour (cf 4.2), 
nonetheless,, distinctions remained available between Al and Psychology within 
Cognitive Science, and between a literal and a looser understanding of the PSSH within 
Al. In section 5.2,, 1 discussed a 'revisionist' history which denounced the 'official 
history of Al" as acting to promote a faction (a faction named in the revisionist history 
as "symbolic Al'). I argued that the revisionist history, the history of connectionism, 
might itself equally be exposed as factional, and that it was indeed a tool of whig history 
to disguise factional interest as neutral truth. I concluded, however, by pointing to the 
importance of a whig history in sustaining the identity of a discursive community. 
Chapter Six may be seen as addressing issues of reading (including attempts by the 
author to control readings), which complements the emphasis on narration in Chapters 
Four and Five. In this chapter I addressed the question which is often taken to be at the 
heart of the identity of Al: the claim that 'intelligence' may be ascribed to machines in 
the same way as to humans. However, I avoided the substantive question and looked 
instead at some of the socio-rhetorical mechanisms revealed by the claims and counter- 
claims concerning the computability of intelligence. In 6.1,1 argued that the Al debate, 
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as an interdisciplinary dispute (between Al researchers and philosophers), provides 
examples of the way that disciplines perform community through the reading of texts, 
displaying and maintaining disciplinary standards in the identification of issues and 
answers5 as well as practices of rigour in exploring those issues. My main example was 
the way in which the two disciplines differed in their readings of the Turing test, which 
for Al researchers was primarily read as a functional or operational definition, but for 
philosophers was taken to be significant as an explanatory example of philosophical 
functionalism. I suggested that this pointed to the difficulties inherent in communication 
between disciplines as discursive communities. In section 6.2,1 looked at ways in 
which Al researchers invoked claims about intelligence in explaining Al to different 
audiences. This included examples of attempts to manage a perceived difficulty, first in 
defining intelligence, and then of the 'slipperiness' of intelligence as an attribute 
(identified in STS as a case of interpretive flexibility). I argued that invocations of 
intelligence in explaining Al to different audiences may be seen as attempts (not 
necessarily conscious ones) to manage the reader through the exploitation of interpretive 
flexibility, together with differences in narrative register; however this may be sabotaged 
by the ultimate freedom of the reader, who may always read the 'wrong' text or read it 
in the 'wrong' way. I concluded by suggesting that accusations that the Al community 
wilfully exaggerated machine intelligence cannot be straightforwardly accepted, but may 
themselves involve a contest of inter-disciplinary authority. 
In Chapter Seven, I returned to the specific question of the market exploitation of Al 
(which I suggested in 2.4 might be identified as technology transfer, narrowly 
understood) and practices of communicating research products to an industrial and 
political (funding) audience. In 7.11 argued that the industrial audience or customer for 
Al was not homogeneously configured, but addressed either as a technical colleague or a 
corporate executive. For industrial researchers, an explanation in terms of programming 
technique was appropriate. However I argued that, for this audience, representations of 
the use or need for applications of Al fell back on talk of human-like systems. The 
corporate executive or financier, on the other hand, required to be convinced of the 
usability and cost-effectiveness of Al, preferably in tenns of proven or already 
implemented systems. This audience was adduced as sceptical and conservative, 
comparable to the industrial audience configured by Al vendors and systems designers 
as not to be told 'it"s Al' (cf 3.3). In 7.2 1 looked at ways in which Al was explained 
and justified as fifth generation computing, by and to policy makers , in the context of 
Vaux, J Chapter Eight 160 
national and international information technology strategies the early 1980s. I argued 
that in these texts fifth generation programmes were justified as strategic (and the future 
of computing) partly by an appeal to academic authority and partly by citing the 
existence of other fifth generation programmes, so that the list of fifth generation 
programmes acted as a self-justifying consensus. Finally, in 7.3 1 asked whether claims 
of machine intelligence had been adduced in explanations of Al in the context of policy 
discussions and for policy making audiences. I suggested that while such explanations 
were available and sometimes deployed, they were likely to be accompanied by 
disclaimers that down-played the claim in making it -a move also sometimes made by 
industrial researchers. I suggested that these disclaimers might also be deployed to 
imply a trajectory, where 'extreme' claims of intelligence might both be dismissed as 
hype and represented as the ultimate goal. These disclaimers of hype concealed the 
need to construct user needs in the marketing of Al on the assumption that human-like 
systems were the only future of computing. Finally, I concluded that the diagnosis of 
hype or overselling as the problem of Al, with its implied ideal of technology transfer as 
the accurate passing of neutral knowledge (cf 3.3), was too crude; rather, complaints of 
the overselling of Al were found at least from the earliest moments of attempts to 
exploit Al (in the early 1980s), and that these complaints acted then (as later) to present 
the speaker asa critical and credible judge of the technology. More generally, the case 
study provided evidence of the way in which social relations pervade communication 
between discursive communities; and this is one of the main issues to be emphasised in 
the following section. 
8.3 Contributions to the discussion of technology transfer 
In this section I draw out the significance of this thesis for the discussion of technology 
transfer. I first consider the status of my case study, as an interpretive analysis, before 
addressing the contributions made by my claim that communication between discursive 
communities inescapably involves the construction of social relations through the 
performance of community. 
One of the most difficult aspects of the interpretive approach I have chosen is to avoid 
speaking of the 'characteristic' explanatory behaviour of a discursive community. It 
becomes tempting to say 'academics say this' or 'policy makers say that, as if these 
were descriptions (or, worse, defining descriptions) of the behaviour of these groups. In 
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principle, I assume that it is open to a member of a discursive community to renegotiate 
the boundaries and terms of membership of a discursive community at any moment; 
however in practice one would expect to see continuity of explanatory behaviour, and 
indeed without some repetition and sharing of formulations it might become difficult to 
speak of a discursive community. Moreover , insofar as my case study is a form of 
anthropological study, I have been looking for such shared formulations within 
discursive communities. I have suggested, for example, that members of the Al industry 
explain Al in terms of market prospects (3.1; 3.2), or in terms of system specifications 
and target applications (3.2); that venture funders explain Al in terms of financial risk 
(7.1); that policy makers explain Al in terms of technological trajectories and 
international competitiveness (7.2; 7.3); and that Al researchers explain Al in terms of 
machine intelligence (4.1; 6.1; 6.2), which may be contrasted to or assimilated to human 
intelligence (4.2; 5.1), or in terms of the symbolic paradigm (5.1; 5.2; 7.1), or as an 
approach to programming (3.1; 3.2; 7.1). These different 'characteristic' explanatory 
practices are certainly important to my case, since they illustrate the more general fact 
that explanatory practices are relative to discursive communities and to their social- 
institutional location. However, my general argument is that discursive communities 
achieve their identity through a continuing negotiation of 'who we are' and 'what we 
do'. In this sense, a discursive community has no transcendent identity, at least for the 
methodological purposes of sociological interpretation. Nonetheless, it is not the case 
that anything goes in interpreting the explanatory practices of a discursive community: 
if, as Barbara Hermstein Smith (1988, p 9)12 argues, 'Evaluation is always compromised 
because value is always in motion', nonetheless any specific evaluation or interpretation 
cannot escape attempting to be accurately drawn or rigorously argued, if it is to 
convince. That is, for my general point to stand I need to have demonstrated that 
performative mechanisms are at work in the explanatory practices of the narratives that 
I have used in my case study; however, the general case only convinces through the 
accuracy of specific interpretations, and here I would stand by my anthropological 
211 
insights, at least until convinced by alternative interpretations. 
Finally, I address the question of what my study contributes to discussions of 
... These remarks were made in the context of an essay on evaluating Shakespeare's Sonnets (Hermstein 
Smith, 1988, pp 1-9). Nonetheless, they seem relevant to more general questions of interpretation, 
particularly in the light of the STS concern with interpretive flexibility (cf sections 1.2,6.2). 
203 It is possible to take the 'methodological horrors' (Woolgar 1988a) as implying that any reading is 
possible of a text and hence that the text 'has' no meaning. Here I am trying to avoid this implication 
by suggesting that while any particular interpretation can be challenged, this is not tantamount to a 
challenge to interpretation in general. 
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technology transfer or communication between discursive communities. In Chapter 
One I argued that there is a problem in the technology policy literature of describing the 
local appropriation of knowledge in technology transfer. I suggested that this was 
reflected in discussions in the STS literature, where the question might be posed as a 
problem of describing how users' needs are constructed through technological design (cf 
Latour 1987; Woolgar, 1991), while also allowing for the relative stability of some social 
groups involved in technology transfer. I suggested that this might be approached 
through conceptualising technology transfer as communication between discursive 
communities (cf Woolgar, 1994b), and developing this in terms of the idea of 
performance of community (cf Cooper and Woolgar, 1993), as well as Schegloff s 
(1972) description of the way in which selection and recognition of formulations of 
location may be used to test membership of a community. From this point of view, my 
central claim for my case study is that I have shown that the explanatory practices 
associated with Al are a site in which authors may do any of the following (in any 
combination): adduce who 'we' are (negotiate and maintain community); adduce what 
Al is,, and what it is for; and construe who the audience is and what they need or want 
to be told about Al (configure the user). In Chapter Three, for example, I showed how 
the indigenous commentators performed membership through their selection of issues 
(what counts as a 'story') that addressed the Al industry as audience as well as subject 
matter. In Chapter Four, I showed both how different narrative registers were relative 
to the construed audience, and that the identity of the field was not constant for 
different audiences. In Chapter Five, I showed how how different narratives of the 
history of Al acted either to compound power, by denying some available 
representations of difference, or to marginalise subfields by trying to suppress specific 
readings or groups of readers. In Chapter Six I argued that academic disciplines may be 
seen to perform community through imposing a preferred reading that marginalises other 
readings. I also explored some varying ways in which the Al research community 
handled attributions of 'intelligence' relative to audience (on the whole it figured in 
explanations for outsiders more than for insiders). While the latter point is specific to 
the case of Al (and it may not be easy to find equivalent attributes, even for other 
research areas making claims of radical social impact), the other examples illustrate a 
generalisable case concerning the performance of commUrUty in explanatory practices. 
This suggests that differences in understanding and explaining research products, relative 
to a discursive commuruty, are not aberrant cases, but are likely to pervade all 
communication between different discursive communities. 
Vaux, J Chapter Eight 163 
I also argued that, in the case of Al, there was no neutral or common description which 
could produce agreement across discursive boundaries. Both the industrial and academic 
Al communities frequently deployed a technical description of Al (in terms of 
programming paradigms, for example) to act as a minimal identifying description. For 
example, Ovum (1989) referred to a technical description to protect Al as knowledge- 
based systems from the human-like implications of the phrase 'expert systems' (cf 
3.1); and the The Handbook ofAl (Barr and Feigenbaum, 1981; 1982) deployed 
technical descriptions of Al as a form of programming, in enrolling industrial researchers 
as colleagues (cf 7.1). While these formulations may be said to have provided a minimal 
common identity for Al within the Al communities, I argued (in 7.1) that they failed to 
produce a common identity that could be agreed across discursive boundaries. In 
particular, they produced a construal of the applications of Al (as human like systems) 
which did not effectively produce agreement across discursive boundaries (for example, 
it was not necessarily obvious to corporate executives that these were a cost-effective 
solution for their immediate practical problems). At the same time, however, I 
suggested that the very futuristic feel of the construed applications, enabled political and 
industrial strategists to identify slightly less 'human' construals of the future of 
computing as a measured judgement. Again, some details of this story are not 
generalisable, and one of the generalisable lessons (the need to create or configure users 
for an innovatory technology) is already a familiar one (cf Latour, 1987; Woolgar, 
1991). What this case study adds, I would argue, is further understanding of the lure of 
technological determinism for technologists, and how this may act to close off the 
imagined future. Nelson and Winter (1982, pp 258-259) and Dosi (1984, p 15) take the 
closing off of the imagined future to be an explanation of relative stability in 
technological development. However, I have shown that the Al community was taken 
by surprise by the failure of Al markets,, because they supposed that human-like 
systems must be the future of computing, and that the applications of Al followed 
directly from the technology. The remark by The Spang Robinson Report (Aug 1988, p 
2) that 'Al is a technology not a market' (cf 3.2), and by Teknowledge on its 1999 web 
page that 'while Al is a very powerful technology, it is not an industry in its own right' 
(cf 3.3), may be read as acknowledging the limitations of a technical description to act as 
a carrier of a technical future. 
To conclude, I would also point out some more general implications for technology 
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policy of recognising that the performance of community is prevalent in explanatory 
practices and in communication between discursive communities. This challenges the 
assumption that differences in understanding, valuing and applying the products of 
research are in themselves a problem, or involve 'cultural') issues that need to be changed 
(cf Vaux et al, 1999). My discussion of the case of Al suggests that the local 
appropriation of knowledge is not an aberration but an element of both successful and 
unsuccessful communication between discursive communities. This suggests the 
possibility of more detailed analysis of the lessons of specific case histories. One 
interesting way to continue from the present case study would be a study of ways in 
which the Alvey Programme is now evaluated, both as a precedent and as a source of 
lessons, through interviews with government policy makers (past and present) and 
members of the Al community. 
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